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Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities

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1. Introduction

Commemoration and marking anniversaries has become almost daily practice in the post-war Kosovo. It seems that freedom of the country gave meaning not only to the present, but also to the past, making its remembrance a meaningful part of the social life.

The 40th anniversary of Philosophical and Sociological studies at the University of Prishtina was marked at the same time with the celebrations of 100th anniversary of Albanian independence. We thought to mark this anniversary in this context, since we were convinced that philosophical and sociological thinking plays a primary role in intellectual and cultural development of a nation and a society. Furthermore, this anniversary makes us reflect on our professional work until now and about the vision for the future, in both personal and institutional aspect. In an interview about the profession of sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu stated that it is the task of each sociologist to reflect on his person and not only on the society as a whole.

We understand that four decades of work in philosophical and sociological studies cannot be summarized in such a short review, as we are aware that within these 40 years we were not able to study the entire 2,500 years tradition of philosophical and social thinking. However, we will try to present some important moments and experiences of these studies in Kosovo, always taking into consideration the historical and socio-cultural context of their establishment and development.

Through a transversal approach, mentioning key figures of philosophical and sociological thinking in Kosovo, recalling their intellectual and professional contributions and describing the historic context of their work, we will try
to present how the work was conducted during these decades, who were the teaching staff and what were main curricular orientations of Department of Philosophy and Sociology and their successive departments.

2. The work experience and challenges over decades

Experience and challenges of these four decades of work of these departments cannot be separated from the overall experiences and challenges of Prishtina University. Each decade of work was particular regarding challenges that the University of Prishtina faced. Many of such challenges reflected directly in the work of the Cathedra, respectively on Department of Philosophy and Department of Sociology. Of course, describing in details all experiences and challenges would require a much broader study, but in this case we will mention some criteria, which may be used to indicate some periods of work of these departments, describing some specifics of these periods. There are several criteria based on which we may divide or categorize these periods, but we are presenting some of them, as in the table below:

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Table 1. Criteria for classification of periods.
In order to better understand the connection between these studies and social and historic contexts, and to better reflect changes made to curricula and study conditions, we will try to present work periods over decades. Each of the decades may be named not only by calendar years but also by challenges they represented in philosophical and sociological studies. Thus, the first decade may be considered as period of establishment and constitution; second decade as period of persecution and differentiation; third period as period of banning and discrimination; while the fourth period as a period of reform and development.

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Table 2. Classification of work by decades

2.1. The 70’s: Establishment and constitution

Social and historical context of this phase is characterized by constitutional amendments of the 70’s of the 20th century, through which Kosovo obtained
a pretty high level of autonomy. The 70’s in Kosovo mark a major social and political change. Establishment of University of Prishtina, massive education and change of constitutional position of Kosovo, generated the need for new cadres (staff) in all fields: state administration and sectors of politics, economy, education, health, etc.

Young people were very enthusiastic about studying in these fields. Over four hundred students were admitted in the first generation of students in Cathedra of Philosophy and Sociology. In addition to being driven by market demand, this undoubtedly was influenced by the dominant ideology of the time. Philosophical Marxist perspective of history and society was considered as the ‘crown’ of intellectual and ideological thinking, therefore its studying, inter alia, provided opportunity to be identified by the higher intellectual circles.

Kosova at the time did not have any tradition in philosophical and sociological thinking, therefore external influences, particularly those coming from Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, were very much present. The first cadres (qualified personnel) lecturing in these fields had mainly studied in those centres. A greater influence, particularly through the literature, came from Tirana, since the books in Albanian language that were published there were mainly selected works of classics of Marxism. During those years there was a cooperation agreement with Tirana University, therefore the influence from Tirana came also through direct contacts, and not only through books.

Studies in the whole University of Prishtina were in two languages, and the same was true for the Department of Philosophy and Sociology. What characterizes the method of studying of that time was mainly domination of theory and lack of empirical aspect. Even the methodology of the time was more theoretical (regarding epistemological approach, theoretical analysis and logical operations), but not regarding methods and techniques for collecting empirical data in the field.

This phase can be considered as the phase of establishment and constitution of philosophical and sociological studies in Kosovo, because in addition to lectures and academic debates that were conducted at University, we saw the beginning of translation and publication of well-known philosophical books, but also the writing of textbooks and authorial books by local authors. A library of «Philosophy – Sociology» was established in «Rilindja» publishing house of the time, which published texts translated mainly from Serbo-Croatian and
which covered the tradition of philosophical and sociological thinking from ancient to modern time.

### 2.2 The 80’s: Persecution and differentiation

The social and historic context of this phase is characterized by the situation created after the demonstrations of March and April 1981. University of Prishtina, which at that time was called University of Kosovo, was extremely politicized, as in fact was politicized the entire public and daily life in Kosovo. Students’ and people’s demonstrations of 1981, with major request for Republic of Kosovo, not only shocked the opinion, but shook the very foundations of Yugoslav state. A severe political, media and ideological campaign began in Belgrade the purpose of which was to degrade University of Prishtina and denigrate the Kosovo intellectual elite and student youth in general. The process that accompanied this campaign and which was lead by the party in power, the Communist League of Yugoslavia, was called “ideological-political differentiation” with the aim to punish, dismiss from university and imprison all those who supported and participated in the demonstrations, and who were labelled by the party as enemies of the people and the state. Ideological and political differentiation was only the first phase of lynching, because Yugoslav secret service immediately began with police persecution, fabricated processes and political imprisonments.

Department of Philosophy and Sociology was targeted by this campaign. In this regard, this phase of work of Department of Philosophy and Sociology, as well as of the University of Prishtina, may be considered as phase of persecution and differentiation. Professor Ukhshin Hoti was arrested and jailed, together with Shemsi Reçica, assistant professor, while Professor Fehmi Agani was dismissed from the University. A considerable number of professors in the entire university were dismissed from educational process and many of them were imprisoned.

In the professional development plan, philosophy and sociology studies were at considerable risk, not only because of imprisonments and dismissals of some of the staff, but also because of severe pressure put on all others. Cooperation agreements with Albania were terminated. Department did not offer postgraduate studies and new personnel had to go to other Yugoslav centres, mainly in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana to finish postgraduate master studies.
Another important aspect that characterizes this phase of work and which is related to program orientation is the tendency to make sociology empirical. Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, which at that time was part of Department of Philosophy and Sociology, made efforts to conduct various research activities. Study program included the course *Scientific Research Methodology* lectured by Professor Gjergj Rrapi, who was known for his inclination towards empiricism.

Library "Philosophy – Sociology" continued its publishing activity and in addition to translations from Serbo-Croatian, the library began to translate texts from French. In addition to Department and Institute that operated within the Faculty, magazine ‘Thema’ and Kosovo Association of Philosophers and Sociologists contributed in promoting philosophical thinking in Kosovo.

At the end of 80’s, political situation was becoming dramatic. The winds of democracy began to blow throughout Central and Eastern Europe, but in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, unfortunately there was a premonition that a real war was coming. Constitutional changes that abrogated Kosovo’s autonomy had incited strong oppositions. Repressive actions of Yugoslav security forces and police continued and as result of one of such actions two students were killed of Department of Philosophy and Sociology – Afrim Zhitia and Fadil Vata. Many others were forced to interrupt their studies, leave the country or emigrate abroad in order to escape the worse.

### 2.3 The 90’s: Banning and discrimination

Social and historic context of this phase is characterized by the abrogation of Kosovo’s autonomy and closing down of education in Albanian language at the University of Prishtina. Albanian students were not allowed to enrol in academic year 1990/1991. In the University of Prishtina, like in every other institution and work organisation, state repressive measures were introduced, that is, administrative measures taken by Serbian politics, which meant the suspension of legal governing authorities and taking under control of institution/organisation by another body which had exclusive authorizations to dismiss Albanian workers and restructure and manage arbitrarily such institution or organisation. State of emergency authorities in the University of Prishtina and in the Faculty of Philosophy began dismissing (expelling) Albanian teachers with justification that they are not needed, because education at the university would be held only in Serbian, and not in Albanian.
As we know, at that time parallel education in Albanian language began to be organized and the University was accommodated in private buildings (houses, basements, garages, etc). Initially, Faculty of Philosophy was transferred to the building of primary school “Zenel Hajdini” and then to “Asim Vokshi” that were in Kodra e Trimave neighbourhood in Prishtina, but later it moved to private houses (house of professor Sami Peja and his neighbours – Haki and Ramush Zeka) that were in neighbourhood Lagja e Muhaxhereve, near Bregu i Diellit in Prishtina.

At that time, University of Prishtina was almost completely isolated and without any possibility to get support or cooperation from other universities. It happened very rarely that visitors, journalists, human rights activists or even curious professors came to see how the education is conducted in private houses. It happened very rarely to organize debates or conferences that would address issues of scientific importance. Number of students was reduced because in addition to uncertainty for work and life, people began to migrate en masse towards the western countries. Uncertainty and lack of perspective was noticed at every step. The interest to study philosophy and sociology was reduced to minimum.

However, despite this situation, the University of Prishtina began reforming its curricula. The program of Department of Philosophy and Sociology was changed and several ideological courses were removed, such as The Marxist
Philosophy, Sociology of Self-government, etc., and some new courses were introduced which never existed before in the program of philosophy and sociology, such as: Social Ecology, Social Pathology, Sociology of Religion, Sociology of Family, Demography, Ontology, Anthropology, Human Rights, etc. More than introduction of new courses, curricular changes are characterized with profiling of studies. The curricula was developed in such a way so that the first two years would be common studies, while the third and fourth years would be divided into two main orientation: Philosophy and Sociology. The title of diploma obtained after finishing studies in Philosophy was: Professor of Philosophy – Sociology, whereas after finishing Sociology was: Professor of Sociology – Philosophy.

This period of work may be called period of survival and it ended with the war in Kosovo, or more precisely in its most dramatic phase – at the time massive ethnic cleansing of 1999, known as the Kosovan exodus. This is the time when professor Fehmi Agani was killed, professor Ukshin Hoti went missing, and some former students and secondary school professors of philosophy and sociology were killed: Muhamet Malsori from Malisheva, Gjergj Sokoli from Gjakova and Behajdin Hallaqi from Prizren.

2.4 The 2000’s: Reform and Development

Social context of this phase is undoubtedly characterized by the liberation of Kosovo and return to public buildings, that is, re-accommodation in buildings from which Albanian professors and students were banned in early 1990’s. The feeling of joy, enthusiasm and euphoria which was linked to freedom and hope; the feeling of victory and return to university buildings, was seen in faces of students and professors. Return to university buildings, arrival of numerous international organizations, contacts and cooperation with others, provided better conditions and new perspective for studies.

However, even this phase, especially in the beginning, was characterized by tendencies for controlling and directing the process that mainly came from UNMIK International Administrator for Prishtina University – Michael Daxner, who happened to be sociologist. After he received the title Professor at the University of Prishtina, as a typical administrator, more than a reform he wanted to have a ‘revolution’. He created the Department of Social Sciences, which according to him should consist of Political Sciences, Public Administration, Sociology and Journalism and which should work based on
Based on his competences, UNMIK administrator divided the Sociology from Philosophy in order to “re-establish” Sociology with a completely different program for which we had made no preliminary preparations, nor did we have the required information. He included himself in the education process in this program, as well as some of his colleagues, who were UNMIK mission members. This adventure had a high cost for Sociological studies in Kosovo, because from a theoretical-reflexive tradition that was established in cooperation with Philosophy now began a domination of highly practical-empirical approach. As result, Sociology became hyper-empirical and theoretical and reflexive thinking was marginalized, which more or less is continuing even today. However, all this transformation had something positive. It started opening and international cooperation; it returned the interest among people for studying sociology; the empirical research began; English, French books, as well as many other translations, particularly from Albania, began to arrive. The book “Sociology” of Anthony Giddens became the basic text for sociological studies in Prishtina University, replacing the text of the 70’s “The Basics of Social Science” of Ante Fiamengo, which explained the society based on the ideological scheme of dialectic and historical materialism.
Seeing the increased interest to study Sociology, the Masters Program in Sociology was established in 2007/2008, the purpose of which was to focus on the main problematic fields, but this program, nevertheless, remained general because there was no dominant study field on which the program would be focused. In academic year 2008/2009, were established doctoral studies in the Department of Sociology and two candidates that were enrolled at that time are now completing their studies. Later, doctoral study program was not accredited, but Bachelor and Master Studies were continuously updated with new courses.

Department of Philosophy was also reformed based on the Bologna Process, but different from the Department of Sociology which under the influence of international administrator abandoned the tradition of cooperation with Philosophy, Department of Philosophy kept in its program some sociological courses, such as Introduction to Sociology, Sociology of Culture, Sociology of Religion, etc. The Master Program of 2012/2013 also includes courses of Microsociology and Macrosociology. Department of Sociology returned to the tradition of cooperation with Philosophy Department, since in its curricula for 2007/08 introduced some optional courses from the curriculum of Philosophy such as: Introduction to Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Ethics and Politics, and recently Social Philosophy.

3. Teaching staff: Intellectual profile and research fields

At the time of establishment and until the 90’s, teaching in Philosophical and Sociological Department was conducted simultaneously in two languages. For Albanians teaching was held in Albanian language while for Serbs, Montenegrins and Bosnians, in Serbo-Croatian. In this regard, we will not mention all the staff that has worked in the Department, particularly those who have worked in the education in Serbo-Croatian language. This could be part of a monograph that could be written later on, but this time we will present the intellectual and professional profile only for Albanian professors who have contribution in the development of philosophical and sociological thinking in Kosovo from the 70’s of the 20th century until today.

Prof. Dr. Fehmi Agani

He is one of the founders of University of Prishtina and Department of Philosophy and Sociology. At the end of 70’s he was dean of Faculty of Philosophy. He was
extremely lucid, clever and a remarkable personality. He was an intellectual with a lot of mental capacity and spiritual energy although in his daily life was very modest. He was known for his intellectual and political contribution in advancing the status of Kosovo starting from the time of demonstrations of 1968, of 1981 and peaceful movement of the 90’s. He was the main ideologist and strategist of nationwide movement of the 90’s. He was the unifying figure between informal fractions and groups in the University, but also between political groups with different political and strategic orientations. Professor Fehmi Agani was the figure which in one hand personified the true intellectual power and in the other, the true moral power. After 1981, he was dismissed from the teaching process in the University of Prishtina, but continued cooperation with Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the time.

He was planning to write a lexicon of sociology, but his extended political involvement, particularly during the 90’s, prevented him in this project, even though his professional publications are many. His complete works consist of 8 volumes, of which we should mention: «In the flow of sociological thinking», «On civil society», «Democracy, nation, self-determination» etc. In addition to many writings, he also translated several books from Serbo-Croatian. His field of interest were socio-political theories, politics, democracy, civil society, etc. Professor Fehmi Agani was executed by Serbian police and military forces on 6 May 1999. Professor Agani was declared Hero of Kosovo.

**Prof. Dr. Hajredin Hoxha**

Lectured *General Sociology* for years I, II and III. His lectures on the development of human society were mainly based on teachings of historical and dialectical materialism. The scope of his research included nation and nationalism, the right of nations on self-determination, rights of Albanians in former Yugoslavia. He was a part-time member of the Academy of Science and Arts of Kosovo. After 1981 he spoke openly against nationalism, Stalinism, even against enverism, which back then was something very rare. He was rector of University of Prishtina. He died in August 1987 together with his wife in a traffic accident in Greece.
Prof. Dr. Ekrem Murtezai

He was professor of Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Logics but also of Marxist Philosophy. He was extremely lucid and very productive in writing. He published several books, like: "Philosophical Studies", but also some philosophical texts for secondary schools. His main works are "Dictionary of Philosophical" and "Dictionary of Religious". Both dictionaries apart from being voluminous and qualitative are the only dictionaries in Kosovo in these fields. He wrote a short monograph for Fehmi Agani, and lately another one for Fadil Hoxha. He was retired in 1990. He is member of Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo.

Prof. Dr. Murteza Luzha

Lectured the course of Classical German Philosophy. He was pretty old (born in 1927) and had difficulties to walk, but was very regular at work and lectures. He published the following books: "Humanist Thoughts of Engels (1979), "Philosophical Reviews" and "Enchanted Creators of Philosophy". He translated from Serbo-Croatian several important books in the field of philosophy, such as Aristotle’s book “Politics”, then “Categories”, Ruso book “Social Contract”, then Gerliq book “Lexicon of Philosophers”, Vuko Paviqeviq book “Basics of Ethics”, and he wrote many forewords for Albanian publications of different works in the field of philosophical and social thinking.

Prof. Dr. Ali Dida

Lectured the courses of General Sociology for second year students, Sociology of Settlements, and for some time the Philosophy of Modern time (Rationalism and Empiricism). He wrote a university textbook on sociology “The Origin of Sociology” which was used as main text in some faculties where sociology was taught, such as Faculty of Philology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Law Faculty, Technical Faculty, Faculty of Physical Education, etc. He completed his doctoral studies with thesis “Delinquency of Minors in Kosovo”, which was published as a book. He was pro-rector of University of Prishtina. He died in 1996 in Prizren.

Prof. Dr. Sefedin Sylejmani

Lectured Aesthetics until early 80’s, when he left the University. He wrote many books in the field of philosophy and aesthetics, but his writings are mainly essayistic.
Mr. Sc. Masar Nagavci

Lectured the course of *General Psychology* until his retirement. In addition to lecturing, he translated several books from Serbo-Croatian. For some time he was pro-dean of the Faculty of Philosophy. In general, he was very punctual at work.

Mr. Sc. Ukshin Hoti

Lectured *Political Sociology* in the Department of Philosophy and Sociology. In the 70’s and 80’s he was among the rare people who spoke English language. By the end of 70’s he had stayed in some American and British universities (Chicago, Washington, Boston and Cambridge, when he completed a specialisation at Harvard University (USA). He is known as an intellectual dedicated to national freedom and unification. He was dismissed from the University of Prishtina after 1981 and was imprisoned because he openly against the official labelling by the party in power and government of demonstrations of 1981. He had openly supported the idea and efforts for Republic of Kosovo and was one of the rare who was openly on the side of student demonstrators, defending their cause. After release from prison, in 1991, he again began working in the University of Prishtina lecturing *Political Sociology*, but as soon as he started working (now in private houses), he was elected leader of UNIKOMB and because of a manifestation was imprisoned again.

For the third time he was imprisoned in 1994 and on the day of his release from Dubrava prison on 16 May 1999 he went missing and nobody knows anything about his fate ever since. Ukshin Hoti is an emblematic figure of socio-political thinking in Kosovo. In addition to many writings on national cause, democracy, etc., he also wrote the book “*Political Philosophy of Albanian Cause*” (Tiranë 1995). Ismail Kadare wrote a book about Ukshin Hoti titled “*Dialogue through grills*”. His name is respected very much in intellectual and political circles, but also among student youth in general. University of Prizren holds his name.

Prof. Dr. Gjergj Rrapi

Lectured *General Sociology* and *Methodology of Sociology*. He also lectured *General Sociology* at the Faculty of Economics. He was inclined to empiricism. He was expert and studied Albanian large families, traditional culture, and the way of life and way of thinking in the Albanian society. He knew Kosovo regions very well and their cultural specificities. He was director of Institute of Philosophy and Sociology and attended different symposiums that were held
in former Yugoslavia and entered into polemics with Serbian sociologists and
demographists who stated that the Albanian demographic boom in Kosovo
was a deliberate work of Albanian nationalistic policy and Islamic tradition
in Kosovo. Professor Gjergj Rrapi defended the thesis that such demographic
boom is consequence of socio-economic factors, particularly of the lack of
economic development, poverty and unemployment and he proved this in a
professional way with figures and facts. His papers and articles in this field
were collected and published in a brochure in 1993 under the title «Kosova in
the years of repression».

Professor Gjergj Rrapi was a sharp surveyor of social reality on Kosovo and its
phenomena. He was interested on the way people lived and feed in different
regions. In his daily life, he was very spirituous and in discussions with his
colleagues he often said of himself to be “the father of Sociology”. In fact, he
often expressed the feeling of superiority, stating for himself to be the only true
sociologist, since us, the others were “hybridized” with philosophical studies.
The truth was that the study of philosophy only made us better, but he considered
that we lack the sense of realism and empiricism that a sociologists should have.

Gjergj Rrapi had planned to write a monograph for the Branch of Philosophy
and Sociology. He published the university textbook “Sociology”, then the
book “Albanian large contemporary family” published in Serbian by Institute
of Social Research in Belgrade, but also in German language in Austria by the
Graz University, translated by Kristë Shtufi. A review for publication in German
was written by the well-known Albanologist Robert Elsie. He translated
Emil Dyrkhemi’s book “Rules of Sociological Method”. He studied Gjeçovë’s
sociological thinking. He died in Czech Republic in July 2002.

Prof. Dr. Gani Bobi

Lectured Sociology of Culture in Department of Philosophy and Sociology, but
also in the Faculty of Arts and has written several books on culture and cultural
phenomena. He is known for his good writing style and broad knowledge in
the field of culture and literature. Professor Gani Bobi, both in lectures and in
his writings, addressed new topics in the field of culture and analyzed them
based on deep theoretical observations. His basic studies were in Albanology
but completed doctoral studies in the Department of Sociology with the thesis
“Albanian socio-cultural integration between the two world wars”. He signed the
famous appeal of intellectuals called “Appeal 212” requesting to meet demands of miners who went on strike opposing constitutional amendments that abrogated Kosovo’s autonomy. Professor Gani Bobi published “Proofs of the modernity” (1982), “Cultural Paradox” (1986), and “Expressive context of self-culture” (1994), while after his death, the publishing house Dukagjini published the complete set of his books in five volumes. His name was given to Centre of Humanistic Studies – “Gani Bobi” established after the war and which conducts quantitative and qualitative research in Kosovo and Albania. He died in Tirana in 1995.

Prof. Dr. Muhamedin Kullashi

Lecteded *Contemporary Philosophy* and *Social and Political Theories* until early 90’s. Then he went to Paris where he started working at the University Paris 8, where he continues to lecture today. In addition to academic work in Paris, he participated in many debates organized by media and different organisations in France, where he brilliantly defended the Kosovo cause and its right to freedom and independence. Together with well known French intellectuals, like Paul Garde, Olivier Mongin, Alain Brossat, Antoine Garapon established the Kosova Committee in Paris, which cooperated with famous magazine *Esprit*, and their activities had great influence in changing positively French opinion on the Kosovo issue. On the initiative of that Committee the Association Fehmi Agani was established in Paris and *Centre François Furet* in Prishtina (at the Faculty of Philosophy). Prof. Muhamedin Kullashi today continues cooperation with the Department of Sociology and Philosophy, holding random lectures on important sociological and philosophical topics, initiating research projects and intellectual debates and participating in panels for defending PhD thesis, for which we are very grateful.

He has written many books in the field of philosophy and theoretical thinking, such as: *Towards metaphilosophy, Clashe of identities, Traces and questions, Modern political thinking, Language of hatred* (published by UNESCO in French and Spanish), *Power and knowledge of Michel Foucault* and has translated some others. Currently he is ambassador of Republic of Kosovo in Paris.

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1 *Centre François Furet* in Prishtina was established after the dissolution of *Saint-Simon Foundation* in Paris, when the entire inventory and library of this Foundation containing over four thousand titles and magazines was donated to the Faculty of Philosophy.
Lecturer Nait Vrenezi

Lectured *Social Psychology* in the Department of Philosophy and Sociology and then at the Department of Psychology and is one of the founders of Department of Psychology. He is known for his experience in social research, particularly public opinion polls conducted by the Centre for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi”. In the 80’s he participated in an American research on the level of lead in children’s blood in Mitrovica region. He is lecturer at University College “Fama” and he is leading the project “Atom”, e project which identifies highly intelligent children and performs extracurricular activities with them. He is very lucid and known for finding logical solutions in most delicate situations.

Prof. Dr. Gjyldane Mulla

She is the first female doctor of Sociology in Kosovo. She lectured *General Sociology* in Faculty of Philology and other departments of Philosophical Faculty (History, Pedagogy). She lectured *Sociology of Settlements, Urban Sociology, Development of Contemporary Societies, Education Sociology*. She wrote the book “Urban Sociology”, which is also the only book of this field from an Albanian author. She is currently working in University College « Dardania » in Prishtina.

Prof. Dr. Avni Presheva

He is doctor of logics and has lectured *Logics* in Department of Philosophy and Sociology, but also in Department of Pedagogy. He finished postgraduate studies in Sarajevo, while completed the PhD in Logical positivism and philosophy of language in Pristina. He has published several books in these fields, such as: “From Language to language”, “Towards metalanguage” and lately a book on the methodology of scientific research. He is retired and cooperates with University College “Fama”.

Dr. Sc. Florije Sela - Kastrati

She became assistant professor of Philosophy in the 80’s and was one of the best students of her time in the Department of Philosophy and Sociology. For some time she was acting secretary of Department. She stopped working before the Albanian language education at the University was closed down. Now she is professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tetova.
**Assistant Shemsi Reçica**

He was assistant professor of *Logics*. He was arrested and imprisoned with the so-called group of intellectuals, together with Prof. Ukshin Hoti. After release from prison, in the 90’s he goes to Germany. In the post-war he restarted working in the Department of Philosophy holding exercises in the course of *Logics*. For some time he was deputy mayor of Lipjan, while now he is unemployed. He continues writing and conducting analysis in Kosovo media. Lately, he was engaged from MEST as expert for school curricula for the subject of Society and Environment.

**Prof. Dr. Ismail Hasani**

In the 90’s he was director of High School in Ferizaj. After the war he became professor in the Department of Sociology where initially lectured the course of *Sociology of Religion*, then lectured some topics, such as: *Introduction to Sociology, Comparative Analysis of Society, Sociology of Collective Memory, Sociology of Identity, etc.* He spent two years in a study visit at the University of Scheveningen in Norway. Now he runs the University College “Humanistika” in Ferizaj, where students, among others, study sociology. He finished Post graduated Studies Degree in Zagreb in the 80’s, while he obtained the PhD in Skopje in the 90’s. He wrote two books on the relations between religion and national identity and analysis between national and religious aspect among Albanians.

**4. Visitors/Associates/Friends of Department of Philosophy and Sociology**

List of visitors, external collaborators and friends of Department of Philosophy and Sociology, and of the current Department of Sociology could be much longer, but we will mention only some of them taking into consideration their support and contribution in development of philosophical and sociological thinking in Kosovo. Many of those mentioned in this list have either held courses or lectures, or participated in conferences, or contributed with consultations, or implemented projects in cooperation with members of the Department or Department.

With some of them cooperation continues even today, and what is most important, the list of friends and foreign collaborators will become longer since current staff has many professional connections with other universities in the region and the world. Research and study activities are expected to continue, and subsequently the network of friends and associates of the department will become even longer.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time/years:</th>
<th>Visitors/ associates/ friends:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In the 70’s | Alfred Uçi (University of Tirana)  
Zija Xholi (University of Tirana) |
| In the 80’s | Jozef Zimerman (University of Vienna)  
Andjelka Milic (University of Belgrade)  
Muhamed Filipovic (University of Sarajevo)  
Rudi Supek (University of Zagreb)  
Mitija Hafner (University of Ljubljana)  
Ferid Muhic (University of Skopje)  
Milosh Todoroviq (University of Novi Sad) |
| In the 90’s | Lino Veljak (University of Zagreb)  
Piero Fumarola (University of Lecce)  
Alberto l’Abate (University of Milano)  
Obrad Savic (University of Belgrade) |
| In the 2000’s | Alain Brossat (University of Paris 8)  
Albert Simkus (University of Tromso, Norway)  
Alberto l’Abate (University of Milano)  
Antoine Garapon (Ecole nationale de la magistrature, Paris)  
Besnik Pula (Princeton University, SHBA)  
Claude Lefort (Sorbonne, Paris)  
Egbar Tellegen (University of Amsterdam)  
Eric Navet (University of Strasbourg)  
Grida Duna (University of Tirana)  
Heinz Leitgöb (Linz University, Austria)  
Johann Bacher (Linz University, Austria)  
Juan Matas (University of Strasbourg)  
Julian Bejko (University of Tirana)  
Karl Kaser (Graz University, Austria)  
Lekë Sokoli (Institute of Sociology, Tirana)  
Lynne Alice (University of Melbourne, Australia)  
Lynne White (University of Melbourne, Australia)  
Michael Kennedy (Brown University, SHBA)  
Olivier Mongin (Esprit Magazine)  
Orgest Azizi (University of Tirana)  
Patrice Canivez (University Charles de Gaulle, Lille, France)  
Paul Garde (University of Provence, France)  
Pierre Hasner (University of Paris 8)  
Pierre Rosanvalon (College de France, Paris)  
Rory Conces (University of Nebraska)  
Servet Pellumbi (University of Tirana)  
Veronique Naoum Grappe (EHESS, Centre Edgar Morin), etc. |

*Table 3. Visitors, associates and friends of Department of Philosophy and Sociology and Department of Sociology*
1. Mission of Sociology Study Program

The study program of Department of Sociology aims to develop sociological thinking for particular social problems and phenomena, as well as for global society and humanity in general. This program is based on the tradition of intellectual and sociological thinking developed in Europe and America and on the social and human topics and debates that are being conducted around the world. The main purpose of study program at the Department of Sociology is to make students able to observe, analyze, explain and evaluate properly social processes and phenomena, as well as to command different methods and techniques for conducting empirical surveys.

2. Profile of Sociological Studies

Department of Sociology is one of the biggest departments of Philosophical Faculty as far as number of students is concerned. After the war, there was a significant increase of interest for studying in the Department of Sociology. Currently, the Department counts over 400 students in Bachelor program and about 150 students in Master Program.

Regarding study profile, the curricula for Bachelor (180 ECTS) is oriented towards general studies without any special focus on any specific issue or topic. However, in addition to general courses (subjects), like Introduction to Sociology, Contemporary Sociological Theories, Quantitative Research, Qualitative Research etc., the BA program includes courses belonging to special fields such as family, religion, environment, media, migrations, etc.

Master Studies (120 ECTS) are conducted in two main curses: scientific courses, the objective of which is to qualify students to conduct scientific research in sociology; and professional courses, which mainly qualifies students for teaching sociology, civic education and other subjects in the field of social sciences in primary and secondary education.

Currently the Department of Sociology does not have a PhD program, except for a program that was accredited in 2008/09 and which now has ended. That
program was mainly focused in studies of nation, politics and democracy, as well as participation and representation of women in general public sphere. An assistant and an external associate of the Department have pursued these studies and are finishing their doctoral studies. Another program for doctoral studies prepared in 2011 was not accredited, so it remains to the Department to prepare a new PhD program based on professional needs.

3. Current Staff and Courses

The table below shows the current staff of Department of Sociology and the courses, respectively study fields of each professor. All assistants have been admitted for doctoral studies and some of them are in the final stage of working in their thesis, so soon we could expect changes in the current structure of the staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professors</th>
<th>Courses and fields of study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr.sc. Agim Hyseni, Prof.</strong></td>
<td>Introduction to Sociology, History of Sociology, Contemporary Theories of Sociology, Political Sociology, Sociology of Education...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Anton K.Berishaj, Prof.</strong></td>
<td>Structure and Social Changes, Sociology of the Family, Sociology of Migrations, Sociology of Religion...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Ibrahim Berisha, Prof. Ass.</strong></td>
<td>Sociology of Mass Communications, Urban Sociology, Rural Sociology, Art and Society...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Fadil Maloku, Prof. Ass.</strong></td>
<td>Sociology of Globalisation, The Basis of Empirical Methods, Social Research Methods, Social Deviation and Control...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Shemsi Krasniqi, Lecturer</strong></td>
<td>Sociology of Culture, Sociological Practicum, Social Ecology, Culture and Environment, Sociology of the Collective Memory...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MA.Sc. Linda Gusia, Assist.</strong></td>
<td>Gender Studies, Comparative Analyses of Society, Urban Sociology, City and Public Space, Sociology of the Family...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MA.Sc.Ardian Gola, Assist.</strong></td>
<td>Contemporary Theories of Sociology, Postmodern Social Theories, Sociology of Religion, Science, Technology and Society ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MA.Sc. Gëzim Selaci, Assist.</strong></td>
<td>Ethnicity, Religion and Identity, Sociology of Human Rights and Social Justice, Qualitative Research in Sociology ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MA.Sc..Artan Muhaxhiri, Assist.</strong></td>
<td>Academic Writing, Statistics, Sociology of Culture, Sociology of Mass Communications...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4. Current Staff of the Department of Sociology*
Prof. Dr. Sabri Kiçmari was full time staff member in the Department of Sociology after the war, selected professor in 2006/07 and as soon as he started working at the Department, he was appointed ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo in Austria, where he serves today.

Administrative clerk of the Department of Sociology is Fatime Reka, which is known for her correctness at work and for very good behaviour towards students and faculty staff.

4. Some specific issues

Average age of the staff in the Department of Sociology is almost similar with the age of the Department, considering the time when the Department of Philosophy and Sociology was established. In fact, average age of staff is slightly above that of Department, i.e., 45.7 years old, an average which is expected to be lower because the Department very soon would need new assistants. Concerning gender, teaching staff of the Department is quite misbalanced. There is only one woman versus eight men. While concerning students, number of female students is much higher than number of male students.

Regarding the knowledge and use of foreign languages, the department staffs speaks English and French. All current staff members have completed their basic studies in the Department, while most of them have completed their Master studies abroad (Croatia, USA, France, Great Britain). In fact, all members of the Department have some international experience, either through studies, presentations or cooperation with different projects.

In general, the staff of Department of Sociology is characterized by openness in communication with students, de-formalization of relationship and overcoming academic clichés. It is not a common practice to address one another with “professor”, nor to wear “academic dress”. Generally, department has a spirit of cooperation and collegiality and I may say that we are pretty happy in this aspect.

5. Current Associates and Courses

Department of Sociology in recent years has had many external associates who lectured different courses, which for one reason or another were not able to be lectured by regular staff. The table below presents only current associates, although Department appreciates very much the qualitative work of previous associates: Lyn Alice, Lyn White, Dimitrij Pozhidajev, Visar Berisha, Gjeneza
Budima, Gentiana Verleni, Albinot Bimbashi, Vjollca Krasniqi, Mimoza Dushi, Isa Bajqinca...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associates</th>
<th>Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Michael Kenedy</td>
<td><em>AFP - International Scholar. Helps in academic cooperation; in designing curricula; in drafting syllabuses, in implementing research projects; publications and new development ideas for sociology.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA.Sc. Mentor Agani</td>
<td><em>Nation and nationalism, theories and models of democracy, social inequalities, economy and society.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hasnije Ilazi</td>
<td><em>Social values and identity, Social philosophy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ramush Mavriqi</td>
<td><em>Ethics and Politics</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Astrit Salihu</td>
<td><em>Introduction to Philosophy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kristë Shtufi</td>
<td><em>Philosophy of the Language, Epistemology of Social Sciences</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nita Luci</td>
<td><em>Social Anthropology, Gender, Education and Power</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Anton Vukpalaj</td>
<td><em>European Integrations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Kamber Kamberi</td>
<td><em>Albanian language</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hivzi Islami</td>
<td><em>Demography</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bektesh Bektishi</td>
<td><em>Statistics</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA.sc. Aurora Zuna</td>
<td><em>English Language I and II, English Language for Social Researcher</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5. Current associates of Department of Sociology*

6. **Project of Cooperation and Research**

Department of Sociology has a tradition of cooperation with other departments and faculties of University of Prishtina, as well as with other universities in the region and the world. Since the 70’s, sociology was taught in all departments and faculties of University of Prishtina and this practice is continuing to a large extent even today, making Sociology part of many university programs in the country. In addition to other UP units, Department of Sociology had and still has firm cooperation links with the Academy of Science and Arts of Kosovo (ASAK) and Institute of Albanology of Prishtina. One professor of the department (Dr. Anton K. Berishaj) has already been selected member of ASAK and is running the project for drafting encyclopaedic dictionary of social sciences.

The Department of Sociology has a significant experience in international cooperation, too. Current staff has traditionally cooperated with University
of Zagreb (almost half of current staff attended or have completed their postgraduate studies at the University of Zagreb).

From 2009/2010 until today, Department has been partner of AFP (Academic Fellowship Program) and HESP (Higher Education Support Program) organized by the Institute for Open Society. This enables it to be part of a broader network of professional and collegial exchanges with Europe, Asia and America. Through AFP, five members and associates of Department of Sociology have direct access to online libraries JSTOR and EBSCO; twice a year they attend international conferences where they present their projects and participate in debates about other projects. Their professional work is strongly supported by Professor Michael Kennedy (Brown University, US), who is also part of this program.

The staff of Department of Sociology after the war participated several times in Prishtina Summer University with several courses: Social aspects of environmental problems, Bioethics, Qualitative Research etc., where in cooperation with teachers from other international universities they developed courses and methods, but also important professional and collegial relationships.

Department of Sociology has also participated in the Tempus program with University of Ireland in implementing the MA program Civil Society and Democracy, within the Department of Political Sciences. Currently, the Department is taking part in Tempus program with Roehampton University in the program Cultural Studies and Human Rights, together with the Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology.

Another important project is being implemented by Department of Sociology and University of Trondheim in Norway, where soon a collection of works is expected to be published titled Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo. This project is lead by Prof. Sabrina Ramet from University of Trondheim. In addition to these, regular staff of the Department of Sociology has strong cooperation with University of Tirana, CEU, University of Strasbourg etc.
7. Vision for the future

The first thing that Department of Sociology should do in the future is to hold on to its mission for developing sociological thinking in Kosovo and to qualify young sociologists so that in addition to theoretical knowledge in sociology, they would be able to use different methods and techniques for collecting, analyzing and interpreting data on social phenomena and processes.

In addition to this, Department should continue the spirit of cooperation with other departments, institutes, faculties and universities in the region and the world, in order to promote social thinking in Kosovo, and also to increase inter-disciplinarity, venturing into new spheres of knowledge, debates, and professional reviews.

The extension of the field of study and research, either with new courses, or with new programs, remains a priority for the Department of Sociology. Of course, achievement of this priority will provide for the organisation of doctoral studies and for extending number of full time staff and external associates.

From it establishment, Department of Sociology was an important factor in development of critical and creative thinking, for humanization of social relationships and development of democratic processes in Kosovo society. This function shall continue to be performed in the future, by creating scientific, human and social values, which not only will be made available but also would be to the benefit of general public.
Study of philosophy at the University of Prishtina have begun in 1972 within the Department of Philosophy and Sociology. Initially, the Department had a joint four-year curriculum, for studies of philosophy and sociology.

From the academic year 2001/2002 Department of Philosophy functions as independent department, after it was divided from Department of Sociology. The Department of Philosophy is accredited by Kosovo Accreditation Agency, three years for Bachelor studies and one year for Master studies.

From its establishment, Department of Philosophy has presented an important pillar for the development of humanistic and social sciences in Kosovo. In recent years the interest for philosophical studies has increased significantly. Today, at the Department of Philosophy there are about 400 students studying in Bachelor Program and 40 students in Master Program.

Department of Philosophy has a very good cooperation with universities in the region and the world through various different projects. Through different activities: debates, lectures, presentations, as of 2010 the Department of Philosophy has begun traditional organisation of the World Philosophy Day.

2. Vision and Mission of Department of Philosophy

As a separate entity within the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy is devoted in growth of philosophical thinking at the University of Prishtina (UP) and broader. Department’s program orientations also reflect the needs of society through reforms initiated with (informal) inclusion of this program and curriculum in the Bologna program. Currently, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Prishtina is the only institution that organizes studies of philosophy in higher education level in Kosovo.

The general vision of the Department of Philosophy is to support overall social development and progress and to increase the level of spirituality of Kosovo society through advanced studies in the field of philosophy.
Within this broader context, the mission of department is oriented towards creating and promoting critical thinking, citizens responsibility, respect and tolerance by studying philosophy, studying through philosophy and studying about philosophy.

3. Academic and Administrative Staff

Department of Philosophy consists of a relatively small but dedicated number of academic staff, whose work and engagement contributes to development of studies of philosophy in two levels, BA and MA. Full time staff consists of following members:

Prof. Dr. Ramush Mavriqi
Prof. Dr. Kadri Metaj
Prof. Ass. Dr. Astrit Salihu
Prof. Ass. Dr. Hasnije Ilazi
MA Ass. Kristë Shtufi
MA Ass. Blerim Latifi
MA Ass. Besnik Domi.

Average age of full time staff is 48 years. Gender ratio in the Department of Philosophy is imbalanced taking into consideration that among full time teaching staff there is only one woman and six men. However, taking into consideration that Head of Department of Philosophy is a woman (Prof. Ass. Dr. Hasnije Ilazi), this gender ratio may be considered more advanced than indicated by statistical figures.

Full time staff of the Department of Philosophy has studied and completed studies mainly in universities outside Kosovo (France, Croatia, Austria, Germany, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and they speak several world languages: English, German, French, as well as Serbian and Croatian.

External associates of Department of Philosophy are:

MSc. Vjolca Krasniqi, lecturer
Hasrete Hysa, lector
MA Valon Leci, assistant,
Whereas associates from other departments within the Faculty of Philosophy are:

Prof. Dr. Anton Berishaj
Prof. Asc. Dr. Ibrahim Berisha
Prof. Ass. Dr. Dashamir Bërxulli
Prof. Ass. Dr. Naser Zabeli
Dr. Sc. Lligj. Shemsi Krasniqi

The successful work of Department of Philosophy is also made possible by administrative staff members Vjosa Sopi and Besmire Gashi.

In the post-war period in Kosovo (1999) important contribution was given by national and international professors, who either are part of, or have been in the Department of Philosophy in different periods, and who have conducted professional work and shared scientific and humane experience with students and colleagues of this department. Neki Juniku, Nait Vrenezi, Masar Nagavci, Sazane Çapriqi, Avni Presheva, Masar Stavileci, Muhamedin Kullashi, Hivzi Islami, David Weberman, Michael Kennedy, Lino Veljak, David Fisher, Emanuela Ceva, Theodor Kubush, Ana Dimiskovska are some of them.

4. Program orientations - fields

Studies of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy are conducted in two levels: BA and MA.

BA studies in philosophy are organized in six semesters (180 ECTS). Objectives of these studies are as follows:

- Education of students in philosophy by developing and affirming main philosophical theories and concepts and by promoting studies and research in this field;

- Development of critical and creative thinking on philosophical tradition and on most important issues of today’s world;

- Development of human resources for application of theoretical and philosophical achievements in practical life;
• Building professional and intellectual capacities, young people capable to take responsibilities on social, political, democratic, social, cultural, educational processes in Kosovo.

Number of full time and part time students that are enrolled in the first year of BA studies at the Department of Philosophy is about 100, but there are no statistics on the number of those who complete the BA studies.

Master studies in philosophy have begun in the academic year 2012/13 and are conducted in four semesters (120 ECTS). Objectives of these studies are as follows:

• Improvement of teaching and education in the field of speculative and practical philosophy and development of relevant concepts in philosophy;

• Strengthening skills for critical thinking, argumentation and comparative analyses on the contemporary world;

• Building student capacities for their orientation to reality of social, political, cultural, scientific-technological and media diversity.

Number of students enrolled in MA studies in philosophy in 2012/13 is 40.

It is important to stress that gender ratio of students in BA level is quite balanced (1:1), while in MA level number of male students is higher compared to female students (2:1).

Teaching programs at the Department of Philosophy are comparable with philosophy programs of universities in European Union member states. Program orientations are concentrated on theoretical and practical philosophy and on history of philosophy; therefore fields of study include courses on metaphysics, ancient philosophy, modern philosophy, contemporary philosophy, political philosophy, social philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, logics, philosophy of science, theory of knowledge, anthropology.

**Projects and scientific work**

Taking into consideration the nature of studies of philosophy, which as humanistic science is more oriented towards theoretical and speculative rather than empirical issues, staff of the Department of Philosophy is committed in teaching philosophy, researching and studying philosophical texts and
literature. However, Department of Philosophy has implemented a number of national and international professional and scientific projects.

Among major achievement of the department should be mention the marking of the already traditional World Philosophy Day. Department of Philosophy since 2010 every year marks the World Philosophy Day by organizing international conferences through which it joins the broader philosophical community of the world, which has been marking this day since 2002 under the auspices of UNESCO. This activity aims to honour philosophical reflections by creating space for debates, and encouraging people to share their philosophical heritage by opening their minds to new ideas and initiating public debates on challenges of society.

In addition to this activity, Department of Philosophy has organized many roundtables and scientific and philosophical debates, while in the last three years it has implemented the following projects:

- Curriculum Development Program (CDP+), WUS Austria, Office in Pristina, 2009-2010
- Development of Gender Studies, Centre for Gender Studies, Pristina, 2009
- Identity and migration, ASO Austria, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Work, Slovenia, University of Pölten, Austria, University Cyril & Methodius, Philosophical Faculty, Skopje, Macedonia 2010-2011
- Academic Fellowship Program (AFP/HESP), OSI Budapest 2010-2011
- Academic Fellowship Program (AFP/HESP), OSI Budapest 2011-2012
- Academic Fellowship Program (AFP/HESP), OSI Budapest 2012-2013.

Through the project Academic Fellowship Program, Department of Philosophy has become part of a network of universities of the region, Europe and Asia, respectively, part of network of philosophical departments of universities from the above mentioned countries.

During the last three years, Department of Philosophy has also cooperated with high schools in organizing visits, presentations and debates with teachers and students. It should be mentioned in particularly cooperation with pre-university College Mehmet Akif.
The academic personnel of Department of Philosophy participated in many conferences, summer schools and summer universities, study visits in the country and abroad, and has contributed continuously with writings and articles for scientific and philosophical journals. It should be emphasize a great contribution that staff of this department gives in publishing the journal NJOHJA.

**Support and cooperation**

The activity of Department of Philosophy and its achievements are first and foremost result of the work done by academic, administrative and managerial staff of the Department and Faculty of Philosophy. But we should stress the big support provided to this department by many individuals, local and international institutions and organisations. Below it is given a list of some institutions and organisations that have contributed for development of Department of Philosophy:

- **University of Prishtina**
- **University of Zagreb**
- **University of Ljubljana**
- **University of Tirana**
- **OSI Budapest**
- **German Embassy in Pristina**
- **KFOS**
- **WUS Austria**
- **DAAD**
- **MASHT**
- **KEC**
- **OSCE**

Support of these institutions and organisations consist on financial support for implementing joint projects, exchange of experiences, professional and scientific refinement through different level of academic studies (MA, PhD), study visits, publication of scientific works, etc.
Priorities and challenges for the future

Achieving the vision and accomplishing the mission of Department of Philosophy consists of two main elements: development of the department and quality work that department provides. Therefore priorities of the department for the future would be focused on activities that contribute to internal development of department and activities that have to do with professional and scientific work provided by the department as a scientific institution of higher education.

In the first context, key priorities of the department are: a) completing the teaching staff of the department with new professionally qualified personnel, and b) inclusion of the department in regional and international philosophical and scientific networks. In realizing these development priorities, department will face challenges which mainly have to do with lack of new qualified staff in philosophy. One of the main reasons for this situation is the delay in conducting of MA level studies in Philosophy (2012/13). On the other hand, inclusion of department in international philosophical networks is mainly conditioned by financial resources, which are scarce or not available at all. Therefore, decentralization of University of Prishtina and decision making and financial independence of faculties and departments is a basic precondition for further development of Department of Philosophy also.

The other aspect related to provision of qualitative academic and scientific work by the Department of Philosophy involves improvement of quality in existing study programs (levels) and opening of doctoral (PhD) studies in philosophy.

The future perspective of studies in philosophy will not only depend on the need of society for critical thinking and genuine intellectualism, but also on how the society can meet such needs. In this aspect, realization of priorities of the Department of Philosophy and accomplishing the mission of this department will be very important.
Anton K. Berishaj
University of Pristina

The Branch of Philosophy and Sociology:
A retrospective on the educational and scientific mission

When marking anniversaries, it has become a common practice to recap the achievements, summarize values, activities, work, contribution and merits of the institution, respectively, actors - be them directly responsible or indirect factors that have influenced this very process. At the occasion of marking the 40th anniversary of establishment of the two-departmental and two-lingual Branch of Philosophy and Sociology, in a solemn atmosphere, was unfolded the history of establishment and functioning, initially of the Branch, and then its division into two separate departments, which as such, continue to function since the end of the war in Kosovo.

Current officials and guests, with concrete information (names, photographs, study programs and biographies), evoked memories about the atmosphere of mid 70’s in Kosovo, when the Branch began its work, course of the process and its survival in the subsequent years of social crisis, maintaining the continuity of work following the suspension of Kosovo’s autonomy, under conditions of de-institutionalization of Albanians, at the time of education in houses-schools, with ups and downs of interest of students for these sciences, that were much needed as far as substance is concerned, but very sensitive at the ideological contexts of the time. Nevertheless, the Branch of Philosophy and Sociology, regardless of substantial scientific sensitivity of the study programs they offered to scientific and political scene of the time in Kosovo, they created and factorized a different opinion.

When presenting the teaching, science, research, critical thinking and writings which generated a new philosophical and sociological approach among university and among general intellectual circles in Kosovo, I am also aware of the trap in which I may be caught on, regardless of my objective efforts to summarize the contribution, activities, events and discourse of such an important institution, both in the past and today. In similar situations, the others of the paper shall be held responsible if the criteria for selecting real values will be neglected and if they will subject of the need for glorification –
or to be tempted by the need to take processes and events outside the social, political, economic, etc., circumstances, which have influenced the course of formation of that very process or opinion.

Philosophy, sociology, logics, etc., were courses that had been included in university programs of the country much earlier. But in Kosovo and other Albanian areas in former Yugoslavia their academic status had degraded, since there were no true qualified staff to lecture them – especially in secondary schools. Usually, these subjects were given to pedagogues and historians to complete their teaching norms, thus giving them secondary importance. With the introduction of Marxism, the jurists were added to the competition for lecturing these subjects (because of the introduction of Constitution, as a mandatory subject in gymnasiums).

Thus, the need to establish a Branch (Philosophy and Sociology) was justified particularly for the creation of qualified staff for teaching these subjects in secondary schools (philosophy, sociology, logics, Marxism, self government, constitution, etc.). The founding staff of this Branch, although in the 70’s, it does not seem to have been “hybridized”, as it happened with many other branches and faculties of the University of Prishtina in their early stages. Philosophy and sociology were fields which in many university centers of former Yugoslavia had a good image and respectable tradition. A significant number of young people from Kosovo got educated in these centers, who later worked in secondary schools, institutes and various socio-political institutions. From the very beginning teaching for Albanian students was conducted only in Albanian language, while there were occasions when Albanian teachers lectured in Serbo-Croatian language as well. I think this is a specific case – taking into consideration the fact that many departments and faculties in Albanian language have begun working with mixed staff (Serb and Albanian). This indicates that conditions were created to establish the Branch for such profile.

The staff of newly established Branch consisted of meritorious and experienced scholars and researchers, qualified in different fields: philosophy, sociology, psychology, political economy, socio-political workers, cultural workers and managers of important social institutions. This was a good potential to extend the scope beyond teaching. Education programs did not remain in the terrain of lecturing only ‘dry’ ideological and diomatic theory, but courageously “descended” to social reality, applying scientific methodology in the empirical research.

In this spirit, at the end of the 70’s the Department established the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, too. Establishment of such institution, although
in the official political circles of the time it did not enjoy any particular support, neither was it given the same value as other existing institutes (such as Institute of Albanology and Institute of History), nevertheless, as result of commitment of the staff of this Department in the field of research and interpretation of social occurrences in Kosovo, it ensured its place among other institutions whose primary activity is conducting scientific research. Institute of Philosophy and Sociology was accommodated in the building of Philosophical Faculty, enjoyed a modest financial support and survived thanks to its own research work.

But the work at the Institute required not only profile of staff that manifested a good sense about social reality of the time, and about processes and problems that society was facing, but who were also well trained for application of scientific methodology in the field. This fact has to do with the incorporation of methodology of social sciences in the Branch of Philosophy and Sociology as a separate module in the study program of this profile which lasted 3 semesters.

Since, as I stated above, the Institute did not have sustainable financial resources for its research activities (apart from a lump sum for a staff of 2-3 people), no spectacular scientific results could be expected. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that during the period of its existence, the institute implemented some projects of which I will mention: “Position of woman in the society” (1982); “Daily migrants in Kosovo” (1985); “Large families in Kosovo” (1986); “The structure of Kosovo’s society” (1988) etc. During the 90’s, managerial structure of this institution collapsed – together with the “Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosova” and the Magazine “Tema”. As far as I know, the activity of this institution was oriented towards publication of some studies and to provide some services for counterpart organizations in the region.

However, its contribution was huge, taking into consideration social and political circumstances – particularly in the 80’s, when scientific work was strongly censored. Also, there were limited possibilities to clarify social reality, which in those years was producing more and more drawbacks and stagnation in all fields of life. Efforts for analyzing the situation that was created led to a slippery ground – and if they were linked to Albanian population, they were considered to have a character of subversive mission.

Generally, in former Yugoslavia, the region of Kosovo that was considered to be the least developed, marginalized and isolated, for almost a century survived because it preserved and kept values and forms of organization of
life, which put in the words of Ferdinand Tönnies, were characteristic of a
“community”. The slogan of “brotherhood and unity” did not have major effect
on the Kosovan enthusiasm. Even in former Yugoslavia, Kosovans knew others
only as much as they were interested and able and as much as the conditions
allowed. They knew the language, literature, history, art, culture... They were
educated in different university centers of former Yugoslavia. But, the broader
Yugoslav community never truly got to know Kosovans. Simply, there was no
interest and readiness to know them. Language, culture, habits, customs, cultural
features, art, literature, etc., even after one century of coexistence, continued
to be unknown for them. They may have read the works of intellectuals of the
nation with whom they lived together for almost one century, such as Kadare or
Podrimaj, only when they were translated in other languages from the original.

But, I have the impression that Kosovans, too, needed to know themselves. There
was no political will, no means but also no true scientific potential to write down,
collect and analyze all of the Kosovan features. Part of the burden in this mission
should have been taken by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology.

Immediately after the establishment of Institute of Philosophy and Sociology,
the Department established the “Association of Philosophers and Sociologists
of Kosova”. Association of “Philosophers and Sociologists” for the short period
of time it functioned played a very important role in powerful articulation
of problems faced by the Kosovo society in the 80’s and 90’s of last century.
Preserving organizational features of a civil society entity, this association
was always present in activities that encouraged and fostered opposition
against the regime of the time. Papers, participation in local and international
meetings and roundtables, collection of signatures against violence and their
submission to the UN, etc., turned this association (which gathered true and
experienced intellectuals) into a powerful and respectable ‘political’ entity,
which along with other political entities of the time, left traces in activities of
Kosovan “Alternative”

The Branch of Philosophy and Sociology, in the course of its activities, published
a magazine called “Thema”. Magazine “Thema” was published in two languages
(Albanian and Serbo-Croatian), depending in which language the writing was
submitted), with a summary in English language. When reading it, one may
notice the continuous need for offering diverse contents in these fields, mainly
from the western world. So, one notices the domination of a constant effort to
mitigate the dose of claustrophobia that had overwhelmed Kosovo society in
general, but also scientific circles of the time – and not only in Kosovo.
For your illustration, I present the content of the 4th edition (3 '85), where we could read: – Aspects of Diderot’s illuminism; – Cultural areal of the Byzantium; - what’s the idea?; – Theory of Robert Michels’ oligarchy; – Man in a city and the city against him; **Ali Aliu** – from ancient literary theories; In the column research – World economic development in the period 1950-1980; In the column – Selected texts – are published: **Baruch de Spinoza** – from “Theological political treaty”, Chapter XX; **Edmund Husserl** – Crisis of sciences as expression of the radical life-crisis of European humanity; **Alvin Gouldner** – Anti-Minotaur – The myth on value free sociology; From the CATALOGUE: – Female Eros and civilization of death (Review of the book of author Vjeran Katunarić; – Review of the book of Ratko Bozovic – The labyrinth of culture.

Most of members of editorial office were students from different university centers in former Yugoslavia, influenced by the spirit of the so-called “Korcula School”, which gathered the elite of these fields, which was known for very courageous critical and realistic thinking towards the social and political reality of the time in Yugoslavia.

Magazine “Thema”, regardless of the tense political situation, continuous campaigns of media pressure against everything that was Albanian, maintained its scientific character. In this magazine, we tried to offer contents that were free of diomatic Marxism of the time, to mitigate the considerable shortfall of literature in Albanian in these fields, but also publication of authorial papers. It should be mentioned that regardless of the slow dynamic of publication, financial and other problems, magazine ‘Thema’ with its publications has played an important role in stimulating and articulating critical thinking in the context and circumstances of the monist reality of that time in Kosovo, but also in compensating for the major lack of Albanian literature and writings in this field.

Kosovo society, has been and continues to be specific in the region – not only because of its historical past – which makes it different from the mother country, Albania, but also because of the features that are manifested in its family structure and organization, in the way how life is organized in large families, position of woman, masse population mobility, the role of immigration in liberation and economic survival of Kosovo families, approach towards organized political power (since up to the declaration of independence, each and every power or government was considered as foreign), family positioning in the kinship structure and efforts made to seek and establish defense and security institutions of the state precisely based on the kinship structure. In such circumstances Kosovo society remains an example of transformation that
took much longer time due to threats, wars, problems of economic recovery, etc. But, it also remains a unique example of interference of anachronistic and modern occurrences in time and space. Kosovan family today has reduced the centennial distance, and now we see living under the same roof, a grandmother that was betrothed in the cradle and her niece, which cohabits with a boyfriend, whom she met without a go-between, without ring, engagement or any other sign of the tradition. These are topics that are waiting to be analyzed and addressed scientifically.

During the 90’s, all management structures that were coordinated by the Branch of Philosophy and Sociology and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology – together with the “Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosova” and Magazine ‘Thema’ collapsed. But this was not just because of the Serbian regime pressure, nor because the research of created reality led to a slippery terrain if they had to do with the Albanian population, in what case it was perceived to have the character of a subversive mission, but because they were quashed by individuals and groups who had monopolizing aspirations. Nevertheless, they continued functioning until after the war in Kosovo. Faculty of Philosophy about two years ago established the Institute for Social and Humanistic Studies. Of course, this initiative came about in different times, conditions and circumstance, which were not at all easier. However, soon it published the first edition of Magazine “Njohja” (Knowledge) and with its committed scientific work it is in the right track to impose itself as a serious institution of science and knowledge.

The Board of this institution is composed of one representative from each department of the Faculty of Philosophy. This Board has selected and appointed the Director of Institute, and without any modesty I may say that for a relatively short time it did a good job. In addition to organizational work for establishment and structuring of management bodies, establishment of a network for cooperation with institutions and individuals, ensuring resources for publication of the first edition of magazine “Njohja” (Knowledge) (supported by MEST), this institute has become part of the ESSI project focused on priorities of “social sciences” sector in the National Research Program for the period (2010-2013). The aim of this program is to contribute in extending the knowledge on social sciences and to support the growth and strengthen economic capacities, human resources and create and strengthen research infrastructure through training for their participation in European Union programs during the period of 28 months (July 2012 - November 2014). This
The project aims to include the academic and research staff in high education of Kosovo, research and scientific institutions, research managers from NGOs and governmental agencies. In addition to this, this program:

Will equip the laboratory with 15 PCs, with installed statistical programs in the Institute of Social and Human Sciences in Prishtina;

Thirty five young scientists from public and private sectors, employed in different organizations, will have the opportunity to compete, train and qualify for application of scientific methodology and for using European databases through intensive courses in the Program for Research Qualifications in the field of Social Sciences. Then big Conference called “Horizon 2020” will follow, where the trainees will be invited to prove the level of knowledge and skills for application of the methodology of European Programs. The ten most successful in these trainings and qualifications will be selected to participate in the Mentorship Program.

This Program will be implemented in partnership with Kosovo Education Centre (KEC), Institute of Social and Human Sciences, UP, University of Vienna, Institute for Social Research and Analyses (SORA), and Working Life Research Centre (FORBA).

Magazine “Njohja” (Knowledge), with a name that due to the political actuality of the term (recognition of Kosovo by other countries) may sound a little over-consumed, but I may say that in its first edition, authors of writings took care, and readers became convinced that it was a truly scientific magazine, aiming to offer content in different fields of social sciences, and of course politics, but not for daily consumption. Since you will have the chance to have this edition in your hands, I will not challenge your patience with detailed analysis, but I just want to say that its main topic is: “Meditations on modern society” (Bekim Baliqi, Emanuela Ceva, Hasnije Ilazi, Kadri Metaj, Sibel Halimi), accompanied with other topics of a sub-category: “On global governance and other policies (Blerim Latifi, Michael Kennedy, Muhamedin Kullashi, Vjollca Krasniqi etc), concluding with writings on ARCHITECTURE (Astrit Salihu, Nita Luci and Valon Germizaj) and a review of Besnik Domi on “Contemporary Challenges”.

The second edition, which is in the process of collection of papers and preparation, will also be a thematic edition – On Human and Social Transformations. The magazine aspires to be open for associates of different fields who share the same concept, not only from the UP, but also from outside and not only in writings but also in the composition of the editorial office.
Human and Social Transformation
The problems of legitimising legal norms and the role of the state in an unconsolidated democracy

Abstract

States that change to democracy are often characterized by a number of gaps in the legal rights and by the lack of control over violence. Putting loyalty to a close group before loyalty to the law is also an accompanying phenomenon of this process, creating a fertile ground for mafia. Some of the difficulties encountered in the implementation of laws in such a country are: distrust of the laws as coming from above since the time of the dictatorship, the importation of European law without an explanation and contextuality, excessive trust in the group and not in the law, etc. - phenomena which are typical for Albania’s postdictatorship period. Meanwhile the lack of independence of the judiciary and the media, and corruption, are common features for many countries with unconsolidated democracy. The consequences of this process are: on the one hand laws not being fundamental to citizens and their problematic applicability on one hand, and on the other hand the violation of some human rights including fundamental rights.

In the beginning we highlight some features of changes in the postdictatorship period in Albania and their impact on the credibility of the law. In this context we will analyze not only the factors that lead to uncontrolled violence among social groups, but also ways to respect human dignity, offering some concepts of the rule of law in the concrete reality of Albania. Then we show how the privatization of violence by a group of men that capture the state is accompanied by the violation of human rights, reducing the level of justification of legal norms in the eyes of citizens. In an attempt to describe the problems arising from political developments in the country, this paper analyzes data from written and spoken media, from official sources, and from reports by civil society and by researchers in Albania and in foreign countries.

Key words: monopoly of violence, group values, human dignity

One of the key characteristics of state violence is that it should be legitimate - meaning that it should only be applied through certain institutions. The tradition of the democratic state has been established quite differently to that of violent organisms such as bandits, mafia etc. According to this tradition, the state is constituted as a central authority, exercising its violence in the same way, when
it should, by means of certain well-known rules, well-established and accepted on the basis of the interests of citizens from the point of view of an administrative bureaucracy.

Violence can be a mode of interaction among citizens, when a group of people do not have restrictions on their actions and can do ill to others. In the face of violence and the fear of violence, the burden of guaranteeing peace falls on the democratic state. To put it another way, this monopoly of violence from the state should give to citizens alike the same guarantee of security.

“Legitimate violence is justified above all by its duty to bring under control illegitimate violence.” So, the monopoly of violence within the state is legitimised by the duty of the state to obstruct and isolate criminal and illegal violence. “Where the core of the state, the monopoly of violence, is at risk, there also the liberal state is no longer what it wants to be and should be” declares one of the scholars of political theory, E. Epler.

States in transition to democracy are often characterised by a series of deficiencies in legal rights and by the lack of control over violence in their territory. Obviously societies in transition, especially those in Eastern Europe, cannot simply be seen as despotic, but their passage to democracy has been and risks being accompanied by a vortex of criminal violence.

1. Context: Albania – an unconsolidated democracy

In Albania, the legal system is based on constitutional principles. This means that the principles of fundamental human rights and freedoms are written principles of law in general, and in particular of each law and sub-legal act. Albania has been a member of the United Nations since 1955, and a member of the Council of Europe since 1995. In the Constitution of Albania it is written: “The independence of the state, human dignity, human rights and freedoms, social justice, constitutional order, are the basis of this state, which has the task of defending and respecting it”.1

However, many social rights, which are not achieved simply as political rights in the constitution, require the intervention of the state because of differences that exist through age, sex, qualification and health. The improvement of social

rights also requires an active intervention by the state through public services, to secure what is considered human dignity.

The Albanian state has ratified a series of international conventions, connected with the defence of fundamental human rights and freedoms. But not all of these conventions have been accompanied by measures that fulfill the obligations that spring from them.

Since some of the ideas that I want to develop flow out of the Albanian context, this piece is a qualitative assessment, but one that can also touch on regional characteristics and experiences. For example, the lack of independence of the justice system and of the media, and corruption, are characteristics shared with many of the states with fragile democracy in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. One of the peculiarities of this process that can also be seen in the region, and is increasingly apparent, is another characteristic, that of privatisation or the easy capture of the state by specific groups that enter politics. One such case is Albania, where the capture of the state by particular groups it its use fort he benefit of these groups, applying illegitimate practices or corruption, results in a significant violation of human rights. People become victims of excesses of power by some of the power-holders.

The unending institutional transition in the country means that the democratic institutions are not as wholly effective as in a normal democratic state. Social groups are still in this condition and experiencing the crises of composition and decomposition.

Perhaps there is a need for a neo-Hobbesian review of the role of the state authorities in respecting laws and rights, to understand the importance of this link in states with unconsolidated democracy. Hobbes wrote: "The greatest incommodity that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge."²

The year ‘97 seemed like just such an anarchy, with the tendency towards civil war as a result of the pyramid schemes³, and where the state did not function and was replaced by banditry.

³ Fraudulent schemes to attract people’s money.
The consequences of this long transition can be seen in the European Commission’s Progress Report, where it is often repeated that the culture of dialogue between the parties is wanting, and that the independence of state institutions needs to be consolidated.

These reports show that efforts to fulfil the functions of the state as regards rights continue. Naturally there is freedom of people to act and live. According to the amendment in the Law for Principal Constitutional Provisions (March 1993), “Everyone has the right to choose where they live and to move freely throughout the territory of the state” something which has been accompanied by a substantial migratory movement of Albanians from rural to urban areas, a displacement that the scholars Fuga and Dervishi term “a massive and unprecedented exodus within the state”. They further describe the condition thus: “The displacement of the population from rural zones towards cities is so massive and immediate that the statistical data reflecting this phenomenon change every day. The cabins and shacks, most on the periphery of the cities, reflect this phenomenon every day. In such dwellings, established without a controlling plan, the basic essentials of life such as normal provision of drinking water and power are often missing.” In this dislocation, and emigration outside the state, were also included thousands of Albanians previously restricted by the dictatorship. They were seeking a better life, exploiting first of all their right of free movement, which was accompanied by great poverty for a period of 10-15 years and perhaps suffered further reversals in recent years.

2. Distinctive features of the transition from dictatorship to democracy

Giving us a comprehensive description of what occurred with the changing of the country’s system from dictatorial to democratic, one of the earlier scholars of rights, I. Elezi, said:

“Albania’s transition to the democratic system was accompanied by political, social, institutional, judicial and psychological changes. A vacuum in the state’s authority for violence and the application of law was created, to which was added poverty and property disputes arising from the unconsidered

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5 Artan Fuga & Zyhdi Dervishi, Ndërmjet fshatit dhe qytetërimit global, sociological essay, (Tirana: Jerusalem, 2002), 149.
6 Ibidem, f.152.
demarcation of land as well as family feuds. All of these led to the revival of ancient practices of popular kanun justice, which served to protect life in the absence of functioning laws.\(^7\)

In the not-too-distant past Albania had had particular districts where the state had no kind of influence and where parallel law applied, but with the additional problem, according to the assessments of international institutions such as Transparency International, of corruption and the non-functioning of state justice.

In Albania, non-state business actors were suspected of having bought particular politicians with influence, calling into question the state’s monopoly of violence and establishing the basis for a state within a state, and for violence by political groups reflecting particular profiteering business interests. This can be seen in the mutual accusations in the political sphere that continue to the present day, which are also seen as a problem by international organisations.

3. The values of law and groups

The rule of law is seen as one the chief factors regulating the balance between the state monopoly of violence and the rights of citizens. It reflects how much trust the players have and how they implement the rules of society, particularly as regards the quality of the implementation of contracts, the police and courts, and the prevention of opportunities for crime and for violence.

Albanians have been justifiably suspicious in the face of their laws, which time after time were legitimised by the statement that they were complying with the will of the party. Thus the legacy of imposed dictatorial laws has left a bitter taste and the absence of a predisposition to respect the law. Meanwhile in the new era they have become justifiably mistrustful of the representatives of the law, who advise them comply with western traditions with the aim of becoming more rational: “I am rational, so become like me”. This foreign rationality a priori that of the European Community, and the lack of an explanation of the benefit of these laws for where they are living, means that even when the laws are good they are seen as a foreign imposition and not as a necessity and a relief for the lives of citizens. The importance of this factor can be seen clearly in Hart’s theory about law when he says: “If the internal perspective in this

\(^7\) Ismet Elezi, “Mbrojtja e tё drejtёs pёr tё jetuar si e drejta themelore e njeriut”, Tё drejtat e njeriut, no.2 (2002) : 26
structure is not open wide, the rules can’t function... Society in such a system can unfortunately be compared to a flock of sheep, where the sheep can end up in the abattoir. And it can also happen that this society could exist and could be a legal system too.”

This spirit seems completely absent in the country, in the institutions that approve and drive the implementation of laws.

The quality of dictatorial laws has also meant that laws are not seen by citizens as helpful, but only as sanctions. But Hart rightly says that laws should be seen not in their impositional form, but in the first instance as helpful for citizens. “There is an important category of laws with a very different social function that has nothing in common with orders backed up by force... On the contrary, they secure for individuals the necessary means for realising their wishes.”

Explanation of the benefit that citizens would have from implementation of a European law and it comes *a priori* from on high, disdaining to offer any link between such directives and the more particular interests of the people of the country.

Many statistics on the ground show that both corruption and the perception of it influence citizens in their mistrust of laws, and their lack of effectiveness is a consequence. At the microsocial level, it seems that this ineffectuality damages the social capital which is an important precondition for fostering the initiative for enterprise, for co-operation and for participation.

The development of social trust in laws is necessary to create the citizen's confidence that they will not suffer from the co-operation in which they enter. While the authority of the law springs from the sense that the law, while supported by the principles of justice, is neutral and does not favour one side to the detriment of another. In this way trust in public institutions is diminished, because the public perceive that the state itself lacks the capacity to be just towards its citizens.

Some of the ways of constricting the circle of loyalty in favour of a close community are well known - nepotism, conflict of interests, and discrimination towards people with a particular geographic, faith or cultural background or origin. The phenomena in question are often considered in the literature of the social sciences as fertile ground for conflict and mafia.

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8 Herbert Hart, Koncepti i së drejtës, (Tiranë, ISP& Dita 2000, 2007), 139.

9 Ibidem, p.43
Quite to the contrary, a normal democracy should guarantee, at least in principle, the distribution of authority such that each citizen - as Rousseau said - has a piece of this power. “Each citizen, together with the others, puts his own person, and his whole strength under the higher direction of the general will, and citizens accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole authority”

But social or economic inequality seriously damages this democratic principle. “It’s the minority that rules from behind a facade of democracy”, wrote Walcer. That is to say, the decisions taken supposedly on behalf of the people, are in fact taken by someone else and under a different pressure from that of the people. This description of Walcer’s conforms precisely with the situation in the country. “The ruling class that truly rules, or an elite with power deriving from a different class but engaged on the basis of social and economic status, takes all of the key decisions. The government is in principle democratic, in theory liberal and diverse, and in practice oligarchic. Elections are a second-hand process, not for the distribution of power but its diversion, a mystification of its real coherence. Regular citizens accept passively their subjugation, or take very little risk.” In fact the participation of citizens is reduced to only voting in elections. As well as the large social inequality, the state’s monopoly of violence is infringed by the existence of divergent goals, values, interests and worldviews.

The scale of urbanisation is also influential in this, as mentioned above. Typically for a country like Albania, where the majority of the rural population was previously obliged to stay in the village, a considerable portion of them shift themselves rapidly to the principal cities via their peripheries, bringing with them the heterogeneous traditions and values deriving from the places from which they came. The peripheries become a problem of integration, but suffer most of all from conflicts of property-ownership, which are often accompanied by blood-letting. Agricultural lands nationalised under the agrarian reforms of the dictatorship, were occupied by many villagers who had not had land or had had very little before liberation. The former owners

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11 Michael Walcer, Politika dhe pasioni (Tirana: Dudaj 2010), 42.
12 Ibidem, f.43.
have consistently sought the return of these lands, but current laws often foresee only a very low compensation, and for very few of the former owners.\textsuperscript{13}

There was another procedure, which offered for those former owners dispossessed by force under the dictatorship vacant land in state hands, but this now does not operate. These procedures have been excessively dragged out by the bureaucrats, and have left dissatisfied those former landowners who could see their property now being worked by other villagers that came during the dictatorship, and who have still not been materially compensated to any significant degree. The distrust of the state in this area was described by the scholar A. Fuga thus: “The existence of these groups and the agreements that they had made with society shook the social bonds of solidarity and of moral respect between people, who became ever more isolated in themselves or in their family circles... Thousands of people connected to each other by ties of kinship or marriage became embroiled in protracted sagas of judicial proceedings, related to property conflicts.”\textsuperscript{14}

One such is the “Case of Driza versus Albania” brought before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.\textsuperscript{15}

The state’s lack of a legitimate monopoly of violence, as a result of the above-mentioned distortions, means that unrecognised forces use violence to resolve conflicts. Self-administered justice and crime in the family continues to be destabilising. Crimes are principally to do with property, water, theft, car accidents, non-payment of debts etc. People do not have the proper faith in the state, either because the state does not intervene or because they see no reason to involve the state - for a host of reasons among which the most important is lack of trust, something which also applies with crime in the family.

The majority see the state as something foreign, distant, insensitive, which serves only to take money from citizens by means of taxes and to do them harm, through the pockets of the leading politicians. Many citizens, if asked about the state, would answer with scorn. As a general rule, the law has failed to establish


\textsuperscript{14}Arta n Fuga, Shoqëria periferike. Një sociologji e ndryshimeve në Shqipëri, (Tirana: Ora 2004), 242.

\textsuperscript{15}The issue was raised on the basis of a complaint (nr.33771/02) against the Republic of Albania brought to Court under clause 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian citizen, Mr Ramazan Driza (“the plaintiff”), on 4 September 2002.
social cohesion through a regulatory base. The law should function with the support of a civic morality, which has its root in the individual’s membership of a specific group. This morality is in conflict with corruption, dishonour and other irregular behaviours that might also be considered illegitimate. Therefore law, including when it comes from respected international institutions, should have a kind of harmonisation with traditional social and moral norms.

One of the impulsions for citizens to break the law is their tendency in any situation to place loyalty to a close group such as the family, kin, friends etc before loyalty to the law. The scholar of penal law in the University of Tirana, Professor Skender Kaçupi, states: “Every outcome of judicial action, not driven by law but driven by favouritism or bribery, brings grave consequences for the implementability of penal law, because the law can be replaced by private justice and selfish revenge, seriously damaging people’s faith in the law and replacing this with the kanun.”

Meanwhile another scholar, Ismet Elezi, wrote that in 2008 26% of criminal acts were still performed for private justice, and in 2009 29%. This demonstrates the law’s lack of credibility and implementation in the country.

This countervailing authority can take many forms, and if the ends of democratic politics are to be served, the majority must be mobilised against the minority. Interest groups, which are simply instruments of this dispersal, are almost non-functional. “For groups to escape stigmatisation and be accepted and respected in society, they need an institutional presence and political and economic resources,” says Walcer. The more material and political resources the members of a group have, the stronger is the group. “Sometimes when this doesn’t happen, impoverished citizens and members of stigmatised groups simply return to anominity and silence, they become invisible people, and the pluralism of civil society is radically constricted. Men and women who cannot mobilise the resources for a successful defence of their interests or a demonstration of their cultural values, live not only with a sense of privation, but also with a sense of the loss of dignity.”

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17 Ismet Elezi: “Mbrojtja e të drejtës për të jetuar si e drejta themelore e njeriut”, Të drejtat e njeriut, no.2 (2002) : 27
18 Michael Walcer, Politika dhe pasioni (Tirana: Dudaj 2010),103
19 Ibidem, p.104
The concept of rationality, which is necessary, at least for the implementation of rights by means of the law, is what brings us to a point that we might not expect: our real interests alone oblige us to be at one accord with the proposition of the law. But their key convictions, those that form the core of their moral identity, demonstrate that people should associate themselves with the proposition of rationality embodied in law. The majority of politicians in the country don’t consider such a process, one bringing together community morality with the law.

We find the idea that there are really certain universal principles of law in the work of Habermas, along with other scholars. But they should not be imposed as if given to us by some authority from on high; Habermas believes that people themselves should be convinced that implementation is right as much for their immediate community as for the wider one: “The disintegration of consideration of different histories of life and cultural tradition reveals the individualism of personal projects for life as well as a pluralism of collective forms of living... But special normative claims become problematic for interpersonal relations regulated in a legitimate manner by the moral view of the same respect for each and the same attention to the interests of all.”\(^{20}\) And the solution he offers to avoid this problem is: “The precise internal relationship between the sovereignty of the people and the rights of the individual is found in the normative form of a way of exercising political autonomy, which is not determined through general laws, but only from a form of communication that guarantees the discussion of different ideas and wishes... The partners of the law, as participants in a rational discussion should see if a norm of discussion can identify understanding between all of those trying to establish it... The substance of the rights of man are found in the formal conditions for the institutionalisation of this kind of discussion of different ideas and wishes, in which the sovereign law of the people takes shape”\(^{21}\). Habermas calls this one of the basic principles of the functioning of the democratic state.

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\(^{20}\) Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Faktizität und Geltung} , Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), 126-127.

\(^{21}\) Ibidem, p.133-135.
4. The state as guarantee of human dignity

In its operation, the liberal state also has the object of guaranteeing human dignity. In formulating this principle, the scholar R. Dworkin wrote: “The state and society must not allow the shaming of the faces of the poor and the powerless. A life once begun should not be thrown away without regard for what kind of life it is.”

This principle seems like a more abstract formulation of two political principles: the first the principle of equality, the second the principle of freedom. A life once begun should not be thrown away without regard for what kind of life it is. At least the institutions and rules of society should support the practicability of this principle.

But what is judged more in Albania is the dignity defined more by group than by law. For this, those distinguishing characteristics that morals and laws have as regulators of the interests and groups need more consideration. Morals do not spring simply from obligation, but as a reciprocal relationship of trustworthiness between the members of a group bound tightly together, as for example, in a family or a clan, it seems that this thing should not be broken for the reflected right of the law. This means that sometimes loyalty to our close group is more tangible, especially when we find ourselves in an extreme situation like social conflict, or in a case of the non-existence of the state for the citizen, because it remembers him only as much as is necessary to get his vote. The support of our loyalty in a small group can give us reason to work together in the creation of a bigger group too, a group to which with the passage of time we will be as loyal, and perhaps even more loyal. Every agreement established without obligation between individuals and groups for what it will become, displays a form of shared belonging, which might evolve into the preliminary stage of the expansion of the circle, where all those who have become part of it we see as „one of us”.

However, participation in our social groups outside the family or the „clan” is quite restricted because of the absence of a reciprocal trustworthiness among groups stimulated, unfortunately, by politicians.

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22 Ronald Dworkin, La democrazia possibile, Principi per un nuovo dibattito politico, (Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 2007) 142
As reported by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, "It can be said that interpersonal and institutional trust are both at a low level in Albania. Trust in domestic institutions seems to have been replaced by that in international organisations. This is strongly linked to the popular perception of domestic institutions as more non-functional than international institutions, and to the fact that the person leading the domestic institution significantly influences its credibility."\(^{23}\)

This might be because the moral identity and dignity of the individual depends on the group or groups with which he is identified. Thus, an individual cannot be distrustful of this group without implying the same of himself. "The moral dilemmas that come from this situation, are less the result of conflict between cause and reaction, and more that between alternative projections of the group, and alternative ways of giving meaning to individual life,"\(^{24}\) wrote Rorty.

In our daily lives, it is difficult not to favour those we love (our immediate family and kin, thus giving rise to a conflict of interests) and those with whom we share some kind of intimacy of ideas and beliefs.

The contradiction between the close interests of the group and the feeling of shared belonging begins to diminish when the state itself represents the interests of citizens and not only parties - thus, when we say without compulsion that we have the belief from those implementing the laws that the laws are truly for the good of all and not of a small group of interests alone.

The tableau of the political situation clashes with those basic principles of redistribution in liberal society described by Dworkin: "Liberal justice does not use political force as a source of private force to influence the collective decisions of the community."\(^{25}\)

Rawls meanwhile claims that fulfilment, especially of this condition, excludes the infringement of basic human rights. These rights include, at the least, a tight circle of rights, such as the right to the basic means for life and security (distinct from the right to life), to liberty (distinct from freedom from slavery and forced labour), to personal property and to formal equality, according to the principles of natural justice (for example the principle that the same

\(^{23}\) Ibidem, p. 63
case should be treated in the same way)."\textsuperscript{26} Formally, fragile democracies fulfill these conditions. However, the Constitution and a series of basic rights that it guarantees cannot be implemented because of the privatisation of the state. For example, as the scholar Sokol Sadushi has also mentioned, "The individual’s right to life is protected by law and is not only an obligation for the law-maker but also for the state authorities, to take appropriate measures for the protection of the lives of people."\textsuperscript{27} And the right to elect and be elected is not implemented as it should be, and because of extreme poverty people sell their vote to a party. It has happened that this vote gets sold for one or more sacks of flour, degrading democracy and representation with it.

Obstruction of the functioning of the institutions of justice by those in power is not unknown, even in more consolidated democracies. Epler says: “In democratic states it is not free trade that has necessarily brought democracy.”\textsuperscript{28} Thus in states with unconsolidated democracy and where the state is weak, for the upper and corrupted class ‘it doesn’t become/happen to the upper and corrupted class’? the other section of the population. So although formally we might be dealing with democracy, in fact we have an oligarchy.

5. The use of public force as private infringes human rights

Privatisation of the state influences for the worse in different conceptions that come into conflict with one another in basic human rights. Dworkin said that: “We should not deny freedom of choice as a right of adult humans whom we consider capable of choosing, although we might think that they lack the capacity to choose rightly. We shouldn’t deny this to anyone, even in the case where we anticipate that they will make a wrong choice.”\textsuperscript{29}

The theory of rights, in many authors from Locke to Dworkin, develops and argues the idea of the regulation of the state and society while perhaps bearing in mind the interests of each individual. The precedence of the individual means that the individual comes first, as by right, and then comes the state. We also find this expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, where it is clearly claimed that "every individual enjoys the rights and freedoms equally,

\textsuperscript{27} Sokol Sadushi, "E drejta kushtetuese dhe zbatueshmëria e saj\textsuperscript{2} Të drejtat e njeriut, no.2 (2002) : 78
\textsuperscript{28} Erhard Epler: \textit{Rikthimi i politikës}, (Tirana, ISPS 2001)149.
\textsuperscript{29} Ronald Dworkin, \textit{La democrazia possibile}, Principi per un nuovo dibattito politiko, (Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 2007), 30.
irrespective of colour, language, faith, political opinion, gender or national or community origin”³⁰

For us today, a politico-administrative culture of negligence, apparent in the institutions of the president, judicial prosecutors etc.

In modern societies, the state acts as a stimulator of trust, because it guarantees the practicability of legal contracts, and if these legal contracts would not be implemented through the intervention of the state then one of its principal functions diminishes or disappears. Otherwise, this monopoly of state violence should give all citizens equally the same guarantee of security. The monopoly of state violence in places with unconsolidated democracy is also brought into doubt because of the bringing into doubt of free political elections by the opposition or by domestic or international non-governmental organisations.

Some of the problems that truly damage the credibility of elections, despite continuous assistance and improvements in this direction and the reforms that have been undertaken, can be: for example, candidates not resigning from official posts to compete, but instead continuing in post and using all possible official resources to campaign, although the law proscribes this.

On the other side, we have a state that has been captured by businessmen, who support political campaigns and win posts in the parliament or executive themselves. “The Under-Secretary of the Democratic Party, J.Gj., was defeated in a northern district of Albania by one of the businessmen of the district, Sh.D. The latter won many times more votes than the political parties represented in that district, demonstrating that his electoral campaign was better supported from the financial side.”³¹ Furthermore, “A powerful businessman wins on behalf of the left in the election of 2005.”³²

It seems that one cannot be much in politics without money. The gathering of funds for parties justifies some of the ‘daylight robberies’ for which senior officials up to the rank of Minister are rumoured or claimed to be responsible. People fight to reach the top of certain hierarchies and then find different - and perhaps illegal - ways to defend their position. This is what the scholar A. Krasniqi says about the financing of electoral campaigns from 1991-2008: “To date, no election process, no party and no candidate has given a responsible

³⁰ Declaration of the Rights of Man, Clause 2/1
³² Ibidem, p.278.
example of a public and transparent declaration of the sources of electoral financing. This has meant that individuals, businesses and private companies create informal reciprocal relationships. These relationships develop into a conflict of interests when those they support come to power. And they also develop into favourable government decisions, replacing the old economic monopolies with new ones supported by the winning parties.”

One negative knock-on effect of these elections can be seen in way that media in the country are controlled by politics, not only in the normal run of things but also during election campaigns. “The two large parties”, according to the figures of one political scholar, “contrary to law buy 65-80% of television time in the form of electronic advertising.”

Electoral problems provoke the continuing crisis in parliament and in the political system, and have not only a high financial cost for the country but also a cost in people’s trust in politics. Albania today continues to be one of those states in Europe that have not managed to guarantee completely the development of free and fair democratic elections. A political opponent is seen as an enemy, and the battle against him at all costs - and not the interests of citizens - is seen as the principal obligation of political forces.

One of the most obvious phenomena is the personalisation of the state. This personalisation describes the situation where everyone who has even a small amount of power in their hands sees it as private property, and where political and administrative agreements are seen as personal ones, and this operates on a hierarchical framework. The state is seen as a vehicle for robbery.

In a recent study, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation emphasised: “The image of high office in an institution in Albania, seems to mean among the public that the words of the individual reflect the whole institution. Thus trust in the leader of the institution reflects the trust in the institution itself. Albanians tend to identify institutions with those who last led them, and not with the institution and its work seen continuously over a particular period of time.”

Meanwhile, another scholar wrote: “For those ruled by individuals and their loyal courts, in principality, monarchy and dictatorship, the model of political

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33 Ibidem, p.353.
34 Ibidem, p.295.
leadership in Albania remains the strong man who aims to control and lead all institutions, who imposes his policies and does not recognise in any circumstances resignation, responsibility, or limit to his reach.\textsuperscript{36}

Although place of work is not seen as linked with personal political convictions, employees in the state administration feel their position at risk if the political force in power changes. Pressures are seen as a cause of state employees’ removal by resignation, in a way which gives up their right to complain administratively or legally and seek reinstatement in work. One third of employees claim that they lost work because of pressure from supervisors. They feel relatively undefended against the unjustified use of disciplinary measures or unjust dismissal from their work. Half of them don’t feel protected by their status as civil servants or by law (the Code of labour)\textsuperscript{37}. The implementation of decisions of the Civil Service Commission and of the courts for the reinstatement of those who were removed from work unjustly is problematic. There are even cases where because of the non-implementation of a court judgement for the reinstatement of an employee, the institution paid the cost of the same work position.\textsuperscript{38}

Are our community institutions empowered? It seems that everything that comes from below functions, and everything that comes from above - from the state - is seen as alien. The paths of psychological dependence on power, for someone who sees only uncertainty, can be extremely convoluted. For example, people can be nostalgic for the dictatorship because of their bad situation. Political conflicts come down to economic conflicts between groups to win new positions of influence. Behind every party we should look to see which enterprise, which media group, and which bank wins.

At moments of political conflict, the media are full of declarations for and against, but they in themselves do not bring any improvement in the conflictual process, because the different groups of authors do not discuss anything or, on the rare occasions that they do, merely counterpose arguments one against the another. Their aim is not as realistic a description of the situation as possible, but to win an audience while claiming that their biased position is better than any alternative. For this the media use a range of rhetorical devices,

\textsuperscript{36} Afrim Krasniqi, \textit{Zajedhjet në Shqipëri, 1991-2008} (Tirana: Konica Color 2009), 351.
\textsuperscript{37} Marjana Papa: \textit{Raport monitorimi mbi qëndrueshmërinë e administratës publike për vitin 2009} (Tirana: Albpaper 2010) 33.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibidem, p.34.
drawing on favourable aspects and hiding the unfavourable, discrediting other commentators etc. And the agreements between political parties that are so often sought by the international institutions are not at all in favour of people, of citizens, but can be simply a trade-off between the parties to try to win on the back of citizens. Political opponents can be both of them so untrustworthy.

The horizontal dispersal of power among the legislative, judicial and executive organs functions with difficulty and there is a constant effort at adjustment for personal interest.

Still worse is underground violence. Underground violence is that which, dressed up in law, tends to become prevalent because it is not simply a means to an end, nor is it a bad means to a good end, but instead it is here a demonstration of power and comes across as the sole power. Formal laws with European clothing are changed into the worse kind of Latin American laws when it comes to implementation, as is the case with the education law and reforms in the hands of the Ministry of Education and Science, which has invented a Bologna à la Chilean because the model of privatization that it uses is Chilean.

For all the democratic clothing, interested parties were not consulted over this law and it disregarded the public university education which is becoming the dominant element of this service in the country. However well laws may be drafted, violence operates in an underground way and the state, with several elements captured by dubious interests, is found to powerless against them. The powerless state is that which is too restricted in its social integration and in its capacity for the control and organization of society.

By way of conclusion, the situation in Albanian conforms exactly with that described by Habermas:

“Whoever sees problems with the justification of law as depending only on problems with those in power, starts from a false premise. The lack of legitimacy often comes from problems with the democratic genesis of justice, something that evolves into unsolved problems with the direction of the state.”39 What Habermas means here by “democratic genesis of justice” is specifically a range of problems arising from the lack of a established level of political culture, from the dictatorial tradition over many years, along with other factors.

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Although there have of course been a range of achievements in Albanian democratic state formation, this issue has crystallized in difficulties that affect the consolidation of the legal state in Albania.

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Sociology of image. The case of “The Emperor's Bed”

Abstract

This article is based on a socio-political study of Albanian society during the period of the totalitarian regime. It uses cinematographic production as the starting point for observations and analysis while later moving towards a discussion on the dynamics of the state and society – the evolutions, continuities as well as the interruptions in the logic, norms, behaviors, ways of life and collective organizations. As Walter Benjamin once said: cinema opens a door towards visual unconsciousness. In turn, this study (and this article) attempts to analytically assess all of the elements that remain hidden and materialized in cinematographic imagery. These images possess the status of sole truths decided by directors who were in turn inspired by the historical events and ideologies of the period. How is society presented and represented in the cinema? The title (“The cinematic society”) provides insights on both perspectives and dimensions. On the one hand there is the portrayal of Albanian society, while on the other there is the portrayal of the totalitarian regime with all of its modifications and trajectories. Since the debate about the history of the totalitarian state is still very much alive (and remains problematic), a detailed analysis of the films and images in general provides a different perspective of history as such. Being an ideological and propaganda tool in the hands of the state, the Albanian films of this period reflect the long journey of the Albanian people: the anti-fascist war, the reconstruction of the country and the agrarian reform, the organization of the state and the creation of the bureaucratic apparatus, the industrialization and urbanization, the plans for the creation of the new man, the novelties and difficulties of implementing these projects, etc. In other words, Albanian films represent an aesthetic-political illustration of this epoch’s history, and not only a mere representation of the past. One part of public opinion in Albania considers this period’s films as a farce; an invention of history out of nothing; a product of ideology. Nevertheless, by using a series of concepts, authors and analysis, we can conclude that this cinematographic ideology – regardless of the intentions - contains a certain dose of truthfulness as it reflected the events of the period, the internal problems of the regime, the concerns and troubles of society, the changes in the political orientations. To summarize, it gives away some truthful elements and traits which are verifiable through other films as well.

Key words: Cinema; Ideology; Totalitarianism; Manipulation; Violence

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1 This basis for this article is the the film by Endri Keko “The Emperor’s Bed” (Tirana, 1973). It is taken and adopted from the book: “The cinematic society, I, The old regime and the people’s resistance) (Tirana : Edlora, 2012)
Film production during the totalitarian regime in Albania was equivalent to the production of knowledge which reduced social and historical processes in line with prefabricated schemes and thus reinterpreted and rewrote the past through an ideological lens. While rewriting the sketches and contents of history and ideology, the discourse within this film tradition is also marked by a tendency to surpass the limits of art. Cinematographic aesthetics becomes a powerful tool of propaganda that confronts the hyper-violent world of fascism and – as Walter Benjamin would say - ends up producing another kind of aestheticization of violence in the hands of the “proletariat”, which is now reduced to being a mere part of the Stalinist state apparatus.

The character of the movie at hand is a partisan fighter called Meke - a person who personifies the past, history, war and resistance. He is the “live” narrator chronicling the war against the Nazi and fascist occupiers. He is, in a way, like the grandparent who tells stories about acts of heroism, the old monarchic regime, the occupations and mass killings during World War two. However, when governed by the film, his stories and tales aim to stimulate a level of objectivity that goes beyond a mere eyewitness account of events; they aim to create or reinforce mythical tales and to treat them as social facts within the collective frameworks of memory – facts that are made official by orders issued by the totalitarian bureaucratic apparatus.

One particular short film, the Emperor’s Bed, provides a wonderful opportunity to observe and analyze the cavalry and exciting adventure of a man who overcomes his initially difficult life conditions, becomes a war hero and ends up as a “legitimate” leader of the people. The film’s images allow us to uncover and decipher the symbolic language of gestures and to translate this data into theoretical discourse. More specifically, they allow us to move from images towards language, concepts, analysis and ultimately towards the new meanings which are materialized in celluloid and which represent, from different perspectives, the nature of power and society during the period at hand. This is the reason why the reading of the film will be divided into four stages or acts.
1. The shepherd

Meke is not the kind of heroic character we're used to seeing nowadays. He is not a sex symbol, a Rambo, a football player, a successful businessman or the head of a political party. He wears anything he can find in a time of war, sports a mustache and a short beard, and his hair is messy. He holds his weapon tightly in between his arm and his shoulder. On his other hand he holds a stick which he uses to orient his people, his mule and the Nazi prisoners. This portrait of a tired, angry and starving man brings to mind triumphant plebeians. Namely, it brings to mind a special kind of plebeian: the mountain shepherd who lives through the grand events of the modern age; the technological discoveries and its consequences; the devastating global war.

Meke is an unemployed shepherd, deprived of his flock of sheep and of the animal populism that is exercised over them. Far away from nature and his natural habitat, Meke is forced to switch crafts and to adjust to the new circumstances. His newly gained status remains pre-modern. The new totalitarian administration reduces him to the model of a shepherd from a cooperative – a system in which nature, land, animals and the means of production belong to the Shepherd State. Just like other families in occupied and non-aggressor peoples, his family also becomes a victim of these modernizing processes and suffers from starvation and from other miseries of life. Faced with threatening circumstances, his sons break away from the chains of primitive determinism and do not become shepherds. The whip of this existential threat leaves them with no other choice but to join the resistance war.

The impact of the past in Meke's psyche helps to explain the first scene of the film, where Meke the partisan – in a completely new configuration of life – is seen holding a shepherd's stick in his hand and orienting the obedient mule, as well as the Nazi soldiers who bow down to the animal force and human orders. The former wolves have been converted to warriors and bureaucrats in accordance with the “technical administrative order” of this world, which Bauman dubs as the modern “spirit of instrumental rationality”.

The fates of the animals and war prisoners are bound together in this journey towards a new unimaginable adventure, even though we can hardly tell if their status is summarized and constrained to the mule – an irony which brings

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3 Ibid, 47.
to mind the famous painting by Francisco de Goya. We need to wait for the subsequent scene in order to resolve the dilemma. Once they're inside the courtyard of a palace, all four characters stop in front of a statue of Hitler. What ensues is a symbolic court trial of images and reciprocal glances. Hitler looks at his devastated wolf-pack. The soldiers, on the other hand, look back at their leader’s angry posture. It seems as if they are mired in shame and discomfort when confronted with the world’s shepherd. Meke the partisan interferes violently. Two other partisans take over custody over the Nazis who will now most probably be executed. The surrounding environment is markedly violent as gun shots are heard all around the palace.

Meke is left standing alone in between the “statues” of the mule and Hitler. He grabs the animal’s tether and throws it around Hitler’s neck. This gesture toys with the possibility of the spectator misunderstanding it – namely, one is tempted to think that the power of the mule will bring down the murderous idol. However, the scene effectively deals with the shepherd’s consciousness. Deprived of politics, the animal can fulfill a pale politicizing role as a preserver of human aberration. Hitler continues to stand there but is subjected to a new force – the mule. The later now becomes an animal-shepherd and produces a populist type of sarcasm. The most intriguing thing in this case is the choice of keeping the dictator’s figure intact aside from ironies and interpretations.

2. The neurotic palace

Meke the partisan cannot resist the urge of human curiosity, driven by centuries long oppression and a sense of plebeian humiliation, to investigate the Royal Palace from up close. He observes the art pieces slowly and with a sense of curiosity. The camera illustrates the furniture inventory, sometimes even providing documentary type fragments.

A sculpture of a healthy and naked woman appears in front of Meke. Standing next to it is a dried up fountain. The shepherd approaches the statue and is visibly angry as he looks at it. You wonder about the kind of curses he’s articulating within his head. He surely feels bad in front of her lustful image and does not know how to behave within the courtyard of aristocratic society – a place of decadence, immorality, endless debauchery, superficial values. His heartbeat intensifies – not from any sense of excitement, but from the clash of two opposite and contradictory models, norms and regimes. One the one hand stands the plebeian, the villager, the embryonic working class. One the
other there’s the patrician, the noble and bourgeois. The shepherd picks up some flowers and bush leaves and throws them around the statue’s body, as if silently telling her: *Cover yourself up, bitch!*

The aristocratic spaces, murals and sculptures are abandoned by runaway soldiers and the defeated monarchic system, and as such they need to be integrated into a new type of courtyard – one that expresses a new form of culture and is inspired by the tastes and sensitivities of the shepherd. This culture succumbs to the power of the plebeian *culture* - to the profane, atomized and totalitarian masses which oppose the culture of court aristocracy, the manners and etiquette of high-culture, eloquent speaking, social rank and blue blood. These issues were analyzed in the famous works of German sociologist Norbert Elias. 4

What we witness is a clash of two visions. This makes the Palace’s courtyard a target of critiques and turns the shepherd’s adventure into a platform for a populist rampage against the monarchy and the occupying superpowers. The plebeian enters forcefully into the former Royal court but does not displace or destroy its objects or its architecture. There is a printed order, issued from above, that is posted in the Royal Palace’s entry door which and which instructs the partisans not to touch anything. They are disciplined in obeying it. Not only doesn’t Meke destroy anything in the palace, but he also tries to preserve order as if this was his own house that was rediscovered after years spent in the mountains. The new rationality seems to have been installed with dizzying speed and the partisans seem to be fully complying with it. The Royal Palace is now in the hands of the shepherd. It needs to be remade into a center of power for a new court type society – for a new absolutism that is being born right there on the spot.

Shocked and surprised, Meke increasingly drowns himself in the blurry and newly discovered world. His eyes cannot believe the absurdity they witness – it’s the messiest situation he’s ever found himself in. This deranged place produces illusions. It is a magic, hallucinative, hypnotic, decadent palace. It starts to deform the tangible world of the courtyard as well as Meke’s inner world. His hands cuddle, rub, verify, touch and create an inventory of the Palace’s items. Every time the two contradictory realities clash, one of them has to yield right of way to the other and ends up causing panic attacks, doubts and phobias. The objects and furniture tell Meke that he is in the

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4 Norbert Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp, 2002)
Royal Palace. But the man who is standing in the Palace has no clue about the smells, sensitivities and habits of the aristocratic order. Imagine the world of a peasant who observes the Palace as if it was an evil and amoral mirror. This mirror forces Meke to also observe himself and his past through the Palace’s eyes. Among other things, the film contains several flashback moments, thus creating a dialectic (of editing) between the two periods, with the purpose of legitimizing the present day situation as something owing to the past – namely, presenting the two periods as a contradictory continuity.

Meke does not need anyone else for this introspection – he doesn’t need a psychoanalyst or any other random interlocutor. He is self-sufficient as he embarks upon a thorough investigation of himself, telling us and his consciousness about who he was and is. On top of the introspection, he also needs retrospection (but without retro-action) since digging deeply within the self takes time. The depth of the inside (intro) bring forth the images of life as it once was (retro). These images come forth in today’s world in the form of an awareness on the past and the present. In order to complete these acrobatics, Meke needs something to shake up his psychological and spiritual condition – he needs an engine, a cause. The Palace creates the conditions for a temporary craze, because otherwise Meke is a strong man who doesn’t get fooled or swayed easily. Nevertheless, even the Palace as a whole, as an architectural object, an aesthetic experience, a place, an idea of the monarchy’s past life, is not sufficient to stir in Meke’s psyche a chaotic journey towards the past. He needs statues, furniture and other more specific motives. Thus Meke enters the Palace so that he can enter a magic world, a surreal game and a pale schizophrenia. The Palace is the waiting room which produces mood swings and changes minds, serving as a steppingstone for the narration of the past.

Meke stands in front the Palace’s mirror. The image in the mirror shows a somewhat deranged partisan. The mirror speaks to us about the past. So that it can achieve its full effect, the mirror is associated by some glimmering and spiraling lights, as if we are inside the head of a dizzy person. Through the mirror and the light, Meke embarks upon his journey by digging into memories and visions which are preselected beforehand. The movement from the present to the past is also associated with continuous cuts of historical images which in fact are original footages. The retrospective passages of the film are very synthetic: childhood, family, the shepherd’s life, feudal despotism, overall misery, a group of boys arrested by fascist police, moments from the
anti-fascist resistance, etc. These segments allow the audience to “familiarize” with the people’s previous life conditions.

As stated above, the analysis of the film is based on a dialectical (and editing) process which aims to say: *We/I remember*. This is a cliché feature that was common for many films produced during the dictatorship period. It attempted to incite a continuous repetition of memory. The film is formulated on the basis of two logics of knowledge/image transmission. One is retrospective and the other is based on the present. It is the people’s past that produces the conditions and causes for the resistance as well as for the independent state that will now take care of the people. It is a past that attempts to re-actualize itself during the present Nazi occupation as a form of rebellion and resistance.

The person who stands right in the middle of these two manipulative tactics is Meke the partisan. He is the breaking point, the border point, the revolution, the war. But he is also a judge of the past, a spokesperson of the totalitarian authority who governs the memory of war victims, because he is speaking in the 1970’s (when the film was shot) in the capacity of a veteran.

When confronted with the power of the landlord and his whip, Meke as a shepherd from the past is completely passive, submissive and waiting for that grand moment when he can tangentially change his miserable life conditions. In the past, he is a social and political nobody. The retrospective tales give us an image of a quiet an peaceful person who is submissive towards the landlords, the aristocrats and the fascist capital.

The film treats World War two in a very suspicious and reductionist manner as it criticizes every occupier and gives them equal treatment: “*You went down the drain, big headed Duce!* In that other world you’ll meet men of your kind, commanders of Rome, Serbia, Turkey who came and left their bones here, just like you did. Tell them that Meke says hello and tell them to leave some extra space for those who plan on doing the same things to my country as you did!” This passage reflects Albania’s change of course in the 70’s after the exit from the “Warsaw Pact” (1968). This image of a total hero who fights against all of the historical enemies of a peaceful nation like the Albanians can perhaps be interpreted as a illustrating a weakening of the totalitarian regime’s authority. There is a need for a new populist discourse on the victories and progresses of the Albanian people in order to ensure mobilization against every aggressive, militant and treacherous current that threatens the absurd “Marxist-Leninist”, or rather Stalinist, doctrine. The denouncement of Il Duce’s and Hitler’s regimes...
as despotic and murderous paves the way for the birth of a new despotic regime which bases itself on values such as the protection of life and which understand itself in accordance with self-defined categories and criteria.

3. The new emperor

Meke the shepherd is finally integrated in historical processes as a liberation fighter (a partisan) in the struggle against sworn enemies. Nevertheless, the paradox is that he starts to develop an authority that is more personal than it is collective. After he enters the palace, he begins to detach himself from the surrounding developments – one can still hear the fighting raging outside the palace – and starts to explore the waning civilization. He is accompanied by other partisans. Some play war tunes in the piano. Others play with a Nazi military motorcycle and sneakingly attempt to turn on its engine. Meke is completely indifferent to all of these activities and details. The partisan is excited and electrified by the sense of power brought forth by a palace that is simultaneously corrupt while also a steppingstone for a newly rising form of government.

Meke slowly begins to get alienated. As he walks up the stairs of the Palace, every floor in which he walks through is associated with a history and a story. He rejects the Palace as a creation of old regimes and regencies, but since he is now inside in the warm, yet now cooled, bed of the Emperor, he cannot resist its authority as well its abstract and concrete power. The Palace is the secret and the key to understanding the entire perspective from the shepherd to the emperor. Its power disorients you. It places you in a surreal world; it captivates you and drives you away from reality until it swallows you and makes you a part of it.

Meke begins to show the first signs of triumphant delirium. His language becomes more aggressive as he debates the world’s rulers. He asks for accountability. He pokes fun at them. He talks about their defeats with irony. He steps up, ladder after ladder, in the world’s pyramid. He becomes the head of the military and later of the Communist Party. “You started this adventure a bit too ambitiously, didn’t you, oh German hero! It didn’t cross your mind to worry about the mountains and fortresses of Albania?” (as these sentences are being uttered, the film shows images of the town of Gjirokastra, as “an antipode” of Nazi insanity). “By know you probably know what kind of reception your army received here, don’t you?” “There’s nothing you can do, your highness. Kings are
bound to eat out kings! How come nobody can’t eat me out? I’m talking about me, Meke, the guy who became a king today in the Royal Palace.”

Through Meke’s words and his communication with the occupiers, we are in fact hearing the dictator showing off the collective power of the people, as well as his own individual power. The shepherd approaches the Empire’s throne by stating: “You’re looking angrily at me because I occupied your bed? You should have thought of that before coming here. You’re indeed an emperor, but you know that even bigger emperors are always bound to come”. After making these statements, the shepherd stands up, approaches the window to salute the victorious people who are standing outside. More than a statement of the people’s victory, the act is a proclamation of the self, of the new Albanian emperor.

After criticizing Hitler and Il Duce in their respective pulpits, it’s now his time to show the people who’s the new boss. “I am an emperor myself now!” The director engages in a lot of editing at this point. We move from the image of Meke the partisan, to original images of Albania’s liberation which show festive and celebratory crowds. The shepherd is in front of the people, the first one to stand in the window of the Palace, while the people below him are cheering and celebrating the end of the occupation, and the opening of a new epoch. The people adore the shepherd as their supreme leader, and he has now undergone the Kafkaesque metamorphosis. Power relations change. While he’s standing at that window, Meke is a symbol of the a power which produces a new kind of populism in which the people are subdued to the point of being completely erased. The sovereign is alienated in the image and discourse of the government and can do nothing else but celebrate his nullification.

4. The stubborn emperors of crisis

Meke enters the war as a shepherd who’s taken hostage by the modern age, a condition which creates fertile ground for a new kind of populism - that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Most people like him were part of the great processes of bureaucratization, emancipation, industrialization and served as the foundation of the dictatorship. Their energy would nevertheless vane as the government came of age, was inevitably consumed and, as a consequence, a new decadence was silently pronounced.
Meke’s children, the new generation of the early 70’s (the period when the film was shot), began to take further steps towards modernization, building up on what their parents had achieved. This refers especially to the critiques against old traditions, taboos and the desires for greater freedom in culture and art. This generation finds itself in complete contradiction with father Meke as an authority of war. The situation is understandable because the needs and demands of the age are different. Meke is a retired person, a war veteran living in the socialist metropolis whose main activity is to take care of his grandchildren. His children are no longer the shepherd’s they used to be, nor are they partisans strongly attached to feelings about poverty, resistance and war. They are urbanized and have different habits and sensitivities. They are inspired by neighboring Italy. Just one year before the film was produced, they had watched the famous 11th festival of the Albanian public broadcaster.

Feeling undervalued, Meke insists on clarifying his worth, and this is why he feels obliged to tell us his entire history, as if he wants to tell us: “I am your emperor, the victor of the war, the generator of progress, the power that can wipe any enemy from the face of the earth. We’ve gone too far with emancipation. It’s time to step back!”

Time corrugates and weakens power. It brings power of age. Meke is much older than he was in 1944. Just like those silly old men whose nature won’t allow them to accept old age as a fact of life, he will turn his eyes even more forcefully toward fanaticism. He fears political openness, liberalization and, of course, his replacement from power.

The Albanian film viewer in 1973 - a peaceful spectator of his fate - has no other choice but to obey orders like a well-bred horse. Those who are half-civilized are stuck at the crossroads of the Cultural Revolution and are shaking in panic. Feeling powerless and castrated like devoted and passive servants, they won’t get anywhere. As residents of populists catacombs, they become zombies in deep sleep who would see the light of day only years later, when they would once again become preferred slaves - now within a richer curricula - to what Michel Foucault dubbed pastoral power. Once again they are waiting for global shifts, hoping for the non-promises of freedom.

During the entire duration of the film (27 minutes) we see the rise to power of the shepherd and the partisan as an innocent reflection of Enver Hoxha’s Stalinism. The viewer’s attention is drawn away once again towards the monarchy, the occupiers and the war. The dynamic of the film, marked by a
populist discourse, erases real people by turning them into blind animals who are nevertheless capable of assessing historical debts and tributes. The mind is distracted, the motives and forces are disassembled, and we witness the return of a fake memory which continues to feed a nation that celebrates its death through parades.

To conclude, I will refer to Arendt’s thoughts about the nature of totalitarian regimes. This statement fits perfectly with the Albanian totalitarian reality: “There is nothing that better characterizes totalitarian movements in general, and the glory of their leaders in particular, than the surprising speed by which we forget them and the surprising simplicity by which we replace them.”

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Hindu culture in the Kosovan social context

Abstract

Given the fact that television brings a range of cultures and ways of life visually into our living rooms, it must be accepted that there is also the presence of other influences transmitted through television programmes. Likewise, television has an impact on the cultural transformation of particular communities. Recently in Kosovo, serials have occupied a considerable amount of television programming, thus impacting on the audience’s culture. Serials have a powerful effect on their audience, but audiences adapt them creatively and use them for various aims of their own. There are a range of examples of how serials are ‘consumed’ by audiences but we will focus on the use of the sari, traditional Indian clothing - Hindu clothing - in Kosovo. This article will also cover the presentation of foreign - i.e. not only Albanian - culture through the opening of restaurants, the choice of names and types of food as well as the exhibition of selected artefacts.

Key words: Clothing, television, transformation, presentation, aspects of culture

All cultures are fundamentally predisposed to change, and at the same time to resist change. There are dynamic processes of time in operation, encouraging the acceptance of new ideas and new things. Likewise, there is the process of a different dynamic which, as has just been mentioned, encourages stability, rather than change, in phenomena and particular cultural manifestations. Today there are fast-moving developments in all areas. People are worried about not being left behind and are somehow constantly searching for the ways and means to move forward, and to keep up with the times.

Television is a virtual resource available to everyone in modern industrialised society, and serves to increase the world’s development. It is a source of knowledge brought to the people, irrespective of where they are and where they receive television’s effects. This knowledge and the achievements of the world enable swift, albeit mediated, contact between a person in one place with others, with other ways of living which are different from those we generally live. Television is implicated in the ‘securing and selective constructing of social knowledge of the imagined society, through which ‘the world’, ‘the lived reality’
of others is perceived and their life is reconstructed in an imaginary way into ‘everyone’s world’ (Hall, 1977:140).

As there are ever more products of the media industry in the world, this has brought about the creation of self-fashion: ‘An area which is separated from confinements of space and time of direct contact, and - given the access to television and its global reach - is always available to individuals across the world’ (Thompson, 1995:43).

Cultures are not isolated. As Franz Boas claimed many years ago, contact between neighbours and tribes has always existed and was spread in many other regions. Human populations construct their cultures in interaction with others and not in isolation (Wolf, 1982). Exposure to external forces comes from mass media, migration and modern transport.

Cultural processes include all those through which people transform the world to be a world within themselves. This means all the specific norms and rules, the values and ideas of groups, the information and knowledge that is presented, exchanged and adapted and that create a new perception in the processes of communication. Films and television series can be seen as communication between cultures, where we can find what is desired to be transformed, transmitted and changed.

By visual means, television conveys different cultures and ways of living into our sitting rooms. Equally, it presents values and ways of understanding the world which may be different from those in our culture, it offers an experience and in a way it completes our knowledge about world culture and, last of all, has an impact on the formation of our routines of life and culture.

In many cases, television today is treated as a source of culture which can be used to strengthen methods of knowledge and expression. Television can be used, or rather exploited, to gain knowledge, to understand ourselves and others and the world around us. We are encouraged to negotiate, to understand and, sometimes, even to change our values, our beliefs and our feelings of identity in an ongoing dialogue with the human stories we see on television. We orient our conversation around the television, linking it with our personal and social experiences and with those we see on television. The way we talk about television reveals a lot about our identity, we communicate who we are, what we believe in and how we are influenced by the television indirectly in our own lives.
Television serials have for a long time occupied a large part of televised time and space in all parts of Albanian society, as well as in world society.

The historian Benedict Anderson argued that the simultaneous consumption of national media (newspapers, television programmes) plays an important part in how we imagine ourselves as members of a national community (Anderson 1983). As Anderson argues, the modern state is not a political, economic and territorial entity; it’s a cultural construct, an ‘imagined community’.

Serials occupy a large part of total television transmissions and in this way many worlds are unfolded, where the audience begins with their own imagination and at the same time it somehow becomes a part of their life and experience. ‘The audience is an active producer of meanings within their cultural context.’ The term *imagination* is separated from real life. A television watcher enters an imaginary world which offers a range of other people’s experiences, different from our everyday life.

A great number of serials are broadcast in Kosovo and each of them has in one way or another had an impact on the cultural transformation of the audience, for instance on their style of dress, food, hairstyles etc.

Serials have an influence on the audience but audiences adapt them creatively and use them for various purposes of their own. There are various examples of how serials are consumed by their audiences, but we will focus on the use of the sari (traditional clothing from India, and Hindu clothing) in Kosovo.

The sari, traditional clothing from India which is very ornate and difficult to produce, but which gives women an enticing look, is in its native land worn by women from all levels and classes of society, who have a certain civil/social status. This form of clothing is therefore transported into India and the Near East.

How is the sari, this traditional clothing from India, connected to television serials? What is the connection in this case?! In Kosovo, but also elsewhere in Albanian culture, at weddings and many celebratory occasions, there has been a noticeable presence recently of women wearing saris. In many cases, the sari is also part of the trousseau, alongside other clothes that are traditional and those that are European.

About two years ago a serial called ‘India’ was broadcast on one of the national television stations. The storyline of this serial included the following themes: family relationships, economic power, the position of women in the family,
inter-cultural marriage, family ceremonies etc. India is a country with many constructed rituals which are an attraction for many foreigners, and it’s also a country where there has been much research by various experts, and particularly by cultural anthropologists.

The world is moving forward with huge developments, but in this forward motion, some of our traditions are weakening, if not disappearing completely, leaving space for new ones. In this case it has happened that specific cultural elements are being approved and being substituted with elements from other cultures, and thus that cultural transformations and substitutions are taking place.

When we speak of the presence of the sari in Kosovo, many other issues emerge which are connected with it, and which call for a more focused study. In the case of the wearing of the sari the influence of the serial can be clearly observed in cultural transformation, and specifically the idea that in order to seem like characters in a serial, women dress like them. In this case it should be emphasised that the sari is dress for everyday wear in India whereas here in Kosovo it is worn only for special occasions, as a party or formal dress.

We are certain that wearing a sari in Hindu culture has to be done with respect for specified social rules, just as is the case in our culture with the deliberate wearing of traditional national dress.

“Those who deliberately wear a wide range of traditional dress in authentic environments are not allowed irregularities, for instance, in not respecting the full structure of the costume, and its morphology in accordance with the gender or age-group or civil or social status of the wearer etc, while those wearing foreign-style or modern or patriarchal clothing for everyday wear seem not to worry about these issues and all kinds of infringements are tolerated. Or when these issues are brought up it can be seen that not much account is taken of them by those wearing modern clothes.”

To be unusual and special, particularly on formal occasions, is something which has been seen as rather desirable and well-regarded in recent times, and in this case cultural influences play an important part.

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1 Halimi Statovci Drita Veshjet Shqiptare të Kosovës, Pristina, 2009, p. 368
"For so-called good clothes, when there is the intention of going out of the house, for official occasions, weddings and other events, even in the modern period and in a way which aspires to resemble modernity, the instruments of social control are seen to be fairly active and exigent. Wearers have to show that they follow fashion and its related fields. This is seen particularly among wearers who are newly married and young women."  

How can such clothing be obtained? There are many ways to tie a sari and this is also a way to understand other social phenomena in Kosovo and its social relations with other places. There are cases where a sari is sewn on the basis of models borrowed from the original which could be a gift from a Hindu friend with whom the wearer lives, for example in Canada. This tells us about population migration and contact between different peoples and communities in a third country which is alien to all. On the basis of the original costume, tailors are engaged and they sew the sari in accordance with the orders received from people interested in this kind of Indian clothing. However, the material is brought and selected already decorated, embroidered with a range of decorations because doing the work specifically for this purpose by hand is labour intensive and would be very expensive.

On the basis of interviewees who wear the sari it emerges that for some of them they ordered the sari from a partner working in Dubai, Afghanistan etc and sometimes this was not done just for partners but for the friends of partners. From this we can see the phenomenon of seasonal and temporary migration for work, specifically for migration for jobs in these places which is common in Kosovo. This could be another theme for further study, especially in the ethnographic region of Anamorava.

And as for the question of whether the sari has reached the market, can we say yes? In Kosovo, for example in Prizren, I’ve noticed a shop exclusively for saris, which has original saris made in India, and they come here in Kosovo with a range of colours. As soon as you enter this shop you are aware of an atmosphere of Indian culture, from the large photograph of an Indian woman, dressed in a sari, and there are also various accessories around. The owner of the shop told us that there are lots of orders, and that they are mainly for special formal occasions such as weddings but also other parties and celebrations.

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2 Ibid, p. 368
This is an example of the influence of serials in cultural presentations, the combination of different cultural elements and an embracing of traditional clothing from a foreign culture with the intention and desire to look different and ‘modern’ etc.

Photograph 1 Sari displayed in a boutique window, Prizren – 2010; photographed by ZH

The Hindu dress culture, like other cultures of dress and other things, is presented in Kosovo in a variety of forms. Another form is the opening of restaurants, in which case the presentation of a foreign country is not only through food and its preparation, but the particular effect the restaurants achieve through their choice of name. This choice is also reflected in the advertising of the restaurant in question, in the way it presents itself, which is linked to Indian culture.

Restaurants may thus serve as resistors or admirers of change and when they are in a foreign country doing business, they can present traditional history and culture, for example through the food, the music, a historical display, an article of clothing or linen.
In the Republic of Kosovo there is a well-known restaurant with the name ‘Mumtaz Mahalla’ positioned in a very good and obvious location. The history of ‘Mumtaz Mahal’ is explained on the first page of the menu. The first thing you can see is the history of ‘Mumtaz Mahal’ which is numbered among the seven wonders of the world and is known as the Taj Mahal. This is one of the ways that you can transmit your history in another country, and can find channels for doing so as effectively as possible.

Photograph 2 The Mumtaz Mahalla restaurant in Pristina – 2011, photographed by ZH

‘Today’s cosmopolitanisms combine the experiences of a various media with various forms of experience such as cinema, restaurants, tourism etc that have different national and transnational genealogy. Some of these forms may start out as extremely global and end up as very local’

The opening of restaurants can thus also be taken as a combination of showing something new, a connection, friendship, adaptation etc. Presentation cannot be done in the original manner in a foreign country so the combination with local culture is seen to be welcome.

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3 Appadurai Arjun *Modernity at Large* (Univerversity of Minnesota, eighth edition), 2008, p 64
The transformation of daily subjectivity through electronic mediation and the work of the imagination is not only a cultural fact. It is deeply connected in principle through the new ways that individuals, interests and aspirations are ever more connected in a diagonal path from the nation/state. Thus, this kind of communication also helps collaboration between countries.

As well as the many changes brought by serials, the restaurants are seen as a good example of adapting another people’s traditions in our culture. It is well-known that cultures create bridges between understanding. Our restaurants here in Kosovo, and more widely in Albanian culture, are developing with great success. And restaurants include other cultural elements. Albanians are distinguished by a variety of clothing which from time to time we see exhibited and worn in restaurants too, whether by the waiting staff, or by the chef. Such sights are attractive, but also significant in the modern world. Maybe our costume, too, could be transported to others in the future? There are even cases where foreigners buy our Albanian costume to keep as a souvenir of our country. There needs to be greater promotion of this issue, protection and special care of them, and greater business and institutional commitment. In this way we teach ourselves, but also others, about our culture and heritage, we learn to love our culture, to love and value cultural heritage.

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4 Ibid, p. 10
National independence, democracy and development: the Balkan ending of the modern myths*

Abstract

National independence, democracy and development are becoming myths, i.e. unreliable stories, in most countries of the former Yugoslavia. Three different accounts are offered to explain each defeat of the modernity. Firstly, national dependence is due the fact that the peripheral countries in this area, unlike the core (European) states, do not have companies strong enough to outgrow “generalized monopolies” in Amin’s terms. Secondly, liberal (representative) democracy, for the time being, does not provide solutions to key social problems such as rising unemployment, corruption, and power concentrated in various cliques. Eventually, next to domestic countertendencies to modernity, the development stalemate is caused by paradigm-shift in the Western economic strategy and policy: from welfare and security to a laissez-faire economy and risk-laden society as goals. The latter goals also contradict the path-dependencies of post-Yugoslav economies and societies marked with collectivism and paternalism. As a result, the countries are increasingly incapable of development in terms of the free-market economy, individualism and risk behavior. In conclusion, some ideas for alternative developments are proposed based on a concept of cultural policy of sustainable development, triangle of democratic institutions, and soft power. These ideas still belong to paradigmatic trinity of modernity, i.e. freedom, equality and fraternity, this time with some modified contents as regards the meanings of democracy, development and national sovereignty.

Key words: dependence, oligarchic rule, underdevelopment, Kosovo, countries of the former Yugoslavia, alternative developments

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Introduction

The title notwithstanding, the aim of this paper is not to add another tip to inflationary discourse of “endism” typical of a number of post-modernist works which rebuff modernity under pretext that it is unsustainable and actually overwhelmed by countertendencies. Although the paper recognizes the current downturns of the modern values, it does not share the post-modernist proclaiming of the end of modernity. Instead, political, economic and other practices using rhetoric of modernization in post-Yugoslavian countries are criticized. Yet, such criticism does deny extraordinary qualities of the modernity, including its inherent potentials for “self-correction” (Eisenstadt, 2000).

The main secular hopes of large number of people originate from the French and the American revolutions. Their ideas of freedom, equality, fraternity and, at the same time, people’s sovereignty (which often is taken as a synonym for national independence) have supplanted a bulk religious, other-worldly beliefs in a just world. In this case denoting the modern ideas as myths implicates that the modern ideas as ideals are necessarily counter-factual, modern legal norms alike, and they still look as a very remote or non-existent (utopian) place. Yet, it does not mean that people’s hope is impossible or meaningless. It is possible and meaningful just because approaching to the ideals is, unlike in pre-modern eras, inherent to contemporary secular sphere, regardless whether secular mind and political actors are hegemonic, as in the West, or they share public space and governmental structures with traditional religious clergy, as in some Arab or Islamic countries (cf. Collins and Owen, 2012). In other words, most people living in modern or modernizing societies still hope that sooner or later, in their or their children’s generations, the modern objectives can indeed be achieved. As Alexis de Tocqueville put in, democracy – and equality in particular – is not welcomed by all, especially not by elites who have proclivity for restoration of the noble privileges; nevertheless, the coming of democracy renders inevitable (Tocqueville, 2002: 13). Furthermore, bearing in mind that democracy is the youngest political regime in history, which follows millennia of undemocratic rule, and that new democratic regimes have necessarily preserved some elements of the old regimes, the “end” of democracy comes about to be temporary in the interplay between modern and anti-modern forces. Still, the question of the longevity of anti-democratic tendencies or practices, moreover their hegemony, is far from being unimportant. How much the current “counterrevolution” will take – one, ten or hundred years or so? In the case of the latter, i.e. hundred or more years, democracy would most
probably be replaced in part or in complete by undemocratic regime which may last for long as well and which "end" may also look temporary. Or, old and new (democratic) regime(s) can intertwine and such exist in contemporary society for uncertain long period of time. In any case, modernity, although coupled with anti-modernity, is an extraordinary achievement when compared with pre-modern achievements and epochs, just because it manifests capability of acting in favor of democracy in spite of its enemies. Accordingly, independence, democracy and development would remain objectives for at least some parts of contemporary elites as well as middle and lower social classes. Furthermore, as a long lasting process of social change the modernity may be modified in a way that can be more useful both to developed and to developing societies, and upper and lower social strata, respectively, than it used to be nowadays. This is one of the reasons why the (international) policy of development was criticized virtually from its beginning, since development, and modernization processes on the whole, have taken different paths in the core and in the peripheral countries. For the most part, modernization in the core has not been followed by peripheral countries. As a result, uneven/unequal development became a rule rather than exemption. Moreover, gaps between developed and developing countries have enormously increased (cf. Dale, 2012). Consequently, antidemocratic forces in the periphery are much stronger than in the core. Nevertheless, this counterbalance constitutes the very logic of modernity. Also, downward economic cycles (of capitalism) entail of traditional or conservative parts of society: again, much more in the periphery than in the core countries.

In 1990s countries of the former Yugoslavia were at the beginning of their national independence as well as the multiparty democracy and economic development in terms of the market economy. Very soon, however, they have been faced with termination of these processes: independence was followed by the loss of a significant portion of sovereignty. In parallel, democracy became a political spectacle without (democratic) substance, and development a euphemism for jobless growth and the rise of new riches. This paper is aimed at explaining these paradoxes in several ways, but basically as the result of the very logic of the modernity, i.e. its inherent contradictions and zigzag motions (cf. Wallerstein, 1990). Eventually, the paper will propound some ideas for alternative developments which still can be considered as modern and probably applicable to the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
Kosovo’s experience

The following quotation is taken from the book *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the periphery* (with subtitle: *Political Economy, Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo*) written by Jens S. Sörensen. It is concerned with contemporary (post-war) situation in Kosovo. Nevertheless, much of what he said about Kosovo is still valid for most countries of the former Yugoslavia nowadays (Sörensen, 2009: 239-254):

“The political parties in Kosovo can be considered neither democratic, nor ‘parties’. Rather they are authoritarian pyramids of power. They have no real ideological basis, and there is no bridge to social group in society and no communication between the political elite and the citizens... Formal unemployment in Kosovo is estimated to be around 50-60 per cent, and has remained at the same high level during the international administration, or has perhaps even been growing... The consolidation of organized criminal groups... constitutes a particular problem for the development of a formal economy... UNMIK has estimated that public revenue collection in Kosovo operates at only 50 percent of its potential, with 80 per cent of the shortfall resulting from black market activity by organized criminal groups... /Finally/ Kosovo is a(n)... area in the epicenter of a wider region affected by ethno-nationalism and illiberal economy. Its path to development cannot bypass this region within which it so firmly politically and economically embedded.”

Why the path of development in Kosovo does not follow prescriptions of the “formal economy” designed by the (neoliberal) policy propounded in the West? In general, why the three modern ideas, that are constitutional in most contemporary countries, namely national independence, democracy and development, have failed in practice and eventually became myths rather than social life-world experiences of most people in the peripheries? One of the leading sociologists in the former Yugoslavia, Josip Županov, who analyzed the case of the “communist hypocrisy”, namely apparent discrepancy between the normative, legally prescribed, model of the workers’ self-management and situations in Yugoslav companies that actually were ruled by managers appointed by the state & party apparatus, concluded that “while the theory marches on the road, practice is rambling through the forest”) (cf. Županov, 1999). Pretty much the same happens nowadays in the process of modernization in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, but also many other areas in the world. The discourse of liberalism and its categories of
freedom and equal opportunities obviously does not correspond to situations in the economic and the politics in the post-Yugoslavian countries.

How to explain the discrepancy between the “highways” and “forests” of the modernity? To remember, Marx explained the paradox of modernity in the terms of the historical dialectics of class struggles (between proletariat and bourgeoisie) that changes fortunes of one or the other side in the conflict, and eventually results either with revolution or with “common ruins” (cf. Hassan, 2012). Max Weber presented modernity as a process of rationalization or “disenchantment” (Entzauberung) in the sense that modern culture discloses other culture’s illusions as much as its own (cf. Motta, 2011). One such self-owned illusion in the West is the market fundamentalism, i.e. the belief that the market alone can solve fundamental economic and social problem problems, such as fair (re)distribution of wealth. Another, yet opposite, illusion which characterized the ideology of the former Soviet-style socialism, was that State & Party, due to its “providential” prerogatives that inform command-and-planned economy, can solve crucial economic and social problems, such as balance between production and consumption. Thus modernization, anti-modernization and/or alternative modernization, such as socialist-communist solutions of the market failure or neoliberal ignorance of the market failure, are interconnected. All these processes are typical of the Western core countries as well, yet there the contradictory processes are less detrimental to the core than peripheral countries.

Why are the modern ideas becoming less and less credible?

National independence, democracy and development appeared in different times in history. The right to national self-determination was born in the second half of 19th century and established as a principle in international relations by the end of the First World War, more precisely upon the dissolution of Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires. At that time national independence included economic independence which brought about the “national economy” as a self-contained socio-economic unit, yet not for long time. As David Held put in, today most states are not sovereign anymore, but rather autonomous (in the sense that they implement laws or rules on their territories). This is primarily caused by the processes globalization, in the economy in the first place (Held, 1995).
Modern democracy was born some two hundred years ago in the USA, France and Great Britain. As such, it is older than most nation-states. In the outset, democracy was basic and local rather than national and representative in different local communities in the American North and in Western Europe (Paris in France, for instance). Today, democracy is representative and centralized rather than basic and decentralized. Democracy exists almost exclusively as the periodical performance of elections for different instances of political power (multiparty parliaments, presidents). Basic democracy in industry / economy is extremely rare a phenomenon and is confined today to Venezuela, as it used to be in the former Yugoslavia from 1950s to 1980s. Meanwhile, especially in the former Eastern European countries, civic participation is declining, and is also declining in the western core, i.e. the United States and the Western Europe (see: Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfer, 2012).

Development as a policy was launched in 1949 in the United States as an ambitious program of international assistance to underdeveloped countries. Today, the goal of development is seriously compromised. The following figures show the magnitudes of the failures of global development (compiled from: www.heartsandminds.org/poverty/hungerfacts.htm; www.themillenniallegacy.com/?page_id=81):

Every year more than 10 million children die of hunger and preventable diseases – that is over 30,000 per day and one every 3 seconds. One third of deaths – some 18 million people a year or 50,000 per day – are due to poverty-related causes; that is 270 million people since 1990, the majority are women and children, roughly equal to the population of the US. Forty six per cent of girls in the world’s poorest countries have no access to primary education. 2.5 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation and some 1.2 billion people do not have access to a clean source of water. Most of the world’s mega-slums have grown since 1960s as a result of market forces and speculation on land. Last, but not least, in 1970, 22 of the world’s richest countries pledged to spend 0.7% of their national income on aid. Thirty-four years later, only five countries have kept that promise.

The ideological trinity consisting of national independence, democracy and development have vigorously been launched in Eastern Europe after 1989. Meanwhile, developmental roads leading to the objectives have been obstructed. How to explain these divergences?
Fading of national independence

The following quote from Samir Amin’s recent article describes EU as a megasociety with three different layers (Amin, 2012):

The first layer is made by “/t/he European core (Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and Scandinavia) /At/ has now come under the economic, political, and social sway of its own generalized... monopolies... Still, the generalized monopolies proper to this European region are not “European”; they are still strictly “national” (that is to say, German, British, Swedish, etc.) even though their businesses are trans-European and even transnational (carried out on a worldwide scale). The same is the case with the contemporary generalized monopolies of the United States and Japan...

The second layer involves Italy, Spain, and Portugal in which the same dominant model—currently, that of generalized monopoly capitalism—only took shape much more recently, after the Second World War. Because of this, these societies retain peculiarities in their forms of economic and political governance that obstruct their rise to equality with the others.

But the third level, comprising the countries of the former “socialist (Soviet-style) world” and Greece, did not constitute the base for any generalized monopolies proper to their own national societies (Greek ship owners being a possible exception, though their status as “Greeks” is highly questionable)...

Having become re integrated into the capitalist world through membership in the European Union and NATO, these /formerly socialist/ countries (including Greece) thenceforward shared the situation of others in peripheral capitalism—not ruled by their own national generalized monopolies but subject to those of the European core...

Therefore, and in line with Amin’s center-periphery concept, more is a country remote from the (Western) core (of Europe), less independent it is. This is because peripheries have no companies powerful enough for to expand their businesses to international markets.

Yet, there is another cause of this discrepancy. National movements leading to the establishment of post-Yugoslavian states coincided with the rise of globalization led by big, mainly Western, companies in industrial and financial businesses. This concurrence has been facilitated by the means that makes the demise of Yugoslavia similar to the demise of Ottoman and Habsburg empires.
in the Balkans. The empires had been dissolved by the means of the doctrine designed by the American president Woodrow Wilson, which was stipulated through the Treaty of Versailles. It is the doctrine of national self-determination. Nevertheless, the principle of national self-determination, understood as constitutive of nation-state, was not consequently applied everywhere, for example in the case of the first Yugoslavia which was established as a multinational state. Still, the principle of national self-determination swept up first as much as the second Yugoslavia (with some short-lived remnants of the complex state, i.e. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia & Montenegro subsequently), although the creation of post-Yugoslav states was supplemented with the UN and the EU requirements as regards the protection of minorities in the newborn nation-states.

Despite the prolongation of the implementation of the principle of national self-determination in the case of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the design of the self-standing nation-state was formalistic rather than substantial. This is due primarily to the rapid loss of some important elements of national sovereignty, primarily the economic or financial. The loss of political sovereignty is mostly due to the countries’ lack of freedom as regards the choice of the economic policies, in particular with regard to finances and the relationships between government and economy. Especially the governments are put under growing international policy pressure (from IMF to EU) in favor of privatization, liberalization and de-regulation. As far as cultural sovereignty is concerned in terms of appropriating the resources of knowledge in the field of local and national economic developments, there is an obvious lack of a “creative class” (Florida, 2002) or “national bourgeoisie” (Poulantzas, 1975) on part of the peripheral societies. There is no such an elite that would be capable of creating development momentum similar to post-war Japan or today’s Finland. Instead, a dependent and highly import-led economy is growing at the expense of relinquishing domestic industries and the rest of the nodes of knowledge (in the universities and public scientific institutes, for example, by introducing highly selective criteria for scientific excellence on the basis of prestigious international references).

Even Slovenia – the most developed among the post-Yugoslav states – complains (as the leading economist Jože Merzinger stated recently in an interview given to the Slovenian national TV) – today the country is in a position (within EU) similar to the one in which it was in the eve of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia! Currently, Slovenia introduces austerity measures in its public
sector economy which is result of its complying with the requirements of the EU and ratings’ opinions of major credit-rating agencies.

In a similar vein, in today’s Croatia the EU exerts pressures on the government to speed up the process of privatization of the remaining state companies. The Croatian government accepts the pressures unreservedly. The government is eager to comply with all requirements by the EU Commission for the sake of obtaining eventually the EU-membership in the summer of 2013.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is as much externally dependent country and, at the same time, the state is dismembered into two or three political units (Bosniak, Serb and Croat) so that it looks like a condominium rather than a federal state with central government.

Serbia is currently in an ambiguous position. It is politically divided between anti-European national conservatives and pro-European liberal technocrats. The former are eager to run a policy of independence mainly in terms of the hard-line rhetoric against Kosovo as an independent state. This is inasmuch paradoxical as it turns out that its rejection to recognize Kosovo qualifies the Serbian independent politics. Nevertheless, such style of the politics of “independence” brings Serbia into a position which is similar to that of Kosovo in international surroundings, i.e. only a part of international community supports one or the other country. Likewise, such situation represents a further impediment to the both states to take ambitious path of development, which eventually could bring both states closer to the core countries in the West. One of preconditions to such a leap in development is certainly good neighborhood and cooperative ties between the economies of Serbia and Kosovo.

In Kosovo, the formal independence of the country goes hand-in-hand with its increasing dependence of the international finances as well as external surveillance regarding the preservation of peace in Kosovo and its borders, respectively.

Shortly after its proclamation of the independence, Montenegro accepted requirements of the EU concerning procedure for obtaining the country’s candidacy status. From then on Montenegro, Croatia alike, fately follows directions from Brussels.

Macedonia, after its failure to join NATO that was caused by the Greek veto, displays its national pride and independence in the symbolic sphere. To make
this clear, one should visit Skopje downtown replete with newly stretched and densely lined-up historical monuments. There it could be seen how far national independence can be, to use Benedict Anderson’s expression, imagined. Actually, the national powerlessness is compensated by, in Friedrich Nietzsche’s terms, the “monumental history” (Nietzsche, 2010) and the “jubilant culture” that celebrates the national pride in face of the Western detachment.

Why all this happens? Why national independence turned soon into dependence and/or a phantasmagoric denial of dependence? There are at least two reasons for this. One is already explained generally by Amin. It is that former Yugoslav countries do not possess powerful companies and consequently cannot increase their international influence.

The other reason for the lack of a more independent politics is the proverbial incapability of post-imperial states to cooperate with each other and thus create peer-to-peer connections (cf. Kiossev, 2003). On the contrary, most of them are rather to be coordinated by external and more powerful thrones of power, such as Brussels, Washington or Moscow. It looks as if the post-Yugoslav countries want to give in to the new “masters of the universe” merely because they want to run away from their yesterday’s compatriots, formerly “brothers” that lived within common Yugoslavian federal state.

Phony pluralism of the representative democracy

“Among European countries, 62% (Germany -lowest) and 80% (Spain and Italy-highest) of their respective populations tend not to trust their governments, while 78% (Germany-lowest) and 86% (UK highest) tend not to trust political parties” (Selchow and Kaldor, 2012)

Obviously, people in Europe increasingly mistrust political parties because these, according to the perceptions, incorporate the biggest weakness of the plural democracy, i.e. its incapability of improving economic positions or halting economic decline of most people. Thus, there is no real choice in

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1 Here, I would restrain from broader commenting on what some of my colleagues from the Republic of Macedonia call “Croatian” and “Slovenian” imperialism, meaning the markets for Slovenian and Croatian industrial companies products in Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, but also the influence of Slovenian and Croatian nation TV-channels... In short, in spite of the expansion of companies from the post-Yugoslav North, it would be farfetched to say that Slovenia or Croatia posses “generalized monopolies” in Amin’s terms. Simply, their big companies are still relatively small with regard to their outputs which could perhaps, through taxation, abundantly “feed” budget outlays of their respective governments. These companies are all relatively weak for to bear on their shoulders, like caryatids, the respective budgets of nation-states like Slovenia and Croatia.
multiparty elections, since those who assume power implement the same economic policy as their predecessors in power, which results with a jobless growth and diminishing of employment opportunities.

In this respect, economic situation in the Balkans is getting worse faster than in either region of the EU. In the Balkans, parties in power convey to broader public very pessimistic messages about the economic future. In place of the former Communist rhetoric of the “bright future”, the future nowadays is neither topical nor it looks like a light on the end of the tunnel. To most people, it rather looks just like tunnel (the metaphor typical of chronic depression). On the other hand, except in Greece, in Balkan countries, unlike in other parts of the South of the EU, there is no mass resistance against the governmental policies of financial restrictions. The political arena – with an exception of Slovenia – is still preoccupied with the agenda from 1990s with predominance of nationalism and historical cleavages reinforced by recent wars of the former Yugoslavia. As a consequence of the relative public disinterest in political participation and agenda other than nationalism, patrimonialism, clientelism and corruption are burgeoning.

The development stalemate

Whereas the modernist project, which culminates with the welfare state, aspired to certainty and security, neo-liberalism embraces uncertainty and risk as a creative opportunity (Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012: 13 et passim.). Thus, policy of material protection has been replaced by a politics focused on resilience / flexibility. In fact, this represents a euphemism which alludes to continuous global disaster management in which military intervention becomes a normal practice. Apart from the rising frequency of foreign military intervention, the political impact of interventions – whether executed by neighboring states troops (e.g. in Lesotho by South African and Botswana troops) or by a Western alliance (e.g. Iraq by the United States and Great Britain troops) on the status of human rights and democracy in targeted states is mainly negative (Peksen, 2011).²

Even ideas and policies of sustainable development are pressured by the imperative of resilience. “/B/uilding resilient subjects presupposes... a world of constant exposure to... catastrophe” (Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012: 14).

² On controversies about the political impacts of military interventions executed officially for the sake of solving the humanitarian crisis in targeted countries, including Kosovo, see more in: Boettcher III, 2004; Mesquita, Downs, 2006)
The bottom-lines of this argument are the growing economic instability in the world and the proliferation of clashes and wars – for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan... Perhaps, the admonitions of a global catastrophe are exaggerated, given that they are based on not, or still not, too many instances of wars and military interventions respectively. We can hope so, but broader picture is pretty much disturbing. It is going about the paradigm-shift in the Western core countries – primarily in the U.S. – from state-building societies toward risk-societies in which corporations in cooperation with traditional /re-traditionalized communities (Castells /2010/ would say: the local mafias) break the axis of the Western democracy based on the relationship between state and civil society, where state provides a protective shield to its citizens and not only service of a privileged class.3

The paradigmatic tendency reminds to what Marc Bloch described as a long era preceding the establishment of the feudal order with kings in the center-stage (Bloch, 1971). Between 8th and 11th or 12th century A.D. a struggle for survival on everyday basis lasted, where poor families were unprotected targets of frequent infringements of robbers which mainly became nobles in the subsequent centuries of feudalism.

Basically, from its beginning in the early 1950s the policy of development was the subject of criticism. Yet, criticism became much stronger recently, following global financial crisis in 2008 and ensuing recession. In particular, post-Yugoslavian countries have entered the current crisis without their own policy instruments, primarily their own banking system. Countries of the former Yugoslavia either have renounced their own banks by privatizing them4 or they are on the way to do this (e.g. Slovenia and Macedonia) (cf. Radzic, Yuce, 2008).

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The explanations provided so far, concerning the ways by which the modernizing processes turned into myths, have one common denominator. It is the shift of power, and its political paradigm accordingly, generated through French revolution and its democratic bottom-up waves of change in 19th century, that was terminated with what Robert Michels devised as the “iron rule of oligarchy”

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3 State that service only the privileged class wages an unofficial war nowadays against the precariat (a neologism for people who live with unpredictable outlooks, i.e. uncertainty and insecurity – cf. Standing, 2012).

4 In fact, domestic banks were delivered to major Western banks. Concurrently, to please domestic patriotic senses, most of the new banks have retained their old names (e.g. Zagrebačka banka or Splitska banka in Croatia, although the banks are affiliates of an Italian and a French bank, respectively). This can be taken as another example of the appearance of the false independence.
Due to such concentration of power, the ruling elites, yet more so in the periphery, have lost their interests in national independence, democracy and development. Instead, they support globalism which is the key strategic policy of business and political elites in the core countries. More properly, they have established the global market without a global state and regulatory mechanisms accordingly; also, they are committed to oligarchic rather than democratic decision-making and are allergic to basic democracy, i.e. bottom-up social movements of so-called “dangerous classes”; eventually, the oligarchs incline to enriching the richest rather than closing the gap between rich and poor.

Possible, yet still modern, alternatives

In spite of the grim outlooks of the processes of modernization with apparent countertendencies to the latter, horizons are not entirely dim. The main reason for such principled optimism is that people(s) in the Balkans cannot give up with their hopes for theirs and their children’s decent survival in a modern condition, i.e. where all hopes are not – because they cannot be – projected into other-worldly perspectives of traditional religions that confounded feudal and despotic empires. On the grounds of (to paraphrase the leading philosopher of hope Ernst Bloch) not-yet-modernity it is still possible to imagine some alternatives against deteriorating processes of modernity and their “realistic” discourses which often bring forceful blockades of progressive tendencies. In order to approach to such a vision, firstly we must devise a substitute pervasive stereotype of the periphery – which is an academic stereotype as well and can be found as such even in Amin’s work – with an open-ended approach. The stereotype says that periphery represents a bad copy of the

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5 In other words, we, or at least we sociologists, did not sink down in deep water, where light disappears and where it is too late for to diving back to surface. Some airs and lights still exist in our surroundings, which enable us to take critical and, why not?, alternative positions vis-a-vis the forces of the new Middle Ages.

6 Initially, Shils defined periphery as an area in which many important things are lacking, from the authority to the consensus around central values (Shils, 1975). Similarly, for Rokkan and Unwin, periphery (in the European space) is a “weaker” part of a society, which often wants to secede from the latter (Rokkan & Unwin, 1983). In line with this argument, one wonders whether the post-Yugoslavian countries were/are able just to secede or they have some different potential as well.

7 For Amin, periphery can adjust to or revolt against center. Only countries such as South Korea, which succeeded in building up their “national productive systems” may “try to impose themselves as active participants of the world system, to force centers... to adjust to the exigencies of their development” (Amin, 2000: 604). Although the following paragraph sounds more optimistically, it does not provide substantial arguments in favor of the periphery: “Peoples and nations of the periphery no longer accept the destruction that polarization represents for them. Bridges can be constructed by establishing an active solidarity between this refusal, on the one hand, and the democratic aspirations of peoples of the centers on the other” (Amin, 2000: 620). Indeed, what “bridges” can bring about solidarity among nations of the periphery?
core and thus is permanently unable to take on an alternative development which still would be a variety of the modernity. On the other hand, for to build alternative in favor of an even development implies that the West, and the EU in particular, are willing to support such an alternative – in place of leaving the area to contingencies of the global free market environment reigned by big corporations, where maladapted societies are periodically rectified by military interventions, with further disastrous consequences for local economies.

Possible alternative developments in the Balkan area can be imagined foremost in the sphere of culture and, subsequently, in the economy and in the politics. Let us try to imagine such alternatives to the current processes.

Firstly, in the culture, “jubilant” culture that celebrates historical heritage in terms of distinction and separations from others might be replaced with a *culturally sustainable / oriented development*. This includes: a) an increasing interest of social majorities in the respective countries in quality products of elite, traditional, and alternative cultures, b) cultivating such needs and desires which will alleviate the strain on natural resources and existing capacities of infrastructure and inhabited areas, and would strengthen social cohesion and communication outside the traditional boundaries of social-cultural identity (religious, ethnic and other) and would also defuse social-Darwinist elements in the society, i.e. the survival of the fittest in the worst sense of the “fittest”) (cf. Cvjetičanin, Katunarić, 2003). And, of course, social Darwinism should not constitute democracy, nor purely intellectual arguments in terms of deliberative democracy should be constitutive of democracy. Ultimately, democracy is a broad competition for sympathies of the others, without using sticks and other threatening means. To engage cultural values into democracy means creating a soft power, a power which equally attracts people’s brains and hearts, their intellectual and emotional preferences for other human beings. For instance, it has been only relatively recently recognized that music is an effective resource with which shared cultural identities could be built. In part, this understanding reflects a transition towards an insight that building a post-conflict identity is not strictly rational but “emotional work” that

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8 Of course, the major setback to the search for an alternative modernization is demise of socialism in the East and its practical disappearance as a macro-societal project. On the contrary, today’s socialist-communist projects seem to return to their cradle, which is (local) community along with some forms of the basic democracy (cf. Teivainen, 2005).

9 This tendency is pervasive all around Europe, especially in representing national heritage (mostly in museums) as something “essential” and “ineradicable” that cannot be shared with others, “where migrant can only be an honorary member” (Matarasso, 2006)
requires behavioral change, addressing feelings and thoughts, and improving communication. In this context, music came to be taken as having the power to impact individuals’ psychic state via the creative process that can help foster change within individuals and between conflicted groups, to facilitate their moral transformation in terms of heightening tolerance and enabling imagination of a common peaceful world (Misina, 2011).

In the economy, a mixture of the planed and the free market economy might be established as an idiosyncratic variety. In fact, every country, say from USA to Kosovo, must not have exactly the same portions of economic policy, whether liberal or state-controlled. Thus, USA will probably never have a social economy like for example Sweden, save Venezuela. In analogy, Kosovo was born and was for long living in a variety of collectivistic and paternalistic policy regimes, from Zadruga to former socialist planning and workers’ self-management. Besides, its economy was for decades integrated within the former Yugoslavian economy. As such, Kosovo cannot thoroughly change its “path-dependent” development policy make-up in a couple of decades of transition to, to use Monty Pythons’ catch-phrase, “something completely different”. Such stress-producing change resembles to notorious policies of the “shock-therapy” as well as to colonial seizure of new lands (where preceding forms of society have been wiped out for to start from the historical “zero”, i.e. for to install a utopian ground – cf. Feuchtwang, 1990), and not a rational economic policy. Furthermore, the shock-therapy and the neo-colonialism in the economy are also disruptive to other social institutions, from state and its would-be-democratic constitution to family and its means for survival. Such an improvised “market economy” becomes a proxy for the “catch-as-catch-can” game in which government develops into an agency that protects most reckless players in the game. Also, such political-economic regime produces a growing population consisting of losers.

In the politics, instead of being merely representative, largely formalized and reduced to periodical ceremonies of election campaigns, two other pillars of democracy are to be established. One is the basic democracy, both in local communities and in companies, which would coexist with institutions of political (parliamentary and governmental) and managerial power (in industrial and other businesses). In such context, basic democracy might become a corrective decision-making mechanism to representative democracy in parliaments, national or local. The second pillar can be made of expert councils – maybe even as houses within parliaments, that would replace traditional senates.
– which might be established for the sake of ensuring as better provision of rational arguments as possible for the working of the deliberative democracy. Of course, the last say in bringing decisions in a democratic system should be on parliaments. This way, within the triangle of democratic-meritocratic power, decisions brought by representative democracy forums would be much better articulated in the interest of the entire constituency.

How much is such vision plausible? Is it feasible enough for to be implemented in current policies? Instead of an elaborate answer (which would necessitate another paper), let me add a personal note. I would cite words of an internationally reputed medical doctor, whom I discretely asked about a dietary supplement and its allegedly favorable impact on the human immune system. He answered as follows: “This thing might help you, you know, provided that you believe in it!” Similarly, policies of development should depart from a holistic approach, based on human energies and visions that include all parts of society and not only some (cf. Needervan-Pieterse, 1999). Accordingly, developers must be domestic people who believe in their own strengths. However, in the case that a society or its elite does not believe in its own energies which would facilitate accruing of social immunity against different shockwaves within and outside the society, as well as in its own capability of creating alternatives to a crisis situation – then further argumentation in favor of development, democracy and freedom becomes futile. Correspondingly, if most people or their elites believe that solutions to their problems of development will come from somewhere else, for example from the West or from Heaven, further search for alternative opportunities would become largely fruitless.

Bibliography


Studying human and social transformations is an inherently interdisciplinary endeavor, although it has been hived off into separate disciplinary traditions of inquiry.

For example, historians might study particular revolutions while social scientists try to establish the general patterns of state collapse, international relations, and social mobilizations that make them more likely. They in turn build on philosophers’ work to clarify the factors distinguishing revolutions from reforms and coups d’etat, even as their disciplinary kin work to figure how different modes of thinking contribute to transformation itself. Psychologists might study the conditions under which immoral acts might be resisted, while anthropologists help us recognize when foot-dragging is in fact the kind of resistance that lays the foundations for revolution.

Both transformers and resisters draw strategically on this scholarship, while scholars have variable relationships to their endeavors, making the division of
labor between theory and practice murkier than is ideal. I am no ivory tower prisoner, however, but I do believe that by explicating the unacknowledged conditions of social action, and being open to and critically exploring the unintended consequences of social action, we are more likely to create a kind of reflexive knowledge suitably humble but more capacious in its attempt to move human societies toward better futures.

The complexity of such interdisciplinary and reflexive scholarship on transformation becomes even greater when we study contemporary history, and when those times are themselves filled with transformations that don’t resemble those preceding. We live in such times, and thus a volume dedicated to human and social transformation is not only academically valuable, but publicly consequential if it can clarify our thinking about how change is happening around us, and within us.

In what follows, I propose that our endeavor will be enhanced if we do at least two things. First, we need to have better conceptual tools that are both rooted in disciplinary traditions but also transcend them. I offer reflections on two that seem to me central to this endeavor. Second, if we use these tools to clarify the various efforts to explain the transformations around us, we might not only recognize that variety in new ways, but figure ways to build on them. For that, I focus on how leading intellectuals address the transformations of subjectivities and structures occasioned by the crisis through which we now live in order to clarify the ways in which different kinds of transformations refashion the world in which we might live. Finally, I consider how some of what I have learned in Kosova and from Kosovars could refine our sense of European crisis and revolutionary subjectivities. I begin by developing my sense of two basic concepts organizing this paper: transformation and articulation.

**Conceptual Anchors**

At the start of my academic career, beginning in 1987, I was part of a network of scholars organized at the University of Michigan through the rubric of the “Program for the Comparative Study of Social Transformations” (CSST). This initial group of historians, anthropologists and sociologists sought to understand the relationship between the intellectual transformations of fundamental concepts – notably culture, power, and history – and the social transformations in past, present and future that inspired those conceptual elaborations. The intellectual practice of that network shapes my own
approach to learning to this day, but its products also offer some of the most useful guides to refining our conceptual toolkit around human and social transformations. William J Sewell Jr was the founder of the project, and has developed his own synthesis of its work whose summary I offer below.

Sewell builds on Anthony Giddens to contrast the “rules” or “cultural schemas” and resources or actualities that characterize structures in order to have a better sense of how the reproduction and transformation of social relations occur. For Sewell, those schemas range from the deep binary oppositions between the raw and the cooked to the more informal or superficial folkways or conventions which may never be written down but which everyone knows, like how to respect the queue. Resources are sources of power that might be either human or nonhuman. The strength of a human body, the capacity to command an army, and knowledge itself are “human” resources. Non-human resources include, among other things, factories, weapons and land. Clearly the latter exist independently of the rules with which we organize social life, but no resource can be activated for human purposes without their insertion into the cultural schemas of social life. At the same time, however, these cultural schemas have their power because the resources themselves “embody” the meanings with which they were originally encoded, and give those meanings power. Structure is based then on a duality, in which schemas give meaning to resources, which in turn can be read by others to confirm the truth, or falsehood, of the schema.

The beauty of Sewell’s approach does not rest only in its decomposition of discourse or of structure into schemas and resources. Nor is its great appeal solely in its depiction of duality. Rather, it lies in how neatly this theory of structure can address the big story and the eventful within a historical frame, all with a view toward figuring the relationship between human transformations and social transformations.

I have synthesized his approach to transformation with five aspects that, for ease of reference, I call the Sewellian list. The first three are especially helpful when it comes to structural approaches to transformation, and the latter two are useful when we emphasize changes in subjectivity. They are:
1) The multiplicity of structures: any social unit is going to be composed of a variety of structures which are unlikely to be entirely homologous or in synchrony with one another. This variety of structures can lead to conflicting claims and social conflicts.

2) Unpredictability of resource accumulation: enactments of schemas can produce quite unforeseen outcomes, and those outcomes, if sufficiently altering the power relations in a given social unit, lead to a transformation of structure.

3) The intersection of structures: structures with different schemas and different resources overlap and interact in any given setting, making their smooth reproduction always potentially problematic given the contradictions that could emerge from their contact.

4) The polysemy of resources: the multiplicity of meaning potentially attached to any set of resources means that these resources can be interpreted in different ways, with various consequences for social transformation. Those with greater authority in interpretation, with greater knowledge, have disproportionate power in this transformation.

5) The transposibility of schemas: actors are capable of taking schemas or rules learned one context and apply them to another. While this capacity is also universally distributed, those with a wider knowledge of different contexts, and different rules across those contexts, should have disproportionate influence in shaping change, ceteris paribus.

Although Sewell is a historian, his theoretical work travels well across time and the world, and is especially suitable for those concerned for the articulations of human and social transformations. And that means we should clarify the meaning of articulation too and how it can be used in scholarly work. We can build on what I wrote with another CSST colleague, Ron Suny, from some time ago.

“Articulation is our keyword, a word that is helpful precisely because it provides an important double meaning. A noun that implies expression, something intellectuals are obliged to do to fill their role, it also implies a measure of fit between a cultural product and the social environment that enables its production and makes that product consequential”. ³

Articulation, however, has a stronger theoretical significance than we offered in that volume. It is especially central to the work of Stuart Hall and those
inspired by him. He appreciated it for the same double meaning as we offered above, but made it more theoretical by emphasizing its opposition to determinisms of various sorts.

"An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time.... A theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects".  

Slack synthesizes his work, offering one provisional understanding of it as a "process of making connections". But she also elaborates,

"Epistemologically, articulation is a way of thinking the structures of what we know as a play of correspondences, non-correspondences and contradictions, as fragments in the constitution of what we take to be unities. Politically, articulation is a way of foregrounding the structure and play of power that entail in relations of domination and subordination. Strategically, articulation provides a mechanism for shaping intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture or context".

As in that tradition, I use the word to imply that explicating the relationship among elements of any structure is more important than understanding how any element is foundational in general. In this sense, articulation invites us to move away from the determinism of material forces, the transcendence of ideas and spirit, and even the compulsions of structure, or of freedom, in the explication of human and social transformations. By working with articulation as concept, we are inclined to think about the distinctions of the various elements in vision, and how, in any particular moment or practice, they are related to each other to form a particular whole. For many who read Njohja, that whole could be Europe.

The Structural Crisis of Europe

The sovereign debt crisis around the Euro has transformed the meaning of Europe. Instead of embodying a promise, the European Union now expresses a crisis. Jurgen Habermas, one of the exemplary critical intellectuals of our era,
addresses this directly. Although of course he has written far more, I focus my remarks here on one recently published volume. 9

His response to the European Union in crisis should be familiar to anyone who knows his work. He continues to address both the system and lifeworlds of the European Union, working to figure their relationship through a public, constitutional, and social democratic lens. 10

Habermas’s concern rests primarily with the growing power of a core of the European Council as it seeks a kind of executive federalism that is a “template for a post-democratic exercise of political authority” 11 This growth of administrative power rests simultaneously on political elites pandering to their national constituencies, gauging public opinion moods and failing to take real leadership in building a coherent more democratic all Europe policy. Beyond the opportunism, he also speaks of various “mental blocks” that prohibit this shift, one of which is to erase the assumption that popular sovereignty depends on state sovereignty. 12

Habermas’s hope rests in an evolving civic solidarity among Europeans. 13 While different issues and policy arenas require different kinds of legitimations, 14 he does find growing possibilities in the “flows of ideas circulating through the communication networks of civil society” primarily within the nations of Europe, but potentially across them too. As they realize potentials through the European Union for the exercise of their rights, they will in practice become more European. 15

His hallmark in the simultaneous engagement of system and lifeworld continues to inspire my own approach. He takes seriously that system, but does not pretend to explain it beyond the legal domain and its constitutional reference. Overall, he regards “the graduated integration or different speeds of unification as the only possible scenario for overcoming the current paralysis of the EU.” 16 However, political leaders fail to offer the political will and decisive leadership needed to realize this function. Germans are in particular abandoning their historical moral responsibility, acting more and more like a “normal nation” which they are not. 17 Ultimately, the leading political figures of the dominant nations must address the basic problem, of “aligning levels of economic development within a currency area”. 18

In fact, this basic problem not only stands in the way of the EU’s proper economic administrative function, it also stands in the way of developing that
EU lifeworld sensibility critical to moving the EU’s development to the next stage. Integration cannot happen without popular participation, he writes, “A Europe-wide civic solidarity cannot develop if social inequalities between the member states become permanent structural features.” This inequality, among others, is, however, deeply embedded in the European Union itself.

It is frankly striking how many diagnose the problem in the same way. George Soros most recently said it starkly, with an appropriately unnerving historical comparison. He writes,

“There is a close parallel between the euro crisis and the Latin American debt crisis of 1982, when the International Monetary Fund saved the international financial system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default. But the IMF imposed strict austerity on these countries, pushing them into a prolonged depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.

Today, Germany is playing the same role as the IMF did then. The setting differs, but the effect is the same. The euro crisis pushed the financial system to the verge of bankruptcy, which has been avoided by imposing strict austerity and lending countries like Greece just enough money to avoid default.

As a result, the eurozone has become divided into creditors and debtors, with the creditors in charge of economic policy. There is a center, led by Germany, and a periphery, consisting of the heavily indebted countries. The creditors’ imposition of strict austerity on the periphery is perpetuating the eurozone’s division between center and periphery. Economic conditions are continuing to deteriorate, causing immense human suffering. The innocent, frustrated, and angry victims of austerity provide fertile ground for hate speech, xenophobia, and all forms of extremism.

Thus, policies designed to preserve the financial system and the euro are transforming the EU into the opposite of an open society. There is an apparent contradiction between the euro’s financial requirements and the EU’s political objectives. The financial requirements could be met by replicating the arrangements that prevailed in the global economy in the 1980’s and dividing the eurozone into a center and periphery; but that could not be reconciled with the principles of an open society.”
Like Habermas, Soros can bring his particular expertise and broad intellectuality to bear on the system crisis through which the European Union muddles. And while both celebrate civil society and the life world’s role in resolving the crisis, and while both have elaborated in intellectually responsible fashion the forms of reflexivity and publicity democracy requires, neither are especially helpful in figuring the subjectivity essential for transforming the crisis. Their approach, however, illustrates just how important the Sewellian list’s first three sources of transformation are.

The European Union is composed of a multiplicity of structures increasingly and apparently out of sync with one another because the patterns of resource accumulation have dramatically transformed the power relations organizing the EU. While some believe the crisis could be resolved with a powerful executive EU body with strong German accent and belief in austerity, that depends on subjectivities formed in acquiescence that believe fiscal discipline produces responsible behavior, which in turn is the foundation for a sustainable solidarity.

That articulation is no longer viable, however. Although the discourse of financial responsibility abounds, and financial power rests in some hands and not others, the definition of the crisis is not only made with the distribution of wealth. It is also made in the transformations of subjectivities. Europe no longer lives in a world defined by acquiescence, and the spirit of rebellion abounds.

**Subjectivity’s Revolution**

Balibar expresses that spirit. He does recognize Habermas’s intellectual distinction and contribution to recognizing the crisis:23

“It comes after a series of brave views where Habermas hit out at the ‘new nationalism’ of German policy and the ‘unilateral’ prejudices that it conceals (we find ourselves wishing that French intellectuals would show the same independence). It makes a remarkable effort to hold together the political, economic and social aspects, and provides an idea of what Europe’s contribution could be in finding a global crisis exit strategy, in which must be factored the need to protect social rights (which does not mean their immutability) and the need to regulate credit mechanisms that increase rapidly above the real economy. It clearly shows that a politically unified Europe (whether or not we call it ‘federal’) is only possible under the condition of substantial democratisation of Europe, that affects the very nature of its powers and their representivity, therefore their legitimacy (as far as I am concerned, I had
long supported a more radical position – some would say uncertain: political Europe outside of which there is indeed only decline and inability for the people of the continent, will only be legitimate, and therefore possible, if it is more democratic than the nations that create it, if it allows them to step beyond their historical conquests in terms of democracy)".

Balibar goes on to offer a familiar critique of Habermas’s position: that his democracy remains too formal, and that “something like a movement must emerge”. Of course Balibar is far from being alone. There are a number of other articulations just in Europe along these lines:

“Many cultural, religious and intellectual figures have issued appeals that call for a different conception of Europe beyond the market. For example, Mikis Theodorakis, the renowned songwriter and composer, and Manolis Glezos, politician, writer and World War II resistance fighter, issued the ‘Common Appeal for the Rescue of the Peoples of Europe’ last October, which invoked the cultural and democratic legacy of Europe and opposed it to the ‘empire of money’ which has come to dominate. This appeal formed the basis for the later solidarity campaign for the people of Greece that spread throughout Europe. In France, Alan Badiou, together with others, wrote the manifesto ‘Save Greece from its Saviours!’ It likewise summons the ideal of European democracy which is threatened by a neo-liberal onslaught, and it calls on a community of intellectuals and artists to ‘multiply articles, media appearances, debates, petitions, demonstrations’ to save the people of Greece from imposed impoverishment (Badiou 2012). Ulrich Beck and Danny Cohn-Bendit call for a ‘Year of Volunteering’ in order to reconstruct European democracy from the bottom up in ‘We are Europe! Manifesto for re-building Europe from the bottom up’. While British Chief Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks, in ‘Has Europe lost its soul to the markets?’ calls on religious leaders to reassert the role of religion in society to act as a bulwark against untrammelled markets – invoking the story of the Golden Calf to remind us why the Sabbath was established in the first place: to preserve a day for things which do not have a market value (Sacks 2011)”.25

It is really worth examining each of these initiatives on their own, and comparing them so that we have a better grasp of their variety and existing and potential articulations. It’s also useful to see how they resonate with more scholarly expressions of subjectivity’s revolution. I think that transformation is increasingly evident in the spread of anarchism’s appeal. And by this I don’t mean its expression in graffiti, but rather in its growing scholarly elaboration.
In *Two Cheers for Anarchism*, Jim Scott\(^2\) acknowledges the kind of knowledgeability that typically goes unrecognized, the everyday intellectuality that recognizes what’s wrong and surreptitiously goes ahead and does what’s right. In the unrecognized, he appreciates how local knowledge defines roads by their destinations and not by the numbers remote geographers assign them. With regard to the subterranean just, he celebrates military deserters who refuse to kill innocents, alongside German anarchists who made a papier-mâché monument to their resistance. In fact, it’s through monumentalities that we come to appreciate far more the kind of anarchism Scott cheers.

In contrast to the lock-step interpretation of war that Washington’s Iwo Jima monument inspires (where the image of soldiers planting the US flag on a rock in the war against Japanese imperialism legislates our association of heroism, triumph and patriotism) Maya Lin’s memorial to Viet Nam’s war depends on each person bringing their own memories and sense of loss, and recognition of comrades missed alongside loved ones remembered, to the monument’s completion. This kind of knowledgeability need not be cumulated, organized, and disseminated. It is rather localized, personalized, and identified with particular individuals and contingent lives. Anarchism need not be disrespectful, angry, violent or anything its detractors claim. It can be quiet, local, and deeply personal and human, and even entrepreneurial if Scott’s celebration of the shopkeeper in its terms makes sense.

Of course this anarchistic spirit is not limited to everyday life, but also infuses many movements attempting to change the world. In the introduction to his collection of essays written between 2004 and 2010, Graeber reflects what he calls the global justice movement, one based on direct action and direct democracy. He along with many others mobilizing in the alter globalization movement\(^2\) have argued that success is to be found in the movements themselves. In light of the failure of revolutionary insurrections to produce greater justice, and rather only greater despair, the revolutionary movement has gone in reverse: to produce in immediate communities the qualities of life they wish to see writ large for the future. Direct action, direct democracy, speak to these.\(^2\) And this is because the transformative moment lies not in their institutionalization, but in the transformation of imagination that takes place when those administrative grips made in injustice are loosened, and the beginning of improvised change happens.\(^2\)
Slavoj Zizek is no anarchist, and rather is identified with a kind of communism that seems to me more provocation than intellectually genuine. That, however, is Zizek’s oeuvre, which itself has sincere, and abiding, philosophical roots. His approach to ideology and his interest in radical change across the world has also inspired quite a following as he recurrently shows us how what we think is true is not really true, how ideology functions differently than we believe. And he shows us not only by using various philosophical currents but also popular cultural elements.

In his year of dreaming dangerously, Zizek focuses on 2011 itself, arguing that the media and hegemonic ideology have “killed the radical emancipatory potential of the events, or obfuscated their threat to democracy, and then grew flowers over the buried corpse”. He also offers a familiar account of capitalist political economy, but his real contributions rest in his stories of rebellion and what they represent, and cannot represent. Although he gives each their due, he accounts for them in two basic ways.

On the one hand, there are rebellions that are but expressions of the impossibilities of their lives. In the USA, the populist rebellion apparent through the Tea Party signifies a moral contest masking a class struggle, but one that functions to preserve vested economic interests. The London Riots of 2011 represent more purely the impossibilities of voice for many within the system, for its performance only signifies the impossibility of acknowledging their own contradictory and impossible lives. Its only possible expression is a kind of “acting out” ostensibly without political meaning, but loaded with it simultaneously.

Zizek exemplifies a kind of intellectuality that works to make the nonsensical sensible. He points to what the real contest, the unacknowledged but fundamental fight, is all about, but not expressed in any real social conflicts. In some cases, however, the movements have their own real emancipatory moments which he lauds, reflecting the second kind of intellectuality for which he is recognized.

Zizek is clearly enamored of the Arab Uprisings, finding in it real radical left emancipatory hope, but really only apparent in its suffocation. It’s more in Egypt than Tunisia, and certainly not in Libya or Syria, that one finds that possibility, for in the first the principal agents of the spring 2011 events sought to empower a network of civil society organizations to extend the radical democratic promise. Instead, a Mubarakite Army that never left power
and an Islamist movement that emerged from the side to take political power and extend their own ideological hegemony suffocated that movement and crushed that hope.  

Zizek clearly can’t be expected to understand the intricacies of the Arab world’s contests, and one might fault him in a number of ways for his account of the Arab Uprisings. There might be less ground to fault him in Europe, for here, his own positions find deep resonance with actually existing struggles. Like many, he finds the Greek contest most compelling on a number of scores.

First, all the dominant ideological positions are meaningless in capturing the contest, although those positions are all designed to cover over that which each side won’t acknowledge. Second, the struggle has moved appropriately to remain outside of power, without offering concrete demands, much as Occupy Wall Street resisted. This, he feels, is a critical kind of politics, by refusing to engage issues on the terms of the dominant, they wind up creating a space that cannot be dominated. At the same time, you can see that Zizek is no anarchist – his Leninism comes out, and finds that unlike the Spanish, the Greeks are prepared to think about the political party that needs to lead, to be disciplined, to take decisions.  

But he has no real advice here, except to say that movements like these should “insist on a particular demand that, while thoroughly ‘realistic’, disturbs the very core of the hegemonic ideology, that is, which, while in principle feasible and legitimate, is defacto impossible (universal health care for example)”. 

Zizek’s intellectuality in theory is very much for those who would wish to extend the movement’s critical distance from the system, and in fact an anticipation of the future that is not yet known. He writes,

“Instead of analyzing them as part of the continuum of past and present, we should bring in the perspective of the future, taking them as limited, distorted (sometimes even perverted) fragments of a utopian future that lies dormant in the present as its hidden potential... one should learn the art of recognizing, from an engaged subjective position, elements which are here, in our space, but whose time is the emancipated future, the future of the Communist Idea ... even as we retain a radical openness to that future”.  

Though one may be communist and the other anarchist, Zizek and Graeber both stand with the revolution, because the notion of a redemptive future remains the only way we can possibly make sense of the present; we can only understand the glue of what surrounds us from the perspective of an
imaginary country whose own contours we can never understand, even when we are standing in it”.

Scott, Graeber, and Zizek, each in their own ways, work to capture the transformation of subjectivities in the crisis. They each celebrate, and work to discover, human transformations that cannot be recognized within existing hegemonies. They certainly work along the fifth element of the Sewellian list, working to transpose schema from one structure to another. Such transposition both indicates injustices and can shape forms of resistance and transformation possible within the constraints of our world. They don’t focus as much on the polysemy of resources as I might wish, but that moves my final consideration.

In what ways might Kosova’s experience of crisis and subjectivities in transformation be valued differently than abiding structures and social practices now determine? As background to that question, why are some contexts more important than others in shaping the transformations of our time?

**Locating Kosova in Subjectivities’ Revolution and Europe’s Crisis**

When we look for the origins of subjectivities’ revolution, most global accounts will point to the transformation that took place in Tahrir. When we look for global accounts of Europe’s crisis, we may mark the burst of the US housing bubble in 2006, or maybe even the structurally problematic introduction of the Euro, integrating the continent monetarily but without articulated economic policies. Kosova may have deep economic problems and difficulties with EU policies, but one certainly can’t argue that a society of some 2 million people can explain the origins of Europe’s crisis (even while Greece, a society of only 11 million, is often invoked as a source). And clearly, given how infrequently it is invoked as an exemplar in global subjectivity’s transformation, one cannot argue that Kosova’s experience of resistance and transformation has a place in the tales woven around 2011’s year of dreaming dangerously. But why not?

I am certainly not in the position to be able to realize that articulation, but the scholars around and reading this journal might find the words, and practices, to realize the transformation that makes Kosova’s history more central to the world than it is, and that it deserves to be. There are efforts underway to articulate Kosova’s structural contradictions and transformative subjectivities with those beyond it, especially in Europe. I propose four points of departure to extend this work.
The structural crisis might be the simplest translation, difficult as it is. After all, the European Union has been directly implicated in Kosova and acknowledges its own failure around EULEX. The European Court of Auditors audit focused on 2007-11, beginning with an acknowledgement of EU investment: over 2500 employees and some 680 million Euro during that period. While “the specific circumstances of Kosovo” are acknowledged, the brunt of the critique falls on the administration of EULEX itself defined by insufficiently clear objectives and poor coordination among branches.

Although I am no expert, I believe others more knowledgeable could explain the ways in which the EULEX critique might be appropriately extended to the structure of the EU itself, especially in the introduction and management of the Euro. Second, the ECA’s preferred recipes for resolution, including notions that benchmarks be used to resolve problems, illustrate the technocratic conception that plagues both the EU and EULEX: that somehow a better design and recurrent review of objectives can make things work better, so long as more financial resources are channeled in that administration.

One should not overlook relative successes of EULEX, as in the improved capacity of “Kosovo Customs” to carry out its work and collect revenues on items crossing borders. But even here, there may be patterns to success and failure that have their roots in more fundamental critiques of EULEX that also apply to the EU. Indeed, if Balibar might find fault in Habermas’s critique of the EU for its relative lack of attention to social movements, they are entirely absent in the EULEX critique itself. One might argue, in fact, that where reform requires an active citizenry, most especially in corruption’s address, EULEX has actually undermined the vital civil society that Kosova once had. “Instead of recognizing the parallel state Kosovar civil society made there was no recognition whatsoever that the war in Kosovo was not a consequence of absence of civil society, but rather a result of its failure. Instead of trying to revive the previous civic spirit – of which Kosovans were still proud – the international mission started with tremendous efforts to create an altogether new one. It was pitiful to see how the same civic activists who under the horrific conditions of Milosevic’s dictatorship achieved to organize the entire social and political life in Kosovo through civic engagement, quite often risking their lives in the process, had to undergo a “civil society for dummies” type of education provided by international bureaucrats who had decided that it was civil society that Kosovo was lacking.”
And with that condition, Agani argues, civil society was faced with impossible contradictions. If it is to counterbalance the state, it must limit the arbitrariness of the very international protectorate, dominant over the existing state, that feeds it while at the same time recognizing that state cares little about democracy in contrast to its mission around “security”.

Thus, I propose one way to locate Kosova more squarely in Europe’s crisis is to recognize the ways in which EULEX itself reflects a more general European Union problem, rather than a specific failure or disposition toward Kosova. To be sure, there are EULEX specific problems, but the fashions in which the EU disciplines transformative subjectivities are not limited to Kosova alone. This, however, is just a parallel instance, and does not explain why one would find in Kosova transformation’s example. I do believe, however, that we might find it in the realm of subjectivities’ expression and action. And we can begin with the response to the ECA report.

On October 31, 2012, Vetevendosje published this:

“EULEX is a failed mission. VETËVENDOSJE! has been saying this for a long time. An international mission which has immunity from domestic law and executive power over local institutions is not just and cannot be responsible for justice. EULEX’s failure of the local population in Kosovo and its failure of European taxpayers are two sides of the same coin of loss....

The short-term political stability paradigm sacrifices democracy, justice and development. Trying at all costs to maintain political stability is stifling society. Kosovo is not defined as a state to be normalized, but as a crisis that must be managed. More has been thought about how Kosovo can do harm to others than how it could do well for itself.

The rule of law has never struck the biggest violators of the law. This is because these offenders are at the top of politics, where they are considered very useful for short-term political stability although very harmful to society, democracy and justice. European officials have cooperated and talked about fighting corruption so much and so long with precisely the most corrupt people in the country who have usurped government and state management functions....

This report is evidence that rule of law mechanisms imported from abroad do not work, especially when they have executive mandates as UNMIK had, and EULEX has today. They do not report to the Kosovo Government but an instance
beyond it, they have political mission led by this instance and therefore, are not independent. Therefore, what needs to happen urgently is the democratization of the rule of law in Kosovo.

This report is evidence of a corrupt government that must resign and a failed international mission that should be withdrawn”.

The final statement is a partisan one, and thus will move some to dismiss immediately the broader statement, even as others can hail it. I left it to signal my recognition of that problem for a scholarly analysis, but I also retain it as something distinctive that other Europeans should consider as they work to figure the relationship between social movements born in this crisis and the political parties that have heretofore governed Europe. Vetevendosje may embody the very revolutionary subjectivities that Europeans seek in their own transformation of the European crisis, and that is my second point.

As a movement, Vetevendosje is exceptionally active and innovative. Able to trace its roots to the late 1990s when non-violent resistance moved from its relatively passive to its more active stage, most notably through the Student Action Network, Vetevendosje began its work as such supporting families whose members were lost during the war of 1998-1999. While in fact it does seek clear independence for Kosova, its politics are also organized around equality and justice within and across nations. Within the Kosovar parliament and also a social force in civil society, Vetevendosje is among the most innovative in its repertoire of movement techniques and political maneuvers. It is also the most active: it has organized by far the most protests since 2002 in Kosova, even though it was only founded in 2005. But perhaps its most powerful force lies in its self-positioning as a force for “truth” against what it says is the “institutional lie” of the international protectorate in which Kosova’s move toward sovereignty is embedded.

That institutional lie is, however, something that the revolutionary subjectivities discussed in the previous section also recognize. In particular, the idea that the European Union is based as much on solidarity as it is on becoming an economic powerhouse is one of the cultural contradictions that threatens its organizational, and legitimating, integrity. The international protectorate may be, then, in concentrated form what the European Union’s actually existing practice has become. And this is why the fourth element of the Sewellian list becomes important.
The hegemonic interpretation of any social condition typically rests with those who have the most resources, and in the case of EULEX, even in its critique, that rests with the European Union. After all, “the specific circumstances of Kosovo” allow, even in failure, EULEX’s excuse. However, the polysemy of resources enables us to reinterpret those capacities in different fashion, so long as proper authority for that expression can be found.

The legitimate authority of any polity rests, ultimately, in the sovereign. In modernity that means sovereignty rests in the people. That fails obviously in Kosova, given its status, but it also fails in the European Union. Those various democratic deficits have different valences, however. In Kosova, that deficit can be ascribed to an external power whose resolution can be found by realizing the normal, democratic, condition. In the EU, by contrast, there is no normal to which transformers might point, and only a resolution in practice that is unprecedented. In both cases, however, a technocratic apparatus insufficiently coordinated with contradictory ambitions denies popular sovereignties. And that is where, in the articulation of crisis, Kosova’s example becomes critical.

One might even argue that Vetevendosje has mobilized that quest for sovereignty more effectively than other European subjectivities in revolution. One might, therefore, consider flipping the valences and consider whether, in the formulation Graeber proposes, the reverse revolution has already taken place in Kosova with Vetevendosje as subject expressing popular sovereignty not only as a national ambition but as a rejection of institutional lies. And with that as our lens, how might we rethink subjectivities in revolution before a Europe in crisis? And here we need to go beyond hegemonic practices within revolution itself for their gendering has gone relatively unmarked. Within Kosova, one of the most important starting points for this effort develops along the politics of remembrance and belonging.52

Drawing on interviews with women who led change in Kosova, the editors seek both to reconstruct feminism and meanings of Albanian-ness in Kosova itself.53 While the recollections of the inspired and inspiring women in Kosova move, the editors’ conclusion synthesizes powerfully:

“... Feminism is not only a mode of knowledge, but also a potential for transformative politics. The rejection of hierarchies of duality is inseparably bound to our dissatisfaction with the language and practices of resistance. To resist is not enough. While all of the women here were active agents in a politics of resistance to a hegemonic other, almost all become dissatisfied with
limits of political and social forms that were permitted and/or made available. They argue for the transformation of the status quo and relations of power. These are related to both their articulation of the “national question” and the “women question.” Future research should focus on the possibilities of avenues for feminist intervention, but also research that is sensitive to meanings of feminism. Women in Kosova widely reject the use of the term feminism, therefore it is not in our place to define this as a lack. But, we do strongly insist for de-essentializing feminism as it is used in the Kosovar context. There needs to be an opening of spaces for contestation, of what feminism entails, but also a more imaginative politics for ending the subordinate position of women”.

By rethinking gender within these revolutionary subjectivities, new articulations of popular sovereignty’s value promise much, especially by working transnationally and nationally simultaneously. In particular, recent scholarship in Kosova suggests that scholars could offer new critical frameworks through which not only contests over socialisms’ past and wars’ outcomes but around ongoing internationalist interventions refigure conceptions of gendered and emancipatory subjectivities. Indeed, a strong case might be made that in an era where publics become thin and passive, feminist art interventions offer a means to stimulate greater reflexivity in public discourse and perhaps greater consequence in human and social transformations.

And that makes my fourth point. In the spirit of Maya Lin’s monument to the Viet Nam war, the implications of a revolutionary subjectivity in these times of crisis are better left for those reading this contribution to complete.

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Endnotes


7. The relationship between articulation and the forms of association emphasized in Actor Network Theory deserves much more extensive review and discussion than I can provide here. For the latter, see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.


Habermas
16. Jurgen Habermas *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*. Cambridge: Polity 2012, p. 116. For example, he acknowledges the importance of addressing these issues: “increasing the equity capital of the banks, greater transparency of the activities of hedge funds, improved oversight of stock markets and rating agencies, the prohibition of fancy but economically destructive speculative instruments, a tax on financial transactions, a bank levy, the separation of investment from commercial banking and the precautionary break up of banking conglomerates that are ‘too big to fail’” (p. 125).


26. Of the three scholars I discuss in this section, Scott is most generally recognized for his intellectual distinction and integrity. Indeed, it was the celebration of his life’s work in Jennifer Schuessler, “Professor Who Learns from Peasants” *New York Times* December 4, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/books/james-c-scott-farmer-and-scholar-of-anarchism.html?_r=0 that inspired by my own read of his most recent book.


33. especially as amended by Hardt and Negri’s elevation of “immaterial labor” (symbolic -- the production of ideas, codes, texts, programs figures and affective – from doctors to babysitters and flight attendants”, Slavoj Zizek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously* London:Verso, 2012, p. 8-9) as the new common shared knowledge that is not properly contained by private property. With at least some of these actors, especially those managing production, enjoying surplus wage, the crisis of 2011 was about the loss of that privilege, and revolution against lost promises.

34. More broadly, the populist struggle is itself impossible, for victory. But it serves: “although the ‘ruling class’ disagrees with the populist moral agenda, it tolerates the ‘moral war’ as a means of keeping the lower classes in check, allowing them to articulate their future without disturbing vested economic interests. What this means is that the culture war is a class war in a displaced mode – pace those who claim that we live in a post-class society” (p.31)

35. The London riots of 2011? An expression of discontent, an “irrational” moment that the overly rational system does not tolerate, does not acknowledge, cannot respect (Slavoj Zizek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously* London:Verso, 2012, p.53). “what kind of universe do we inhabit that can celebrate itself as a society of choice, but in which the only alternative available to an enforced democratic consensus is a form of blind acting out?” (p.54) The danger is that there is no global capitalist meaning, it de-totalizes meaning, and thus to rebel against it is to act out without meaning (p. 55).

36. “The Egyptian summer of 2011 will be remembered as the end of the revolution as the suffocating of its emancipatory potential. Its grave-diggers are the army and the Islamists. That is to say, the contours of the pact between the army (which is still the good old Mubarak army, the great recipient of US financial aid) and the Islamists (who were totally marginalized in the early months of the upheaval but regained ground subsequently are becoming increasingly real: the Islamists will tolerate the material privileges of the army and will be assured of ideological hegemony in return. The losers will be the pro western Liberals (still too weak despite all the CIA funding they receive to ‘promote democracy’) and above all the true agents of the spring events – the emerging secular left which tried desperately to organized a network of civil society organizations from trade unions to feminist groups” (pp 74-75) in Slavoj Zizek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously* London:Verso, 2012,


38. At the same time, the stories about rebellion – here he talks of Greece, are all untrue and impossible: it is not that the Greeks or lazy, or that the Germans impose neoliberalism, or that the Greeks are victims (they fight back), but that they are all untrue, all impossible. P. 13.

39. Unlike Habermas, Zizek spends hardly any time thinking about the system’s design (of its broad contradictions of course he says much, and of its desirability he also recognizes, invoking Lenin (Slavoj Zizek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously* London:Verso, 2012, p.82)), except to say this: “Reacting to the Paris protests of 1968, Lacan famously said: “What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a new Master. You will get one.” it seems that his remark has found its target (not only) in the indignados. We got the first glimpse of this New Master in Greece and Italy. As if ironically answering the lack of expert programs offered by the protesters, the trend is now to replace ordinary politicians with a ‘neutral’ government of depoliticize technocrats (mostly bankers as in Greece and Italy).” (pp. 80-81). But while organization and discipline and expert alternatives may be necessary, the demands should be avoided for now, he argues. “Time is needed to fill this space in positive fashion”(82)


43. Hasnije Ilazi, “Europeanness as a Hybrid Identity” in AFP Working Papers Volume 2 (2011-12) in particular argues that at a policy/practice, Kosovars are not the only ones who need to adjust their practice to become European, but EU actors need to change their sense of Europe for the EU to fulfill its potential.

44. European Court of Auditors, “European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the Rule of Law” Special Report 18/12 October 30, 2012 eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/17766744.PDF


47. http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid=2,2,5251


49. AFP sociologist at University of Pristina, Shemsi Krasniqi, has conducted extensive research to understand the social dynamics of this flight to safety during 1998-99. See his unpublished paper, La Memoire face a L’Oubli: 10eme Anniversaire de L’Expulsion Kosovo: 1999-2009”, Pristina, Mars 2010.


51. For elaboration, see Albin Kurti’s talk http://tedxtalks.ted.com/video/TedxVienna-Albin-Kurti-Internat TEDX Vienna.


Articulating Africana Philosophy:
Future challenges of mainstream political philosophy

Whiteness has become — in effect, if not de jure — more structurally central to the very self-conception of the field than in other subjects, so that by pursuing this agenda one is, in a sense, challenging philosophy itself in a way that black scholars in, say, other areas like literature, history, sociology, are not challenging theirs.

Charles W. Mills

Abstract

One of the main challenges that various theories within mainstream political philosophy face today come from the emerging field of Africana philosophy, an umbrella-concept that is progressively developing and thus questioning the very essence of many principles rooted in the western tradition of conventional philosophy. The theories that are discussed in here from an Afrocentric perspective are the social contract theory and the agenda of philosophical praxis, modernity, and lifeworlds. While the former faces a serious challenge set forth by Charles W. Mills from the domain of oppositional political theory, the latter goes through an endeavor designed by Lucious Outlaw in order to find a framework that completes this philosophical agenda from the Africana philosophy area of thought. Social contract theory, based upon that developed by John Rawls, is criticized for being white in essence whereby racial justice is completely ignored. As such, it follows that the contract in contemporary political philosophy needs a serious revision that should start by acknowledging its true (racial) nature. On the other hand, the revision of the agenda for philosophical praxis, based on Jürgen Habermas theory of modernity, is an attempt to find the tools to bring race and the lifeworlds of the African blacks into this project. In his attempt to do so, Outlaw shows the importance of the predicates such as race (or lack thereof) in mainstream political philosophy. This paper is in essence an attempt to show the challenges that rise from the field of Africana philosophy to the mainstream philosophy through these two specific theories (i.e. social contract and philosophical praxis of the modernity project), and the revision and completion of them respectively. This effort is realized through an account of the revision that Mills does to the Rawlsian theory of Justice as Fairness via his Racial Contract theory and the supplementation that Outlaw does to the theory of Habermas via his addition of the framework that promises tolerance for diverse lifeworlds, taking race into account.
Key words: race, justice, social contract, lifeworlds, modernity, philosophical praxis

Introduction

Africana Philosophy is an emerging field which surpasses the academic philosophy and creates space for idea, intellectual endeavor, discourse, reflecting activities and critical thought, coming mostly from persons of African origin (though not exclusively), living in Africa or African Diaspora throughout the world. This type of philosophy does not necessarily refer to a specific method or philosophical tradition, and it is not a special philosophy. It is more of an umbrella concept, an attempt to organize those ideas and endeavors which fill in the space of this field, to then bring them to the domain of philosophy. Lewis R. Gordon, American philosopher originating from the Caribbean islands, known in the field of Africana philosophy, defines it as “a species of Africana thought, comprising theoretical questions raised from serious engagement with ideas in Africana cultures and their hybrid, mixed, or Creole forms around the world” [unofficial translation].

As the African identity was imposed over the people of Africa through the colonization and the conquest of the continent during the modern era following the 16th century, the field of Africana philosophy comprises specific issues raised in the domain of what was identified as “African” and the connotations which this term, or the term “black”, entails. It therefore deals with that philosophic aspect which includes this field of thought. Africana philosophy treats problems and issues related to identity, society, social transformation, the self, the ethics, politics, conscience, freedom, dependency etc., including issues such as race, colonization and racism as serious threats of the time. Gordon employs the terms “theological suspension of philosophy” for this field, a term which, according to him, paradoxically generated a new philosophy which surpasses the philosophy itself. In this line of thought, it is qualified also as a post-European philosophy or science.

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 14.
5 Ibid.
Two philosophers dealing in issues related to the Africana philosophy domain are Charles W. Mills and Lucious Outlaw. Both originate from the Caribbean islands and are among the most renowned philosophers of the region. Their contributions in Africana philosophy deal with specific theories developed from the black race population viewpoint. They use two different methods to shed light into realities pertaining to the black population. Mills is the philosopher of the opposition political theory, while Outlaw, although not belonging concretely to the field, explicit elements of it can be found in his theory. In the subject elaborated below, both philosophers assume the already well-known theories in mainstream political philosophy as grounding in order to amend them respectively. Mills builds the argument in the form of reviewing and repairing the social contract (referring mainly to that of John Rawls), while Outlaw uses the theory of Jürgen Habermas (on the project of modernity) to fulfill it with a new prospect, mostly silent one, the Afro-centric one. This is the first philosopher of the contract field, while the second one refuses that theory and places his focus on putting the lifeworlds of the black race population in the core of the philosophic praxis agenda. Thus, on one hand there is Mills who believes that the contract should be kept running in order to serve justice in society, though needing a thorough review (which is divided into the stage of recognizing the drawbacks of the current social contract followed by their correction), and on the other and there is Outlaw with his voyage to find the framework on which to build the race arguments, freedom, justice. This paper is above all an attempt to pinpoint the challenges posed to the theories of mainstream political philosophy from thoughts of the Africana philosophy field. This attempt is accomplished through illustrating examples of two concrete theories and exhibiting their downsides.

The Social Contract: The Approaches of the Africana Philosophy

A very popular topic in the contemporary political theory is that of social contract. A considerable number of philosophers of moral and politics deal with the contract theory ever since it was in a way revived by John Rawls after undergoing a period of discrediting ever since Kant had worked on it. What will be in the focus below is a serious challenge threatening the contemporary theory of contract from the spectrum of Africana philosophy, accomplished by Charles W. Mills. The contemporary approaches to the theory of social contract, enrooted in the Western tradition, face many dilemmas when the theory is viewed fromm the
viewpoint of groups which do not belong in the Western world (mainly referring to non-whites). One of them, mostly expressed, disputed whether the roots of liberalization, on which this theory is based, are racist in their core. Placing the emphasis concretely on Rawls’ theory of social contract, built on the principle of *justice as fairness*, what threatens it is a criticism which shakes the sustainability of its basic principles: justice and fairness.

### 2.1 Racial Contract versus Social Contract

Mills uses the theory of social contract as a tool to emphasize the domination within the framework of the contract as he believes that it serves as a starting point for transferring the concerns and aims of radical democratic political theory into the mainstream apparatus.⁶ Given that the contract theory was revitalized in the domain of modern political theory by Rawls (on justice), Mills’ radical revisionist theory is consequently a drastic review of the former, said to totally overlook the racial justice. Qualifying it as exclusive, representing an ideal situation which would consequently carry the deformation of the historical reality, and consequently damaging for justice and fairness (here: racial), Mills insists that the way we perceive the current social contract should be reviewed, and this is in fact a task asking to lunge into the core of the issue as criticism against racist thinking of Illuminist philosophers does not suffice. This is a need to rethink the way we develop the political theory in general.⁷ The main aim here is that the racial contract, instead of being seen as a subversive theory of mainstream contract, be seen and transformed into a conventional one, i.e. be accepted as relevant for the current reality. The idea of an exclusive and manipulating contract agreed upon by the powerful to subdue the others under the pretext of their inclusion as equals, exists as a clear precedent in the Western tradition of the contract.⁸

The racial contract consists of descriptive and normative dimensions. While the former presents how things are with the contract theory in relation to socio-political reality and how that reality was attained, the latter is an attempt to explicate how the current social contract might be used to construct a reality free from the notion of race as a category, i.e. on the repairing which it needs in order to achieve this goal.

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⁷ Ibid., 79.
⁸ Ibid., 82.
2.2 The Descriptive Aspect of Racial Contract

Mills’ thesis on racial contract (the descriptive one) comprises of three main claims: the existential, affirming that white superiority continues to be present in the world; the conceptual, which claims that white superiority should be considered a political system; and the methodological, which claims that white superiority as a political system can be used in theoretical domain to illustrate the contract as such only among whites, i.e. as a racial contract. The latter is a type of a social, political contract, and above all epistemological contract upon which a state with all of its entities is built and focused on racial differences. It is qualified as exploiting as far as the economic domain goes (namely, what belongs to whom). The racial contract differentiates the white (as completed individuals) from the non-white (as objects instead of subjects of the contract) with the purpose of creating a society where the former are privileged whereas the latter exploited.

The main problem with this contract built on racial principles lies with the assumption that it does not acknowledge races as a categorizing domain. This misinterpretation of the true nature of the contract disables the just assessment of policies and actions on the basis that the race is not an indicator of the situation in any of the aspects of life. It is thus evident that the racial contract comprises in itself an epistemology of ignoring which neglects the non-white and thus ignores their existence as equal citizens. In so doing, it misinterprets the reality presenting it in a form which brings profit to its signers to the detriment of another race. The acceptance of the racist nature of the contract would place the emphasis on the constructed nature of race (that it is a social construct and by no means a natural category), and thus would open up a path to a society free from racial categorization.

As far as the systematization of this contract in one of the two main methods which explain the relation between moral and politics within the contract, it can be positioned in any of the two. To remind, the two methods are: contractianism, based on the Hobbes’ line of thinking which means that people are oriented towards personal interest (a rational assessment of which method leads to gaining the maximization of personal interest leads

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9 Ibid.,7-9.
10 Ibid., 11-12.
11 Ibid.,11.
12 Pateman and Mills, Contract and Domination, 101.
them to act morally), and contractualization, based on the Kant’s line of thinking which claims that rationalization calls for mutual respect among persons, consequently requiring the moral principles to be justifiable for everyone. In the contractualist theory, the individual in not motivated from the personal interest (unlike with contractarianism), but rather by devoting the justification of moral standards valid for everyone.\textsuperscript{13} Mills chooses to place his contract within the Hobbesian tradition (being that it represents generally the tradition of the contract). So, if what the political contract \textit{inter alia} does is the already existent moral codification (to not rely simply on the sense of moral as a constituting part of human’s consciousness), then the justice is determined based on what is right in the natural state. The problem with this and the contract is that the codified moral is based on color, and as such limits the possession of natural freedom and equality not only among people of white race. The non-white are destined to come to this world as unequal and not free, therefore justice in the natural state is only shared among the white (and thus the universe is split in persons and sub-persons on racial premises).\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{2.3 The Normative Aspect of the Racial Contract}

With the normative racial contract, Mills’ argument is split in three parts. The first one deals with the argument that the mainstream theory on social contract is essentially white (in the racial context) while this fact goes unnoticed; the second is the way in which the racial contract can be used as a tool to work on non-ideal theories; and the third, the way changes within the modified framework of Rawlsian contract can be justified.\textsuperscript{15}

As regards the first part of the argument, the contract in the racial context is white as there are historical facts that early theoreticians of the contract had placed racial limitations on who could be counted as a person with equal rights. Moral egalitarianism was not necessarily employable for non-white groups. Furthermore, this contract as such should be reviewed deeply from the point of view of non-white racial groups, which is why a radical review of the description on how societies were created and what true egalitarian requires now of us in the moral aspect. Although it is people themselves who create a socio-political order, not all of them have a role of the same importance in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Mills, \textit{The Racial Contract}, 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Pateman and Mills, \textit{Contract and Domination}, 108.
\end{itemize}
establishing this order. So, whiteness and Euro-centrism of the contract are a result of the projection of this contract from a population with history and problems other than those of non-white groups.16

The second part poses an important question for the solution of the race problem in the contract. Now that the problems which do not even occur in ideal theory are raised through racial contract, the issue is what to do in order to address them. So, by disclosing the true nature of the social contract (exclusive of realities belonging to the non-white), in order to improve justice there is a need for moral education of the members of an entity (something which current social contract fails to do) by raising their awareness on the damage which white domination brings on their own moral, their abilities for sensibility over other races, and their ability to have unbiased relations with other colored groups.17

In the concluding part of his argument, Mills tries to repair, by means of his theory, what he terms as “the fracture” in Rawlsian contract. Prior to this, it is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves of the basic concept of the original position and the veil of ignorance according to Rawls’ theory, in order to see more accurately what Mills does to them afterwards. In a nutshell, the original position is the idea which determines what are the most dignified principles of justice and equality of a society which is seen as a system of cooperation between free and equal persons. These right terms of social cooperation come from those included in the process, i.e. people themselves.18 The veil of ignorance, an allegorical characteristic of the original position, is a key element of the latter and serves to create circumstances in which the notion of justice is not deformed based on people characteristics or circumstances; in other words, circumstances are created for an objective justice. This veil serves to deprive those behind it from knowledge on their characteristics and circumstances beyond the veil; as these characteristics and circumstances are those that determine how they (people) will be treated when they are not behind the veil, ignorance on the situation they will found in pushes them to select the most dignified principles to accomplish the institutions of freedom and equality. Thus, the notion of justice which would be adopted under such

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16 Ibid., 110-111.
17 Ibid., 118.
circumstances is perceived as the one supported from the reasoning of the most just and unbiased type.19

Regarding the abovementioned concept, it is first of all important to make a difference between ideal and non-ideal theory: while the first one in on the justice of a perfectly just society, the second one in on the linking justice in unjust societies. Consequently, the ideal for racial justice would be a society where race is irrelevant in determining people’s fate. Although the principle of self-ignorance lies with racial contract, the difference is with the level of social ignorance. The veil of ignorance which supposes an ideal situation behind it (Rawls), in Mills’ theory is suggested to be finer; and thus, instead of thinking ourselves in an ideal social order (impossible for the non-white), social ignorance is smaller therefore the choices are of the nature of non-ideal social orders (here it is possible that one might end up being a member of a discriminated race). This type of contract is therefore constructed on the existing social order, while Rawlsian theory is ideal as consequently has no downsides within it which needs repairing. Here the emphasis is put on the need to construct a representation tool which is reformed in a dignified manner (from ideal theory) in order to address issues within a non-ideal theory.20

So, in order to eliminate the unacceptable racial differences, proportionality needs to be established between white superiority and their dependants (i.e. the non-white). This proportionality would eliminate racial differences, and thus the need to reorganize the society on egalitarian, liberal theories or justice as fairness would be eliminated. Mills finally claims that improvement of racial justice (as explained above), due to its special nature, requires only a decorative form, the weakest one, of equal opportunities, this being a kind which in theory would need to be indisputable within the entire political spectrum.21

In stating this Mills emphasizes a problem which is perhaps rather silenced precisely as it is not recognized as a problem in the field of philosophy, while not observed from Afro-centric viewpoint. The change of social order legislations to eliminate racial discrimination can easily not suffice, and as easily it can be that injustice in a certain period of history still form the basis on which contemporary societies operate.

19 Ibid., 237-8.
20 Pateman and Mills, Contract and Domination,118-120.
21 Ibid., 131.
2.4 Racial Contract outside the Afro-centric Viewpoint

The relevance of racial contract is not limited only to America, where the discrimination of colored groups is of higher degree (larger percentage of their presence, etc.). It is also relevant in Europe, although on partially different terms. To give an example, the first people who were called “race”, which were classified on the basis of race and thus seen as inferior, were the Irish. This racism against the Irish initiated the trend of racial ideas and turned into a model for racism against the black. In Europe we can still see a type of racism against those who are seen as “different” from the European values (this being quite an ambiguous term). To illustrate, there is the case of division on somewhat “racial” basis between Western and Eastern Europe (not as geographical, but cultural term), where there are still cases where inter-marriage or whatever interaction of personal will is not very accepted. While the issue is still such in Europe (although this is not a comprehensive account of the affairs), in America one witnesses rather a racism within the system (such as the one against the black or the indigenous population, for example). So, although there is definitely a great difference between the notion of race in America and Europe, it is nevertheless present in both continents. This puts the emphasis on the importance of understanding the shortcomings of exclusive elements of some mainstream philosophy theories, as the injustice which emerges from them is not necessarily applied only within one domain. Consequently, philosophic negligence towards such issues might carry even greater consequences than those that have already started to emerge.

3. Philosophical Praxis Agenda within the framework of Africana Philosophy

Unlike Mills, Outlaw builds his theory in the field of Africana philosophy thought addressing the question whether a reviewed agenda of the philosophical praxis, as suggested by Habermas, could contribute to the attempt to find a framework on which to build up arguments for a world which promises tolerance for diverse lifeworlds, while being based on a consensus promising practical universality.\(^\text{22}\) As regards Habermas, what he tries to do in general is to revive the Illuminist project through another approach to this project, while this project from the Afro-centric viewpoint, requires supplementation by means of accommodating the African perspective and creating the conditions

for it to be equal to the others. Outlaw, as a contributor to the field of *Africana* philosophy takes Habermas’ theory as a basis to develop his theory to serve a reviewed agenda to construct the above-mentioned framework.

### 3.1 Lifeworlds: the importance of particularities

Given that *lifeworld* is one of the key concepts of what is further discussed, it is initially important to examine what the notion of *lifeworld* entails. The notion of *lifeworld*, according to Habermas, is to do with everyday life we share with others; it is the word with which to name informal domains and the domains which do not carry in them some political or monetary value of the market, but contain social importance instead. Parts of these domains are: family, political life outside organized parties, culture, voluntary organizations, mass media, etc. *Lifeworlds* are also open to changes and amendments, which occur in a gradual manner. These changes and repairs of *lifeworlds* occur through actions, communiqués and discourse.  

Whatever the case, participants in this co-operation are not initiators who possess the situations aided by responsible actions, but are rather products initially of the tradition to which they subscribe, then of solidarity groups they belong to, and finally of the socialization processes within which they grow. Self-reproduction of a *lifeworld* occurs to the level that these three functions, stirring beyond the perspectives of involved stakeholders, are met. This fulfillment is the multiplication of cultural traditions, integration of groups according to norms and values, as well as socialization of the young generations. *Lifeworld* is therefore a tool for social and symbolic reproduction of the society, and as such it serves to the spread and improvement of different kinds of knowledge, such as the scientific, moral, technical, and other ones.

Issues which Outlaw raises from the *Africana* philosophy viewpoint are related to the very importance of *lifeworlds*, formed based on how people understand themselves. Given that the understanding of the self is formed based on particularities such as race and ethnicity, their importance (especially for those who rank under the domain of racial categorization) requires a review of the philosophic praxis agenda, viewing the world from the viewpoint of black Africans. Here the debate opens up challenging aspects of the modernity.

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project (especially of its philosophic Universalist anthropology), this time form the viewpoint of the nationalism tradition of the black population.\(^{26}\) Here an attempt to use the modernity project is noticeable (Habermas), namely to build a framework which addresses race and ethnicity, given that Habermas’ project does not speak of race specifically at all.

The reason why the social contract is not used to address these philosophic endeavors is that it is qualified by Habermas and consequently even Outlaw as not suited for it, as it does not address the issue of social order. The theory that social order is based on a network of contractual relations is not very sustainable when one cannot claim precisely when and how is it that those who were supposed to abide to it have become its implementers. Also, not everything that is of contractual nature is in a contract. The greatest problem with it however is that the contract presumes that a set of social norms and rules (especially those claiming that the contract must be implemented) have already been put in place, instead of explaining the existence of those norms and rules.\(^{27}\)

However, both Illuminist philosophy and anthropology have their deficiencies: it does not contain the necessary elements to surpass racism and ethnocentrism. Outlaw, in his attempts to develop a reviewed critical social theory argues that the notion of “universality” which is used in the project of modernity should be corrected, and the corrected notion should then play the role of the key norm for the notion of “reason” which also needs reviewing. Here Habermas’ endeavor for a critical reworking of theoretical basis of social “modernity” come to play, in order to produce a corrected project: one which recognizes the cultural and social importance of lifeworlds, and also the practices conditioned by the understanding of self which assumes its shape from race and ethnicity.\(^{28}\)

### 3.2 Reviewing the Modernity Project

Habermas’ modernity theory which is worked upon here is not a separate program, but rather a collection of ideas dispersed in its different programs; it can be said to represent the hidden moral dimension of his social theory. As such, it is two-dimensional: one of those dimensions is a result of historical

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developments, and the other is that of social revolution. Modernity is qualified by Habermas as a project and not a historical period, since it is seen as a cultural movement which started as a consequence of the modernization process, i.e. of social and cultural transformations during a given period. The problem which followed this movement was the rebinding of specialized knowledge (a result of Illuminism with practical thought and daily processes) thus utilizing its potential for the better, i.e. its reentering to lifeworlds and the common interest. Modernity is further known as an unfinished project, as the problems it addresses, according to Habermas, are still not resolved, but it has to be kept alive as the alternatives offered instead of modernity are worse than this project. Its finalization would be required sooner or later.

Habermas’ attempt for a critical review of the theoretical basis of social “modernity” for a corrected project (which acknowledges the cultural and social importance of lifeworlds) is made through rehabilitation of reason into a “communicative” reason as a way to conserve Illuminism. The normative content of modernity is that this project “shall no longer loan criteria out of which it assumes its orientation from models emerging out of another era; it needs to bring out the norms out of itself [unofficial translation].” This is because this normative and rational content of modernity are created from the way the intellectual executors of the modernity project have understood themselves. So, the norms which modernity pulled out of it are based on the resources of reason, but only the reason of executors of the project. Thus started the use of the reason “focused on the subject” (one based solely on a set of lifeworlds and ignorant to the others). To avoid this way of thinking, Habermas debates of communicative reason: one we produce, in a way, through communicating and debating with one another until a consensus is achieved (simplified principle of discursive democracy). The idea of communicative action and discourse in Habermas’ theory is the basis for social order of modern and secular societies; they form and later maintain the social integrity by keeping the society together. Practically, this is the response to the basic question of Habermas’ social theory, how the social order can be enabled. A minimal description of the concept of Habermas’ democracy is that

30 Ibid., 65.
31 Ibid., 66.
32 Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 7.
34 Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, 47.
everything should be done in order to imitate an ideal situation of discussion. The revolutionary political project of modernity is guided by the liberalization theory with its four main characteristics: individualism, universalism, egalitarianism, and melorism (the idea that social institutions and political arrangements can improve with people’s attempts). The ways these characteristics are applied in practice have played an important role in the way America is formed as a nation-state.\(^{35}\) Liberalization of American Illuminism has known and emphasized human imperfection, yet it not necessarily has links with individual freedom to people’s democracy. The differences between anthropological philosophy of individualism and political principles of universal law and people’s democracy have played a very important role in creating America. Although liberals and thinkers of Illuminism were more than aware on the existing diversity of its social and political consequences, Outlaw argues that the way this diversity is addressed was not right, and this politics pursued by the latter has brought up the creation of an oppressed underground comprising of black Africans.\(^{36}\) Its political manifestation is explained as follows:

Not all persons, members of certain groups, were initially in the best position possible. Some of them (or their successors) could improve this position; some, due to their “nature”, could not do this. Egalitarian and universal elements of liberalization should be regulated balancing from realities of human diversities, i.e. the need, in some circumstances, to bring into play the melorist element of liberal conviction [unofficial translation].\(^{37}\)

America turned into a model for inter-contradictory tensions between illuminist thoughts and its practices. This occurred as a consequence of the fact that:

[O]n one side were implications of devotion to “unity of mankind” in philosophic anthropology interwoven in political philosophy of modernity anchored in the ideas of reason; on the other hand was the attempt to manage human diversity and imperfection through elaborating a defined hierarchy, quite thoroughly, on the basis of purity, corruption or the level of development of reason (or even the presence or lack of ability to use reason) in certain groups of people [unofficial translation].\(^{38}\)

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\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 163.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.
This is the form with which social differences were justified on racial, ethnic, and gender basis, and as a consequence the social equality was limited. The hierarchies in the context of diversity, according to Outlaw, were built with the permission of reason, while it “in the process turned into the whore of political benefit [unofficial translation].”\textsuperscript{39} So the liberalization was no other than a theory prepared on the basis of reason from the classical and modern Illuminism to deal with the human diversity through hierarchies privileged with reason, which reduced the egalitarianism to the point where there was equality only among the equal.\textsuperscript{40} Initially, executors of modernity reasonably justified the hierarchies of social groups through scientific accounts over race. These scientific findings were initiated from the need for a justification on the hierarchical and social order based on race. In 18\textsuperscript{th} century, biological accounts for the use of race to explain social differences were used as a valid reason to rule over the black Africans. This stood until further scientific studies were made (especially those by Darwin and Mendel) which changed the explication of human differences from the “pure kind” to the genetic ones.\textsuperscript{41}

These findings, however, did not eliminate the racial dependency or submission. Instead, as Outlaw explains, the executors of modernity have continued to seek other accounts in order to justify their deeds. The next alternative they employed was the difference among races which was not based fully on biological findings, but also on socio-cultural characteristics. So, the notion of reason continued to serve hierarchies of diversity which were at the center of American liberalization of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Furthermore, in challenging the biological explanation of racial differences, ethnicity started to be used as a synonym of how race was used until then.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, this type of reason in function continued to be used for justification of such classification which held another world under the feet of the first one (the dominated). In order to find an exit from this situation which continues to be recreated in essence differing in nuances only, one needs to observe Habermas’ communicative reason, which has the function of the attempt to improve this abuse of reason, rehabilitating it in a form which would not permit such abuse.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 164.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 165.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 166-168.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 169-171.
3.3 New Grounding for Practical and Theoretical Agenda

Having in mind those aspects of the modernity project (with the theory of liberalization) from the prospect of Africana philosophy, the issue raised is how to change this current paradigm – on what basis and in what way – in order to put the emphasis on those elements, constitutive parts of some groups of people, in order for this project to be reviewed. So, as Outlaw suggests, the issue lies on how to create a structure of a social order which values the racial and ethnic differences in order to accommodate the politics of difference or to find a way to value these differences without pushing for a compulsory “homogenization”. Now it was seen that modernity with liberalization philosophy cannot resolve this problem given that it lacks the aspect which accommodates the politics of differences. In order to establish such structures which value the importance of predicates of race and ethnicity, a suitable terrain needs to be created for practical and theoretical agenda. This model according to Outlaw should contain two main characteristics: one which values the definitive characteristics of the people fully, those being characteristics giving a form to our lifeworlds and the way we are in relation to others, and one of the principles which take into account these characteristics (differences among people) and based on which we base the organization of socio-political life and intellectual structures (part of which people are).

One of the greatest challenges that the politics of difference brings is the necessary precondition to look into the core kernel or the essence which ontologically is core constitutive part of every human; i.e. it must be looked at from those which are termed incidental differences (such as ethnicity, race and gender). This core kernel or essence for a long time was identified with reason, but in fact these incidental differences are not really such: without them we would not be our own self. As a result, it is not the reason that is the core, but those characteristics which make us who we are. The challenge presented with the just assessment of race and ethnicity is the achievement of a balance between the space given to these differences between people (respecting them) and preservation and advancement of social and intellectual life.

in his suggestions for a serious review of traditions stirring from modern Illuminism and the notion of reason as constructed from the latter one, Outlaw emphasizes that first the “man” must be rethought in order to create a system

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43 Ibid., 173.
44 Ibid., 174.
45 Ibid., 175.
where the unique, individual, and the unlike is more important, and not disregarded in pursuit of unity and universality. Here one must take into account particularly the groups, the existence of which was neglected until now (such as the black Africans). This problem cannot be resolved for as long as there is no critical improvement of the key notions related to the human. Furthermore, the problem does not lay only with philosophers and racist executors of the project, but in philosophical anthropology which contains a core drawback which needs mending. The key contributions to bringing essential change to the last project of Illuminism and thus move on beyond universality which disregards individual characteristics (and is based on subjective reason) can be achieved from philosophers by perceiving the differences on racial and ethnic basis (in cases when they are applicable).\(^{46}\) To do that, Outlaw suggests, based on Michael Novak’s proposal (another American philosopher), another form of liberalization, a cosmopolitan liberalization instead of the universal one is needed. The cosmopolitan one is built on two main principles: firstly, the devotion to a system of full understanding, common, intellectual, and secondly, awareness on the differences, especially those who are key stakeholders in shaping our lives and the way we perceive the world.\(^{47}\) In order to practice this liberalization (which would contribute to Illuminism and emancipation), key thoughts of those races and ethnicities which were until now excluded should be taken into account. This does not imply that racial and ethnical thinking should be the only way to view things, but they should not be left totally neglected either in the path towards a just and emancipated society.\(^{48}\)

This is partly what Habermas attempts to do with his notion of communicative reason: move towards universality by respecting the peculiarities of lifeworlds, and at the same time avoiding falling into the attractive trap of relativism. With discursive democracy, everyone has the right to participate with their thought, and the society is still trying for a universality which is finally achieved by taking into account the viewpoint of all people, as they are formed from their individual lifeworlds. The problem with Habermas’ theory is that it is very difficult to recognize the peculiarities of lifeworlds and respect them, moving at the same time towards universality, and not mentioning concretely the race as a predicate.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 177.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 178.
3.4 Addendum: Euro-centrism and Afro-centrism

When the Afro-centric viewpoint achieved by Outlaw is added to Habermas’ theory, the latter is filled with what was not its constitutive part as a result of the Western tradition from which it stirs. Though Habermas rehabilitates reason (to a communicative one) to avoid these characteristics which influence the creation of an unjust social structure, Outlaw expands his theory attempting to construct a specific framework which is fit to address special categories of people who were oppressed as a result of implementing modernity (hierarchical racial and ethnic categories). Viewing the modern reality from a viewpoint of a dominated group and providing historical explanations to the developments of differential division based on peoples characteristics, Outlaw proves the true use of subjective reason, and as a result, the importance of improving the social theory.

The importance of people’s lifeworlds, formed from their particularities (in this case, the racial and ethnic ones) is more than apparent once it is clear how essential these characteristics are for people. Consequently, going beyond them is undesirable and unnecessary, as this would lead to removing the basic components of their identities. When it is said that all of the lifeworlds should play a role in the social theory, a specific framework is needed for lifeworlds and predicates of certain groups, the lack of which is in a way the basis to qualify the modernity project as lacking, if not disorienting.

4. Conclusions

Africana Philosophy and the attempts to articulate the ideas comprised within this field mark a new development not only in the philosophical domain, but also beyond it. The challenge which some theories from the Afro-centric viewpoint have already started to present to those of mainstream political philosophy is a step towards a movement not necessarily against, but definitely beyond the latter expanding its philosophical and practical realm by means of different corrections and amendments. The contributions of philosophers such as Charles W. Mills (in social contract theory) and Lucious Outlaw (in the modernity project) to the Africana thought domain are undoubtedly very valuable for the advancement of the latter, and even the reviewing of the conventional political theories. In presenting the criticism coming from those two philosophers to the two theories belonging to the later stream, one can see the importance of taking diverse perspectives into consideration for
different theories, which often remain unnoticed as a result of historical and political circumstances, this serving to the advancement of a more just and equal social order.

**Bibliography**


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Why do we still need Philosophy

Abstract

The author’s text “Why do we still need philosophy” aims to focus on the presence of philosophy today and on its role in understanding social sciences, and its humanistic and critic educational purposes for the new generations.

Since the role of philosophy cannot be disputed for the aforementioned reasons, the author disputes a few wrong approaches in the teachings of philosophy especially in Kosovo. He also disputes several self proclaimed / so called philosophers or authors of philosophy who had gained recognition during the Ex-Yugoslavia era that were unable to resist the most basic test of humanism during the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, many of them became political functionaries of the repressive apparatus and warmonger of Milosevic such as Mihajlo Markovic in Beograd and Aleksa Buha in Sarajevo causing humanistic revolts not only against them as individuals, but also towards a way of perceiving philosophy.

The author finds that a single philosophy does not exist, but rather philosophies as in the plural form. He defends the standpoint that besides its epistemological functions, philosophy has a wide range of educational while it can serve as social therapy in societies with crisis or post-conflict societies. The author analyses illustrative examples of the humanistic impact of the philosophy of Karl Popper, Hannah Ardent and Richard Rorty.

Key words: Philosophy, humanism, freedom, history, critical thinking.

The first dissertation: Philosophy and the teaching of philosophy

Many teachers of philosophy in our high schools, perhaps unconscious of it and with good intentions, make the mistake from their very first day of lecturing when they try to explain to their auditor what philosophy is. To answer this question they immediately refer to the history of philosophy and the ancient Greece while presenting philosophy as something old fashioned which is more than 2500 years old, thus extinguishing the curiosity about philosophy from the very start. While others become attached to the etymology of the word saying that philosophy is love for knowledge or wisdom, anticipating then an
agreement with love of knowledge, and while love might not appear anywhere, knowledge will become mechanical and the quest for it will become memory thus not a creative.

The result of these wrong approaches lead to the common opinion that philosophy is a complicated matter, unnecessary even and the common denominator of these opinions is the expression “don’t philosophize!” Therefore, those who see philosophy as a history of philosophy consequently arrive at an anecdotal conclusion about philosophy, which resembles the fate of king Lear who had many daughters and had distributed its wealth among them keeping for himself only his old age. This anecdote hints at the relationship of philosophy with special sciences, and in this context those who want to save philosophy do not hesitate to call it a science, naturally a little different than the exact sciences, but sometimes considering it even an exact science aiming to solve with its use the many problems of people and the whole of humanity, to serve practice the way Marx did in its eleventh thesis about Fauerbach where he expresses that, “up until now philosophers have explained the world, but the question is how to change the world.” In this way Marx had not only destroyed philosophy in the name of its “realization”, but had also marked the end of the tradition of European philosophy, while wanting to make it practical as “an ideological weapon of the proletariat” with which he wanted to realize the social revolution. Another aim, though not as dramatic as that of Marx, was the efforts to “reform” philosophy and to make it a precise and useful science the way that the radical imperialists, the positivists, and the neo-positivists tried. It is precisely here where the paths of those who want to understand what philosophy is and those who misunderstand separate. Those who fail to recognize its importance are like those who misunderstood the world of Sophia, the most beautiful woman in the world, who would not belong to anyone in particular, and refuses to become an instrument or be manipulated. She despises to become confined within a definition because she believes that a definition means putting a period on a sentence, and a period means the end of the debate. In relation to the differences of philosophy and science one should also examine the differences between political philosophy and science, or in plural, political sciences, philosophy of science, and science itself. Moreover, examining the differences between the arts, and the philosophy of art, morals as a norm of behavior and the philosophy of morals, the philosophy of justice and justice itself etcetera. The in-depth examination of these differences will allow the scholar of philosophy and its admirers to recognize the contribution of philosophy in the constitution of the culture and values such as rationalism,
individualism, truth, justice, freedom, and human rights of the European societies. I believe that the aforementioned mix-ups continue to play a role in the misunderstandings of philosophy today. One must look here to find the distortions that strive to make philosophy “useful” from its beginnings of philosophers as courtiers and servants of all kinds of politics all the way to the notion of philosophy as an instrument to change the world, if indeed philosophy wishes to preserve its relevance.

The second dissertation: Philosophy and intellectual dishonesty

Emmanuel Levinas, a very popular author today, was asked what he wanted to do in philosophy after completing his studies, and he answers: “Naturally I wanted to work in philosophy but what could that imply besides academics and the pointless activity of producing books. To practice sociology as an empirical science, which Durkheim would suggest to his students the framework that he had set himself *apriory*, or should I repeat the perfect work of Bergson, impeccable as a poem, or should I explore variations of it? It was thanks to Hurssel that I discovered the meaning of the mere possibility of “working in philosophy” without becoming imprisoned within a dogmatic system and all at once avoiding the risk of vague intuitions...” Further down, we find in Levinas something more essential regarding the problem of philosophy in relation to humanity. To Levinas we ask: “ You have firstly been a historian of philosophy and analyst of other philosophers, and you have published articles on Hurssel and Heidegger, but in your first book titled “Existence and Existents”, you have written this book as you state in your preface, during the war while in the concentration camp...”¹

This question and its answer along with the many approaches of philosophy represent the main turn in the perception of philosophy for me today. I will go back to my initial question of what is philosophy and why do we still need it, and why would we continue to need it, in the hope that we would understand who we are and where are we headed. My beginner students have often asked me the above question in my courses of philosophy. I could not tell them much more initially other than; philosophy will help you in learning how to think critically and to use your mind. Unfortunately, this question has also been asked to me by life itself, and not only from the academic circle. After I completed my studies of philosophy in Prishtina, I continued pursuing

¹ Emanuel Levinas, Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, Fayard, Paris, 1982
a Master Degree in Philosophy in Sarajevo, and then in Paris. In my thesis during the academic year 1980-1981, I discussed "Sartre's Interpretation of History". I cannot say that I encountered any disagreements with the type of the academic philosophy. On the contrary, there were professors that I had met in Prishtina, and later in Sarajevo and in Paris whom I admired. I can say that I had phases of utter confusion in regards to the purpose of philosophy, but I cannot say that I gave up my search for a single moment, even throughout the most unfavorable years 1990-1999.

The real turning point in my perception of philosophy happened during the nineties. During the most dramatic time in history since the Second World War, while Yugoslavia was in the verge of destruction, I saw one of my professors, Alexa Buha in the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs for the government of Radovan Karadzic. He had once been a good connoisseur of history and philosophy, and specialized in the classical German philosophy. But throughout the duration of the war within Bosnia-Herzegovina he passionately defended "the historical right" established from the referendum of a racist Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, which preached that if a Serb, living or dead, occupied a piece of land, that land would be proclaimed Serbian, and all other nationalities would have to be expelled, and all Serbs would unite in a single state.

At the center of this monstrous laboratory in Belgrade, a "famous" philosopher whom I did not know personally, but whose work I had read and for whom my colleges had often spoken had become an advisor to Slobodan Milosevic. I would watch him on Television time and again in rallies around Serbia and this Mihajlo Markovic was not the only one who had implemented Milosevic's political program and who was using philosophy as an ideological weapon to awaken the most primitive masses. My colleges who had been his students had said that they were aware of his actions, and though they disapproved, they were aware that he was working for his country and they would not be surprised if one day his people would hail him a hero. I can say that this was the ultimate turn in my dealings with philosophy in order to resolve the great misunderstanding about what philosophy was not. The first thing I could do was to trace the idea that philosophy does not exist, but philosophies do. The protagonists of existentialism, of individualism and freedom supported this idea. One of them was Sartre, whose philosophy I was familiar with but whose ideas on Marxism, his attitude towards the Nobel prize, and the student revolts of 1968 – though he was anti Stalinist and anti colonialist- would simultaneously make me uneasy when considering what had happened in the world with
Cuba, the Soviet Union. By following his ideas on existentialism it became clear to me that one should not expect a philosopher to be infallible, but rather to allow him to claim responsibility and to learn from his mistakes. Even though it was an unfavorable time for philosophy, I can say with conviction that it was during this period that I began to clarify my own philosophical standpoint. Revisiting the old books I had brought from my stay in Paris during my studies helped. During this time, the Serbian regime had announced Serbian as the official language and all lectures had to be conducted in Serbian and I was fired from my job at the University. Time became abundant and simultaneously it became monotonous, and monotony is the most destructing thing for a human being. Even though this feeling was in contradiction with the existential understanding of time as the deficit resource that can turn even a human being into nothing. Under these conditions I became an existentialist, in the meaning that I began to lose contact with my friends and fellow colleges and our students who were glorified by Mihajlo Markovic. I began to appreciate solitude and I began to select my company. A strange intuition led me to the company of artists, painters, who at that time were hosting exhibitions in coffee places and other places I had never before thought possible for such functions. They made life somewhat bearable for they did not have totalitarian plans or megalomaniac goals. They existed for their day-to-day work in a society that had fallen into a totalitarian repression. I was impressed with the way they understood philosophy and perceived friendships.

This very spontaneous and ambitionless relationship between philosophy and art brought me to other philosophers such as Albert Camus and Kierkegaard that had never considered or categorized themselves philosophers. I found in them the philosophy I was seeking for more than two decades, the non-academic philosophy, and non-teleological kind of philosophy. By re-reading their works I found the honest existentialism- subject and subjectivity- and my own notion of subjective truth. The objective truth that surpassed the individual but looked deep in history, the very notions that were demolished within the dogmatic systems and the ambitious philosophies for which many students of philosophy fell victims. These were people I saw in political stadiums and populist rallies.

If I can say so, perhaps not in a precise way, the personal debate about philosophy and its importance came to me through an existential autobiography, where there are naturally errors in actions and attitude. Existentialism in me arrived the way it had arrived before, as a glance within someone who has decided to
deal with philosophy and can be asked: “why do we need it?” I need a certain kind of faith because it is a time of crisis. Religious belief was not enough for me, even though the transitions after the fall of communism in Albania and in Kosova were warning for a triumphant return of religion. The religion of the soul as a kind of life of the universal idea, where the thought about existence strengthens, was crucial for me. The impulse and the purpose was necessary for me to continue to deal with philosophy and that is why I was attracted more than ever to Kierkegaard’s proposition “belief is existence” as a way to know and understand oneself. It was a question of a philosophical duty to explain existence in a non-academic way, but perhaps in a psychological way, because my psychology was becoming a sort of outline of my soul’s possibilities because the empirical social possibilities were being questioned. I was becoming convinced that this state was a sort of call for freedom through the means of inner actions that would allow me to choose that which I truthfully wanted. After the year 1990 the war that was descending south form the north of ex Yugoslavia caused the big destruction in our Balkan existence, and that is why I was convinced that philosophy with its seriousness was becoming more important than ever.

The third dissertation: Philosophy and “homo-politicus”

The then known impacts and the acquisition of tradition: A human being should not forget anything. It is not essential what you know, but rather what you think: In order for philosophy or philosophizing to be honest, the philosophical thought should spring from within, from ourselves. In this way, the entire acquisition of tradition happens through our own life goals. The way, in which history of philosophy exists for a person, makes up a fundamental problem for that person’s philosophies, and that requires a personal solution. Naturally, Marxism played a role in my model of studying philosophy, but fortunately, I recall that it has not been completely dominant neither dogmatic. My generation has had the opportunity to avoid the soviet alternative of Marxism and to become educated with authors of the western Marxism. This has allowed me today to not be a radical anti Marxist, furthermore, in the field of political philosophy, I gather that without Marx and the challenges he presented to the intellectual world, we would not have such brilliant works by Karl Popper, Hannah Arendt and other thinkers of liberalization. The history of philosophy, unlike the history of other sciences cannot be studied only with the mind. Especially in a situation of crisis, or the situation of the borders, what
shakes up and makes us acquire from history is existential reality, which in the context of philosophy is discovered and can be understood only through thinking. What remains strange and incomprehensible is the border for our own truth and not only for ourselves. In this way, I found that the study of philosophies of the past does not have an essential role if our own reality does not become a part of this study, and if the way we think does not become a preoccupation for the way we think.

Now I believe that I have reached the level of perceiving philosophy as a necessary field in our school’s system for humanistic educational purposes. I also think that education at a great extent should be in itself education and respectful towards the individualization and subjectivity and these notions require a democratic legitimacy, a school model that is free of dogmatic, authoritative, planning, and populist inheritance.

Why planning? Because it concerns the status of philosophy in society. We have changed the social system from a planned economy to a market economy. Despite this we are witness to the ambition of the state and the government and the word planning is put in front of our face, and every day we listen to lectures about “strategy”, which in fact are inspired from the big totalitarian philosophies, and it is not by accident that a postmodern philosopher used to call them the fatal strategies, destructive for the fate of the concrete person, in this case not only for the students, but also for the citizens. Every time that I have participated in the debates regarding the school system, especially the universities, the most commonly used word, and the most disgusting one for me has been the word planning: capacity planning, registration planning, employment planning, etc., which certainly come from mentalities and ambitions not very distant that have proven fatal for freedom and for civilization. We are told for example that we must develop the curriculum and studies that are connected with the needs of society, economy and employment. Where does that mentality leave philosophy and other things? What can people do with it, and the answer according to that reasoning would be that no one would need it, because we saw that if we present a question like that, (and the question has ideological signs) even Levinas had problems with philosophy being perceived this way. Here we must find the reason why all the ideologies and especially the totalitarian systems have either rejected philosophy entirely or they have downgraded it to the “ideological weapon of the classes” of the dominant ideology. “The ideas of the dominant class become dominant philosophies.”
I am returning to the syndrome of planning: according to the logic of planning based on study groups and the universities, today we would see that all of the universities in France, Germany, England, and the USA would be closed, because everyone knows that the economy of these countries is already full and cannot employ everyone, not even the young people who come out of the universities, and universities are not so concerned with who is going to find employment after graduating but they rather care about the quality of studies that they offer. That is why I think that the protagonists of planning with or without their knowledge propagate socialism and monopoly of the state over everything that would pretend to develop the competition and the freedom of undertaking. In this context, the prevention of the work of the private universities results as obstruction for civil society and free universities, even though as the ministries have designed them in their transfigured patterns they too resemble profitable enterprises more than private universities. This restrictive, arbitrary, and monopolist attitude unfolds the mentalities and the model of philosophy of the actions of the protagonists, whom if you were to ask about philosophy and its status today, would gladly confirm that philosophy is not needed to anyone today. I personally think that such “fatal” strategies cannot be sold to anyone for they have no place and are unattractive for all the lovers of freedom, human sensitivity and humanism.

I will quote here Karl Popper, who after his experiences with fascism in his country, developed a model for an open society illustrated with the method of resolving problems step by step promoting the priority of good politics in proportion with the economy, because according to him, bad politics destroy even the strongest economies, whereas good politics promote the economy and the well being. It should be emphasized that Popper’s entire work is a dialogue with Marx while implementing the method of radical rationalization as an attempt to recognize Marx’s merits and failures. He highlights that Marx is an outstanding methodologist in the field of research who made interesting analysis in regards to work, money, capitalism and the exploitation. According to Popper, Marx was influenced by the Hegelian project of totality, and perhaps it was Hegel and not Marx who was responsible for the consequences of historicism. He presents Hegel as a philosopher of the Prussian state, who took over the philosophical justification of the reality in the Prussian state and all the results of historicism as a faulty method of interpreting and building a society. Marx’s conclusion that “the then known history of the society was a history of war of the classes” had its theoretical base in Hegel’s historicism and his ambition to explain everything within a philosophical system. Popper
writes that Hegel had prepared the conditions for a totalitarian state and that Hegelianism and a materialized hand form the XIX century represented by Darwin made up the surrogate of fascism. That is why Popper warns us that history is full of deceitful prophets. Many murders have happened in the name of the nation because the dominating ideologies are corrupt. Popper gives two reasons why Hegel’s philosophy became so dominant and influential: The first reason was political and it is connected to the support and affirmation that it received from Prussia considering it as its own philosophy and a sort of a ideological agenda. The second reason had a theoretical nature, which means that it was a complicated, and a speculative philosophy, which was difficult to learn and acquire causing the scholars to feel inferior and unable to contest because they would look as unworthy of philosophy and insufficiently informed. According to Popper, that is how totalitarian practices were affirmed from Hegel to Marx, with projections to the future, and scientific aspirations such as the “scientific socialism” and thus promising paradise while they created hell. This method of practicing philosophy Popper calls an example of the intellectual dishonesty. Popper thinks that these models of a fatal society can be avoided by a different approach, much different from historicism, which he calls the engineering of choosing a government step by step, and without bloodshed. According to him Marx had made very interesting observations and he had used respectful methodology, but when it came to the main problem that of the state, he failed, because he concluded that “the state will dissolve”.

In fact, according to Popper we cannot hope that the state will dissolve, but we can hope and we can work that it can become democratic through reforms and it can become liable for freedom. 2

Therefore, since 2500 years ago philosophy has never ceased of asking questions, and its duty today is to continue asking the right questions, and to present once again that gashing theme (speaking in Franz Kafka’s terms) of the relationship between experience and thought aided by the request of being conscious. Should we easily allow that our experiences should shape our thoughts, or should the thought be a factor of overcoming the transition without falling into the trap of the ambition of implementing philosophy like Marx, as Hanna Arendt says that Marx had stopped the wonderful European tradition of the freedom of thought and dialogue replacing it with the duty of philosophy to change the world. The arrogant political monism has left its footprints in all the fields and layers of thought. The Veberian ethics (Protestant ethics), as a

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sufficient base for capitalism must be read as an attack against political monism and its philosophical consequences that are found everywhere. And we must not stop here; we must read Hanna Arendt’s conditions, nativity and plurality. These messages must be interpreted in the sense of the future generations, whether or not they will be able to solve the dilemma of philosophy that was traditionally hidden in the relationship between democracy and culture. This dilemma, and the question of this thesis will be passed on to this generation, and naturally democracy will be the organizational form because they will be modern and they will need culture, hence philosophy.

With an uncertain gesture looking out towards a blurry horizon we can suppose the possible transformation of the current order of consensus, of the domination of the majority, of the freedom of speech, and everything else that is part of this world of independent individuals. Philosophy will continue to be educational, a guidance, and a good ally for responsibility and for the freedom of the individual.

**The Fourth dissertation: Freedom not determinism**

Man is free, and man is freedom. We have been left alone if we agree that there is no determinism. From the very moment man is born, from this fresh beginning which is a humanistic condition (Hanna Arendt), he is responsible for his actions. Man is also responsible for his own feelings. I can value the strength of my feelings when I act according to that feeling. In other words, the feelings shape after a person’s actions. Freedom is within the self that is why to not act inspired by freedom, but to calculate and to find an advisory is the same as including another person in your choices. Philosophy is a wonderful ally for the freedom of thought and freedom of speech.

From a philosophical point of view freedom is an ontological category and it deals with human dignity. In this aspect the concept of freedom is closely connected to responsibility and justice.

Naturally, the history of human devotion and sacrifices for freedom is lengthy and we usually mention the most important points of this history such as the American Declaration, the Declaration of 1789 in France, and the Universal Declaration of the year 1948.

To separate form the historical point of view, we must first accept that human rights pose a few fundamental problems that must be resolved if we wish
for them to become central part in educating the citizens and consequently developing factors of democracy. Every time we talk about human rights we must be careful to choose the fictional discrepancy between civic and political rights and social rights. Civic rights are the rights that the state guarantees for the citizen or non-citizen: equality before the law, security, protection from arbitrary power, private property, freedom of opinion and speech. Political rights give the individual power; participation in elaborating the common will and the right to accept taxation as well as the freedom of thought.

It is essential to understand that human rights are based on one person’s relations with others and this relationship produces equality. The other person has the same rights as I do because we are both equal and his rights are my rights, and I am like him. That is why human rights are based on the principle of equality. That is why the discussion of this matter depends on how the state is organized. It depends on the balance of the institutions. That is why the problem is not always protecting the individual from the state but creating a state that is constitutional and juridical, a democratic state that means a certain contract...(Kosova, the conflict of the citizen with the state, the disputing of the state, loyalty and sovereignty, the relation between democracy and tradition)³

Today there is a theoretical debate about the hierarchy of the human rights and social rights. There is no doubt that for a society in transition the freedom of expression presents the beginning of change, the transition from a totalitarian system to a democratic one. (A personal memory about the removal of article 133, “verbal violation” from the criminal law.) Supported by human and intellectual courage, free speech became the factor of deconstruction of the political theology since 1990 for most Eastern European countries and ex-Yugoslavia. A kind of “power of speech” as Foucault called it was the factor for all the social transformation in Eastern Europe, like in Hungary and Poland, and that was the beauty of the mind. But those intellectuals who played a role in the Yugoslav catastrophe represent the dark side of the mind, and it is precisely this relation which best shows how closely connected freedom of speech is to responsibility and justice.

The freedom of expression and one’s consciousness about its importance produce in a society the public sensibility whereby each citizen values their own interpretation of a situation and reasons in relation to what must be done. All of these begin to appear in the shape of opinions, of sensitivity that

³ For further information see Kardi Metaj “Kultura demokratike si desideratë sociale, te “Njohja” no. 1, Prishtinë 2012
is often called political sensibility. This sensibility is partially determined by the individual’s social background and their concrete living conditions. The sensibility is at the same time prospective, which means that while being based on traditional way of thinking and feeling about things, it is also obliged to interpret and adapt to the new realities.

Richard Rorty, a pleasant interlocutor on the issue of why we still need philosophy, in *Philosophy and the Future* sees philosophy as necessary in educating people, namely educating their emotions. Being a pragmatic philosopher he manages to successfully touch on the role of philosophy for human’s future and freedom. He splits this debate into two subjects. The first one is that of separate worlds, reminding us about plurality as a deep human condition and the need for education in line with it as well as the role of human debate, where philosophy offers its human expertise. According to him the second subject is the instrumentalization, where he develops the idea on realism versus instrumentalism.

I would like to conclude the topic of this discussion by reiterating Rorty’s brilliant idea on the old relation between rationalism and sensualism and the role of respective philosophies, especially that of rationalism and science, in relation to human plurality. Rorty advises: “Not the reason of science (which aspires the sole authority of the rational) but the utilization (or not) of violence in order to change convictions should be the criteria of the rational and of rationalists, as there may be more than one forms of the rational...”

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The focus of this study is the relation of media with the audiences in Albania and Kosova. The study further aims to analyze the relations of television media, as a means of mass-communication with the public, observing above all their tendency to transform television into a control tool, namely to influence the path of creating independent judgments. The talk show type programs present in Tirana media will be treated as shows simultaneously serving to initiate the public defense of powerful people. This claim shall be followed by the attempt to answer the questions: is the tendency to win the “public battle” one of imposing “the indisputable truth” to the audiences? What is the media impact on them and what transformation do media undergo as a result of the mediatization of society? What is the relation between them and what is their mutual refusal or impact? Does the Albanian spectacle present the current situation in Albanian society or is it an unrealistic portrayal of made-up images? Beyond this, other TV media from the Albanian environment will be treated, together with their impact in shaping the public opinion. Televisions in Kosova will be treated as being in apathy with regards to spectacular talk-shows, and dominated by political tendencies which predominate the cultural discourse. TV opinionism comprises another characteristic of the “Albanian spectacle” which will be in the focus of this study. Does this opinionism constitute a media mechanism to spectacularize the public, or does it comprise, together with the media itself, an instrument in the hand of “power” to control and construct the society? Special phenomena characteristic for the Albanian media in Albania (and its impact on the society), will be contrasted and compared to special phenomena of the media in Kosova (together with their impact). The relation of television with the public opinion in Albania and the tendency to “spectacularize” the society through presenting public judgments will be in the core of the research; while in Kosova the tendency to develop controlled media through information control shall be looked into closely.
There is a general belief, often disputed, that media, just like the political representation, is a product of the culture in a society, and that the tendency to supervise the general public belongs to all media in transition, especially those of mass-communication, such as the television.

As the media culture belongs to the society, and even one under transition, let us start our quest in a speculative form: Is the television as a developed media in the Albanian environment during the last 20 years a representation of this reality and what is the role of the individual or the collectivity in transforming the conscience of free judgment? Is there a self-proclaimed tendency to spectacularize the relation of Albanians with television? If so, what is the final goal of this tendency and how was the symbiosis between expectation and free judgment as well as the tendency to reach the peak of “the power of lights” through opinionated filters created (society of advertisement, in which the supervised opinion is promoted)?

Let us start our search in viewing the relation which media in Albania, Kosova and elsewhere in Albanian environment have with the audience. First of all, let us claim that the Albanian society all over, partially politicized, has produced and derived political media, inclined to spectacularize to the level of “the paradise of lights”, which means the *pro forma* presence of a necessary veil of spectacles, enabling the institutionalization of their political aims (and strings).

As we are talking about different media contexts, derived from different political and social ones, is this tendency developed uniformly, say, in Albania and Kosova? No, because the cultural, social and political context, completely different in those two Albanian countries, has determined the scope or the level of individual and collective participation in constructing televised media, namely their relation with the “society of lights”. Therefore, today we speak of different media contexts, cultural contexts and, above all, of the somewhat paradoxical developments in the relation between television media and the citizen, by which we somewhat include the relation of the individual with the media tendency of “blunting the masses”.

The tendency to spectacularize, both individuals and the collectivity, as a precondition of “rehabilitation” and “participation” in the cultural and political trends of the society in Albania, as well as the unnoticed and indifferent role of the audience in relation to the politicized media tendencies in Kosova, constitute paradoxical edges in the relation between Albanians and television today. Yet, as our paper does not aim to treat the relation of media to the
audience particularly, or even the relations between media and marketing, but rather that between media as a political and cultural instrument and the media instrumentalization of the society, the “canonization” of media exposure as a precondition to be included in the mass-initiative politicization, namely controlled media and political deculturization, will be essential.

As already known, the talk shows in Albania constitute an essential concept of television. Particularly main television channels produce live shows by which they aspire to spectacularize the society, or make it impossible for the audience to detach from the media product, and consequently they achieve the silent pact of agreement on the control power of the media in their behavior, determining their dependency on media.

Yet, if the spectacularization (cultural, political and social, alongside the media one) is a per se aim (an aim in itself) of the media (television mostly) could it also be that the most important TV shows serve as the beginning of public defense for the powerful people of politics and further, as a determination of the sole instrument by which the individual may be treated as a part of the mediately culturalized society? Is it a tendency to win the “public battle” of imposing to audiences “the irrefutable truth”, which they must accept through agreeing with the media tendency to serve as an instrument for political “culturalization”, through media “spectacularization”? What is the media impact on them and what transformation do media undergo as a consequence of mediatization of society? What is the relation between them and what is the mutual refusal or impact?

If the most important feature of those “show-screens” is the bond they make with the audience and the impact of television over the Albanian public, the inclusion without reluctance of lay people without any public importance in live shows, speaks of a tendency to “spectacularize” the Albanian individual and society. Most of Albanian citizens are ready to participate in a TV show and become “participants” in the making of the show and the spectacle, with whatever role in it, regardless of the fact of whether or not it relates minimally to them as individuals. Apart from the fact that the show-media with spectacles constitute the main interest of the Albanian audience, the audience itself is open to make public its own identity (if that identity can be distinguished in the plurality of collective spectacles), without a public function in this collective spectacle of the Albanian society.
This definition however is only based on the media environment of Albania. In the other Albanian parts the impact of media is dissimilar. In Kosova, as was mentioned at the beginning, the television is apathic with regards to the talkshows of the world of spectacle, while political affiliation predominates the cultural discourse. Consequently, the audience is not tied to television in the sense of cultivating civic or cultural principles and it does not constitute part of creation of media culture, nor of any spectacularizing tendency. There the audience is almost immune to television spectacularizing tendencies, and the TV centers themselves, as a product of traditional media culture, are far from becoming spectacularizing media. This immunity touches on the cultural discourse and its refusal, each time it is wrapped with “political discourse”. This pertains particularly to public television, the RTK, which unlike the public media in Albania, receives a broad audience and frequent viewing. Even here a sort of cultural paradox is observed in the relation between the individual and television, should we compare the situation in Albania and Kosova. Why does this occur, such an extreme situation in the relations of audiences in the two main cultural and media Albanian centers? What are the factors making the lay and private Albanian person so open to the public on one hand, and totally immune on the other? What are the paradoxes and what are the edges of the relation to television in Albanian society? Is this only a transitional phase of development in a previously closed society, or is it the very nature of the Albanian individual? Do the audiences in Albania and Kosova change (as the media do)?

Mediatization/ “Spectacularization” of the Albanian Individual (Television / Mediatized Public Opinion)

The media development in Albania, since the beginning of the 1990s, is characterized by common inclination of Albanians to cultural and media “westernization”. The media was consequently developed under the western media influence, mainly of neighboring countries (such as Italy), which “spectacularizes” the society, treating this as a premise for the “mass-marketing”, or the impact on media culture of the audience and through it, the political and social culture. The pact of creating a political dependency through media dependency is the political and media end goal of a spectacularized society. The debate on politicized media (television) in Albania, a constant debate (non-substantial, in our view) should therefore be oriented to the impact in behavior, more than in political affiliation of media. The political
affiliation is a rapport deriving from the role between media and marketing and does not constitute the focus of this study.

Kosova, in a somewhat different (and changeable) political and cultural context, due to the traditional spirit and its influence, has developed some independent media in the 1990s, developed media controlled by local or international politics, namely businesses, in the first years of 21st century. Paradoxical, isn’t it? Today, it has a politically controlled public TV broadcaster, “controlling” perceptions through news bulletins which are predominantly politically motivated, without any tendency to spectacularization, but rather aiming towards political objectivism, as well as some other media dependant on the premise of “building by any means” of a society in which the media role is culturally and politically necessary. There is a tendency to create the media power of businesses, which will necessarily increase the impact of the media in the life of individuals, if the media role is not previously transformed in a new concept, as will later be analyzed in this paper.

The relation of the individual as an active center of independent judgment and the inter-influential spectacle (media/television) in Albania was developed leaning towards the latter. Television has managed to achieve its goal: institutionalize the spectacle as a means to communicate with audiences. The individual suddenly sees himself turned into a spectacle object, without managing to “impose” as a subject who, through this TV “publicity” aspires to accomplish certain goals in his interests and those of the community he represent (as a lay non-public figure). He is invited to spectacles, becomes part of them, accomplishes his “spectacularizing” part according to the scenario he was given and finally, totally instrumentalized, he turns into a “media person”, but never a “public personality”, since his participation in television does not constitute a participation in the public arena in which he would express his opinions on certain social or other special issues, but only a “participation” in them. Thus he simply participates in a spectacularizing arena, in which a certain “game” is being “played”, aimed at entertaining the television audience, or increasing the subscription to a TV platform, in which the citizen / the individual simply simulates his own role in an almost static manner (i.e. not being active, but submissive to spectacularizing actions on him).

The reasons for such availability of the Albanian individual to be spectacularized without any public function (apart from entertaining the audience to the detriment of his private dignity), should be studied thoroughly from sociological
and anthropological viewpoint. The long period of isolation in the communist system might have influenced the Albanian individual to view himself as "lost", while the chaotic period of (endless) transition, in which the Albanian individual remains unaccomplished, with a poor quality of life, unemployed, without quality education, relatively isolated from the world, not integrated with the rest of the world etc., has influenced in empowering this self-perception of the individual as being “lost”. Found in this state of “inexistence”, the Albanian individual has somehow accepted to transform into a “public being”, since as an independent thinker he does not manage to exist and have a function in the society. Based on this fact other phenomena can be explained, such as the militant behavior according to which “the inexistent Albanian individual” merges with collective identity and ideas, lacking a self and ready to do anything which lines up with alienated thought, never being his true self.

In Kosova, however, the relation of the individual with television as a spectacle arena is different, in the sense that the individual is less (much less) predisposed to become part of TV and media spectacles, precisely as a refusal to the tendency to publicize his private identity. Yet, this relation of the individual to the media remains as indirect, due to the tendency of the latter to manipulate, and therefore politically and publicly instrumentalize the individual in Kosova through information/ misinformation. There, the problem of this relation lies not in the tendency of the individual to be “publicized” or “spectacularized”, but rather in the aspiration of politics to keep the individual as far as possible from the public sphere (as a common good).

In this comparison of the individual and the media in the Albania-Kosova relations, it is not to say that in Albania the media is not politically instrumentalized. Yet, unlike it, the main aim of the media in Kosova is not the spectacularization of the individual, serving to the television programming, but rather his public instrumentalization in the function of political interests of political parties in power.

This refusal of the spectacle by the Kosova Albanian individual – and the political instrumentalization through media “information”, which the government imposes to him constantly – constitutes an abnormal situation for a European society (or aspiring to be such), the reasons for which might be many. The fact that the Kosova Albanian citizen was active participat for almost two decades in the process of the movement for freedom, independence and democracy, might make him more interested to re-find and live the private life, "the lost
intimacy”, being predetermined to lead as non-public a life as possible (even less so spectacular). This is only one interpretation of this refusal to spectacles. Meanwhile, the fact that the Albanian individual and society in Kosova are “informed” and influenced by politics through controlled public media and to some point influenced private media (due to their donation receiving character), speaks of the lack of social reaction to political developments which through media are presented as favorable, but are in fact damaging in the process of accomplishing the will of the Kosova people for independence and a state (such are the many political compromises in relation to Serbia turning the state of Kosova non-functional).

Just like in the first case when the individual is mediatically spectacularized, without a function to the public interest (the case of Albania), so in the other case where the “independent thinking” of the individual or the society is publically controlled through media (Kosova case), we asses that media has deviated (unintentionally perhaps) from its main aim: true an unbiased information, as well as “entertainment” which does not jeopardize the ethics or the dignity of the individual or the collectivity.

The Impact of Television in the Public Opinion

Nowadays in the Albanian environment, information and opinion shaping on public issues is still accomplished through media, namely television, news and shows broadcasts on television. This is why the impact of television in shaping the citizens’ opinion on public and political issues is so great (on the relation of television and public in today’s European society the Italian author Zecchi speaks in his Man is what he watches). Political parties aspiring to seize or remain in power, have turned the positive relation with media / television into an essential practice of political activity. The “support” which a party might have from the media may influence its coming or remaining in power, just like the “animosity” with the media, or part of it, might send a governmental party into opposition. Be it just or not, this influence of the media on the public opinion is now noticeable, and even among Albanians (in Albania and Kosova) this sort of influence is increasing.

While in Albania the media is an articulator of politics, divided into two political extremes, pro the political left or right wing, with different scale of biasness and influence, the media in Kosova, especially the televised media, has constantly been against the right and pro the left wing (what is known as the former
KLA establishment, which after the war formed a political party and is today in power). Due to ideological, political and financial domination, the public broadcaster RTK remains to this very day covered with a purely political veil. Due to the donations and the origins impacting on their foundations, some other media were created “to achieve the aim of an open society or multiethnic society”. Due to the direct impact of governing politics on the media through the public money, other media in Kosova remain financially dependent (and therefore politically so) from the government. Naturally, in this semi-darkness there are media, such as the “Koha” group, which nevertheless have partially overcome the ideological and financial dependency in the interest of public sphere.

Thus in Albania the influence on the public opinion is more difficult in the sense of the ability of one side of the media to have monopoly, while in Kosova, the Public Radio and Television is practically controlled since its establishment from the party which is today in power, the PDK, or from its parapolitical structures. Being that the RTK has a wide land and satellite broadcast, the possibility to influence/manipulate the public opinion through it is greater than that of other television channels which claim “non-biasness”. Even the Law on the RTK, approved only recently in the Kosova Parliament, more due to international pressure than the law-drafting immanence in Kosova, expresses very clearly the tendency of the party in power to constantly keep it under control.

The media market, however, cannot only be treated within these two cultural and media centers, without observing their inter-dependability. This would of course require to notice the “breakdown” of the spectacularizing tendency, namely, opinion-shaping according to political dimensions, between the two audiences, as a result of inter-dependability or, at least, media intercommunication between Tirana and Prishtina. Let us offer an example. As known, television channels of Albania enjoy a wide audience in Kosova. Yet, regardless of this “fondness” and the audience they enjoy, their aspiration to expand the influence (control) on the audience is in disparity, at times even among televisions from the same media outlet. Regardless of the fact that Top Channel is very critical of the government and Prime Minister Berisha and favors (if we are permitted to so phrase it) the socialist leader Edi Rama, Berisha’s popularity in Kosova is incomparably greater than that of Mr. Rama (if we could still say that Rama enjoys popularity in Kosova). Or, in the opposite case, although TV Klan openly supports Mr. Berisha and fiercely criticizes Mr. Rama, the audience of this television channel in Kosova is incomparably lower in relation to that of Top Channel.
So the audience in Kosova has made a clear division between the program quality and entertainment level on one hand, and biased information of Albanian TV channels on the other.

Another interesting case is presented by the TV Klan twin channel in Kosova, the Klan Kosova channel, whose programming quality and editorial policy are clearly different to that of the core unit TV Klan in Tirana. While TV Klan, as already mentioned, supports the right wing in Albania, Klan Kosova and its main actors are known as strong supporters of the Kosovar left wing, namely the current Thaçi government. In this endless situation of paradox, the question which might rise is the following: is it in the editorial policy of TV Klan to support parties in power, as the right wing in Albania feels closer to the left wing in Kosova? Or perhaps the private media in Kosova are obliged to always keenly support the governmental parties (not even saving the politically forsaken professionalism)? It suffices to say that this constitutes an anomaly in the media relations which we are examining here.

Such a situation, murky in appearance, died in two colors: the white against the black, which turns into a battle of the black against the white in Albania, and the black against nothing in Kosova, becomes even more obvious once the practical relations of citizen / individual with the media are observed. Televisions in Albania, we emphasize, aspire “the state of light” by alienating or not allowing the individual development of independent political judgment, keeping it “under the shadow of the spectacle”, and reminding him constantly of the white-and-black color range. The television in Kosova, however, due to the lack of this range, aspires to control the individual through direct and not circumlocutory language, i.e. not aspiring a “state of lights”, due to its refusal to spectacularize the individual, and rather sell him the political “truth” as a product of media relations. In both cases, the individual and his independent judgment remain hostages of the anonymity created from the degrading effect of lights in Albania, or from the cultural indifference, produced by political media in Kosova. In both cases the independent judgment aligns with the individual drama space, but is not erected to the level of individual responsibility to the individual culture in society. It needs “spectacularization” in order to treat its being as equal in “a state of lights” or “total public indifference”, with the purpose of treating its lost being in an informatively controlled society. Both of those stances keep him beneath the lower level of being a politically active being (Aristotelian zoon), which does not create an independent judgment as part of submission to media tendencies, but in
relation to their professionalism, which they put against their personal culture and vision on the collective cultural harmony.

Is therefore the spectacle or public manipulation (i.e. political inertia), a measure for the creation of independent judgment? Furthermore, are these premises critical steps, based on which we would judge the activeness of the public? We believe not. Both stances speak of a still controllable public which treats the necessary presence as a possibility, adapting it to the imposed form, even by cutting the thread of interacting with it, or by being totally inert, yet still totally inactive, towards it. His independent judgment is preserved as such to the point of adaptation, or the meeting point with the form imposed from television. Beyond it, his judgment is prejudiced by the acceptable space of participation. And this devotion and adaptation to form, in the media of Albania, or the total lack of relation to it in Kosova, signifies the alienation of the freedom of independent thought and, consequently, lack of independent public judgment which shapes its public opinion.

Nowadays, the judgment of the opinion turns into judgment for the opinion. In a changing society, when the totalitarian mass is preserved as a memory, the judgment of the opinion will narrow the room for activity to the extreme, alienating it into a conformist space, in which the independent judgment, already adapted in form, is seen as the link between the society and the public disposal for the victimization of the individual creative space. Inertia of judgment, different to that of the elites, yet spread into public debating space, puts them into crisis to.

Mediatization / Politics with Media

As the concept of television and its media product in Albania is set in the form of a spectacle, where the “entertainment” which disregards the civic / public ethics constitutes the main aim, the political public debate, as well as the parliamentary, media and television debate, is viewed and constructed in the same form of political spectacle, which regardless of the debating “wilderness” is seen as attractive and, almost entertaining for the Albanian television audience. Often the debates degrade into personal insults among debaters, which sometimes makes the televisions place the accent on them, exceeding the issue of public or political debates, as they assess that this is how the “space of public lights” increases and, even if indirectly, enables an increase of TV audience. Then, the very tendency of televisions to stir such debates seems
intentional, otherwise the media themselves would have to lead the attempts to change that approach of debating in public. Why? Is the dominant discourse of the entire Albanian society, or are the TV political debates, and not only them, seen as a “stage” for entertainment?

In fact, one of the aspects which might influence this type of discourse among political representatives in public and TV debates is their attempt to prove their “loyalty” to political leaders, who are considered as a gate for the accomplishment of their ambitions. The more doctrinal / indoctrinating, aggressive and refusing a given political representative is to arguments of his political opponent, the more will his political role be seen with fondness.

Such a tendency to conflict in TV debates has started to spread in Kosova, precisely because Albania’s TV channels are widely viewed there. Yet, unlike with the TV shows in Albania, the debates in Kosova are much less dynamic and aggressive, consequently debating and circulating fewer ideas. Is this a sign of emancipation and culture among Kosova politicians or is the society not yet open and free to discuss all of the problems it faces? An empirical comparative study perhaps would clarify these relations.

The Opinion (projected) on Television / “Electoral” Power of the Opinionists

The “logical” consequence in this midst is the aim of television / media to project the opinion and impose that in the public, namely to impose their own truth as a real / factual situation. Thus television / media as an opinion-shaper on general societal deveoplements aspire to exercise its own influence in determining the approach and orientation of politics in relation to those developments. If the media could represent the public interests and opinion in this tendency, i.e. if it were an influential mechanism of the public and civil society in the state political bodies, this could perhaps be right and legitimate. Such examples with independent media serving the public interest are found in western and liberal-democratic world. Yet, in case of Albania and Kosova, the role of the media in shaping / creating the opinion presents another tendency of social and political instrumentalization of audience (as individuals and collectivity).

Thus the media in Albania, and Kosova too, have selected a cast of opinionists, who with their (in)dependent knowledge present their judgments and impact the shaping of the public opinion. The aim of televisions, through the direction
of those “opinion-shows” as “show-opinions” – being in supremacy as an information source for the citizens – is to determine the political will of their audience, which is projected as a potential voting troop. Putting politicians against opinionists, during the electoral campaign and in any other period has given the latter the image of the “neutral” observers and the “right” of judgment. The final confrontation in one of the TV arenas might be crucial for the electoral and political fate of a leader aspiring to win the elections. Often enough all of this may be just an improvisation, as has happened in Albania and especially in Kosova, where the opinionists, invited to articulate their independent thoughts, sway their opinions depending on the political casts they serve.

There are however cases when the media managed to transfer this opinion into general judgment of the public opinion. At least once, televisions in Albania and Kosova, as projectors of the public opinion, have managed to influence the shaping of the dominant public opinion for political debates, for the necessity of political change in government. The first case was that of 2005 in Albania. At that time, media intensified the criticism towards the socialist government of the time, leaving aside not even the smallest drawback or scandal and giving sufficient air space to the political alternative of the right wing. Regardless of the need for change and power rotation in 2005, the Albanian television channels (and the written media) had aligned themselves with the opposition (apart from Albanian Radio and Television). We want to stress a fact: if in 2005 the socialists were discredited in government, the media, just like the opposition, presented them as totally discredited. A silent professional observation can outline a similar tendency for media influence in future electoral developments of the country, yet now against the right wing and pro the left wing, however similar with that of 2005.

In Kosova, in fall 2007, shortly before the independence was proclaimed and after the death of historical president Ibrahim Rugova (2006), the television media (and the written ones) managed to create and impose the public opinion that the time had come for political rotation and that the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), which had lead the movement of an independent state since the late 1980s to the late 1990s, should step into opposition, because Kosova had to be led towards “the final aim” by the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK). In fact, as mentioned above, being always biased (favoring the party emerging to power), the idea of such a projection of the opinion has existed early, yet is became accomplishable after other (non-electoral) factors became accessible, such as, for example, a part of international factor present in Kosova which
sought partners in imposing other compromises, opposed to the aspirations of Albanians (such as entry into talks without any predetermined principles or the neglect of resolute principles, set in Rugova’s time). Nowadays this medium, found between Scylla and Charybdis, is forced to soothe the compromises in relation to Serbia and through controlled informing and propagating the pro-governmental “opinionists”, it is trying to impose the opinion that the state of Kosova is moving towards “the conclusion of supervised independence”, as if this was an accomplishment and not a logical ending of a (exaggerated) process.

Finally, these cases prove that in Albania and Kosova it was not possible to set “media conditions” for genuine impact in creating an independent opinion, to which the TV audience / potential electorate would refer. Searching for space outside dependency from media in which they are represented, serious opinionists are faced with the challenge of either “silencing their voices” or smoothly turning into individuals as biased as the medium airing them to the wide audience, whose judgments align with the expectations which the television uses as tools and strategies to shape the collective judgment. Are there clear borders between audience expectation, independent professional judgment and the possibility to participate in a TV debate regardless of the professional opinion, previously shaped, which might not side with the “expectation” that the television channel has as a public media?

Is therefore a “rebel” performance of an opinionist, whose attention is not the television audience possible or is this after all just a “game” in a controlled stage?

Spectaculalrizing Opinionism as Political Breakthrough

Apart from the service which the opinionists’ cast conducts for the government and the political parties in Albania and Kosova (more in Kosova and less in Albania), in the majority of cases, this “type” of opinionists will soon end up in the same political setup with the very ones they had “judged well” while presenting their “independent opinions” in public. To bring examples: In Kosova, prior to any political campaign, the PDK promotes the opinionists’ “guard”, to whom, as a payback for their political judgments, it presents the posts of Deputy-Ministers or Members of Parliament. If you were to analyze the government and the Parliament composure, you will find media-political representatives who are there without any voter support (only the decision-maker’s decision over the militant voters determines their fate). Recently, the debate on the often-talked-about Criminal Code, which contains two
disputed articles (37 and 38) on the limitations of freedom of speech, made the discrepancy between the profession and political affiliations of journalists emerge into surface, as did the demagogy with which the code sponsor, Minister of Justice, once called on the MPs to vote for it and then called on the President of the State to not accept them. The journalists were accused of sleeping under government sheets, while the government needed no accusation, as the majority of journalists had embraced the political “dialogue” with the government and other Ministers had to reiterate the Minister’s demagogy as an announced moral act. The media experience in Kosova, tightly linked to politics, has enabled some journalists to behave like “political conformists”.

This phenomenon shows that the Albanian society, in Albania and Kosova alike, has yet not managed, not even at the level of media opinionists, to build the “culture of public interest”, in which public non-political personalities undertake to protect and promote the public interest in certain interim or regular periods without aspiring any personal public or political promotion. Meanwhile the principle of “activation” for the civil society is not the assumption of the political/governmental power, but the influencing of it.

There are many opinionists who have changed their critical stance once politicians established certain (cooperative) relations with them (e.g. a part of opinionists have ended up as political advisers or MPs for political parties in power). There are also many opinionists who, due to deteriorated personal relations (and interests) with certain politicians, use the public space to attack the same politicians without any grounds, implanting a great hatred among the voters who do not know “the story” behind their relation. And it is the media/televison that gives an opportunity to those opinionists without any professional (or moral) credibility to exercise their influence on the public and the voters for the benefit of the political wing the media itself supports.

Thus Albanian TV opinionists are to a great extent instrumentalized and instrumentalizing. They serve the interests of certain political conjunctures through instrumentalizing waves of the media, and in playing the role of public judges they aspire to build up their public profile for the benefit of their future political carriers, only seldom focusing on general public interests. It seems that the fate of many “analysts” and “opinionists” is similar to that of many “activists” of the civil society, who after receiving the many funds for the empowerment of civic activism, swiftly turn into political parties and quickly assimilating the political behavior against which they were once “committed”.

As to whether or not this is a virtue of the Albanian citizen too, or just a vice of our civic and political bodies, remains a dilemma which needs examining and debating within Albanian societies in Albania and Kosova. Are the television channels going to free themselves from their controlling tendencies and will they stimulate the free judgment? The problem of media tendency to control and influence the public opinion and through this to increase the access to political decision-making, in not one linked only to media particularly. This is in fact a problem which reflects a wide scope of issues which the Albanian societies (in Albania and Kosova) have in their endeavors to build a political and social life on the principles of freedom and democracy. There are many factors and sections of those societies which need reforming based on liberal-democratic principles, and which would lead to the liberation of media/television from their controlling tendencies. Above all, it is the civil society which needs reforming in the Albanian societies. In Albania and Kosova alike, civil society has not managed to build its profile as a representative of the public interests, “combating” against government on the basis of public interest principles and not as used for the “breakthrough” of their representatives into the race for political power.

Also in need of reform are the political parties, which currently generally operate not on the basis of democratic functioning, but on the logic of full compliance to party leadership. Those very same party individuals/militants are the ones to support their leaders in the tendency to put under control every public sphere for the sake of their political, party and individual interests. The governments in Kosova and Albania are in fact a political product of those political parties, without change of which we cannot aspire to build a normal European society.

**Bibliography**


Feminism, socialism and post-socialism

Abstract

This text examines socialist experiences in Central and Eastern European countries as they shaped post-socialist actions/reactions with respect to women’s position in those societies. While the generalization for the region is not possible since each socialist regime’s attitude and policy toward women’s liberation differed from country to country, we can talk about some common patterns with regards to selected social spheres, namely the education, labor and family policies and feminist activism. Coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina in my writing I certainly draw from my personal experiences of life in both socialist and post-socialist country in which the women’s rights and position are significantly differently affected than it is the case with majority of Central and Eastern European countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina and women in Bosnia and Herzegovina were greatly affected by the war of 1990s and consequent politics of ethnification of society. However, given that we so much focus on the consequences of war we omit the issues that have arisen as the consequence of the political post-socialist transformations and subsequently inadequately respond to the issues of women’s empowerment. This is why it is important to also address the issues affecting changes/similarities in gender regimes during socialism and post-socialism.

In the European countries that declared themselves socialist (either in their names or their constitutions) and true to the Marxist ideology during the 20th century, the peculiar relationship between Marxism and feminism affected gender/sex equality both during and after the socialist period. Although

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1 The purpose of this text is not to debate whether the countries at the focus of this analysis were truly socialist in sense of application of socialist ideas in their social order or whether they were authoritarian and/or totalitarian societies. It is important to stress that the officially declared ideology of the states was socialism and that some of the aspects of socialist ideology were implemented within the states. The policies directed towards women were promoted under the pretext of socialism, and thus were perceived as the socialist interventions into the liberation of women. It was actually theorized that the emancipation of women was to be done through their entrance into paid employment and removal of the class relations. (Waylen, 2007: 141) We will here further refer to the countries at the focus as East and Central European socialist countries as a matter of convenience.

2 It is significant to point out here that during the so called socialist regimes there was no mention of gender and gender equality but the only reference was to sex equality. Concepts of gender and gender equality are only introduced during the so called post-socialist period. Feminists themselves started actively using concept of gender as "a way of referring to the social organization of the relationship between the sexes" (Scott, 1999: 28) in late 1980s. Therefore, when referring to socialist period and pre 1980s we will use the concept of sex equality and when referring to post-socialist period and post 1980s we will use the concept of gender equality. Dual use of the concept sex/gender equality will be when referring to both.
socialist regimes pronounced themselves women-friendly and did introduce some policies to further women’s liberation, they actually used women first to help foster socialist revolutions and later to swell the workforce while their gender/sex-equality policies remained merely pro forma. On the other side, many feminists, especially in the West, dismissed socialist ideology entirely, arguing that in order to achieve gender/sex equality a society cannot be analyzed exclusively in class terms — so Marxist demands “could be (and in part have been) satisfied without altering women’s inequality to men.” (MacKinnon, 1982: 518) During the post-socialist period the attitudes on both sides played a significant role in hindering women’s participation in the public sphere. On one hand, women were seen as allies of the overthrown socialist regimes because of those regimes’ formal proclamations about women. On the other hand, only Western feminist ideas could be accepted because post-socialist regimes welcomed only “progressive ideas from the West”—and Western feminism lacked the contextual knowledge that could make it relevant to the post-socialist societies, tending to discredit it.

Also affecting women’s position is the fact that their experiences in different countries that applied Marxist ideas to the social order varied considerably since so many other social factors influenced that application. The manifestation of feminist ideas during both the socialist and post-socialist eras was (and is) conditioned by numerous social, economic and cultural factors within each country/society. Equally significant were the levels of freedoms — such as freedom of movement and expression — and of the civil and political rights allowed.

This text will examine socialist experiences in Central and Eastern European countries as they shaped post-socialist actions/reactions with respect to women’s position in those societies. Of course, generalization for even such a narrowly defined region is not possible since each socialist regime’s attitude and policy toward women’s liberation differed from country to country. Still, we can talk about some common patterns, while acknowledging that the issues of women’s rights and position varied greatly both between different countries

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3 The discourses and politics in the countries in focus were defined and are still in many ways being defined in the context of the Cold War binaries and the rivalries between the so called capitalist West and so called socialist/communist East, as well as so called First World and so called Second World (Chari and Verdery, 2009:9, 30). Given the introductory nature of this chapter we will not enter debate about the constructions of the “West” and the “East” and will use them as referred to in the Cold War references to each other.
and within countries. Certainly, these patterns were present to a significant extent within the former Yugoslavia.

**Women’s liberation through education, labor policy, family policies and activism**

Socialist regimes made significant changes in education, labor policies and family life; they also allowed limited activism. As noted above, social contexts were different, but some common features and factors affected women in Central and Eastern socialist countries. Here are the key influences on women’s liberation in the socialist period.

**Education**

One of the most important factors in women’s liberation under socialism was equal access to education. This was closely connected with their engagement in the labor force. Education provided many women the opportunity to leave the private sphere and “pursue jobs that they considered personally, intellectually, or creatively fulfilling.” (Massino, 2009: 20) Higher education and vocational training gave women entrée into many professions—even the higher paid ones. However, as Isabel Marcus (2009: 119) noted in her analysis of the situation in Poland, Romania and Hungary, while state policies regarding women’s education were seen as measures directed towards advancement of sex equality, they also served the socialist regimes’ agendas of rapid modernization and industrialization.

Education was free, and primary (sometimes secondary) education was compulsory. However, access to education was not equal for all, though some steps were taken to achieve that goal. For example, the Soviet Union’s attempts in 1970 to improve women’s skills and encourage women’s enrollment in technical education courses were hindered by such issues as limited dormitory space for female students in schools offering training for “male occupations.” (Kay, 2007:53) The same issue, plus distance from schools, also played a significant role in hindering rural girls’ access to education—despite the socialist regime’s intention to raise the education level of rural populations.

Furthermore, while catering to mobilization of women for the workforce, the educational systems did not address the issues of gender/sex inequality at all. As Salecel put it, “Educational and political discourses are always linked; they are
part of a certain ideological universe in which educational discourse prepares the grounds on which people later learn to identify with the dominant political discourse.” (1994:54) So it is important to scrutinize the content of educational curricula with respect to gender/sex equality in the socialist societies whose regimes proclaimed that the “women’s question is solved.” Although textbooks contained images of women as workers (Brunnbauer, 2009:82), education programs perpetuated patriarchal attitudes and gender/sex stereotypes. The curricula were filled with political and ideological propaganda (Salecel, 1994:54) and there was not much room for questioning the gender/sex stereotypes and patriarchal status quo. Nor was there much room for critical analysis of socialist society (but much critical examination of capitalism). In public discourse, feminist ideas were usually dismissed as bourgeois and capitalist, so their penetration into the education system was almost impossible. Even so, one could argue that the expansion of education and increase in professional and technical employment for women provided them with opportunities to entertain new ideas (among which were feminisms) and even encouraged the onset of female and feminist organizing.

**Labor Policies**

After World War II, and in the context of the Cold War, the West and the East European states took opposite directions with respect to women in the labor force. In the capitalist states, women were generally replaced by returning veterans, with the resulting reestablishment of the prewar gender order. (Massino, 2009:17) In the socialist states, women were newly placed in factories in order—among other motives—to show the progressiveness of socialism regarding women. (Massino, 2009: 17) Still, although women’s liberation through work was enshrined in Marxist doctrine, state encouragement of women’s entry into the labor force was not entirely because of that. As Molyneux (1985:52) observed, “It is not women’s emancipation per se which social policies aim at, but women’s emancipation as an integral part of a wider strategy of socio-economic change.” While numerous other explanations for this labor policy are possible, it is not insignificant, as Molyneux pointed out (1985:52), that the states proclaiming adherence to socialist ideologies as the reason for such policy were poorer states. In these countries gender/sex equality and work were used by policymakers to promote mass industrialization and party loyalty. (Massino, 2009: 17)
In any case, more women were in the workforce, their proportion much higher than in Western countries. (Kay, 2007: 8; Masino, 2009: 17; Brunnbauer, 2009: 82; Waylen, 2007: 142) Brunnbauer argued that incorporation of women into paid labor provided them with autonomy in personal decisions and increased their authority within the family because it made them less economically dependent. (Brunnbauer, 2009: 94) Furthermore, it basically “broadened women’s social and cultural worlds, luring them away from the countryside and into industrial towns and cities.” (Massino, 2009: 14) As Brunnbauer noted, in Bulgaria, women “did not see any alternatives to wage labor” and “most women were not willing to give up their job even if their husband earned enough to support the whole family.” (2009: 84) He further concluded that employment brought women “social validation and self-esteem.” (Brunnbauer, 2009: 84)

However, gender/sex inequality in the labor market persisted in East European socialist countries. Molyneux (1985: 51) pointed out that women were employed in lower-paying jobs, earning on average only 60% of male wages. This is supported by data that Harsch (2009: 12) provided on the GDR, where one of the world’s highest levels of women’s employment was attained, but where women’s average pay levels remained more than a quarter lower than men’s in 1989.

The gender-based division of work affected women’s education and employment. First, being unable to access highly paid heavy industry jobs—but with equal access to education—women opted for higher education and positions connected to it. (Waylen, 2007: 142; Kay, 2007: 65) Of course, this precipitated changes in valorization of such positions to the detriment of women, since “feminization” of professions meant a subsequent fall in wages, e.g., in medicine. (Molyneux, 1985: 51; Massino, 2009: 21) According to Massino (2009: 21), because these jobs were considered extensions of women’s traditional roles as caregivers and moral educators they assumed lower status than the manual labor idealized by the state (e.g., mining and construction) or jobs in heavy industry, administration, and politics. And easier access to certain judicial positions in societies with one-party regimes

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4 With respect to Bulgaria, Brunnbauer pointed out that while some women did enter the better paid “typical male” jobs in heavy industry (women represented 20.5% of all labor in construction and 32.5% in metallurgy in 1988), women dominated in the lower-paid textile industry (72.3% of total labor in textiles and clothing industry and 73.6% in the leather and shoe industry in 1988) and service industry. (Brunnbauer, 2009: 82)
still did not mean an equal role for women in governance since in such societies the executive, legislature and judiciary did not equally share power.

**Family policies**

Although socialist intervention partially transformed family and private spheres, it was inadequate to change women’s domestic role. Molyneux wrote that “insofar as women’s position in society is inextricably bound up with their position in the family, the democratization of this institution must have major consequences for women” (Molyneux, 1985: 50) Marxist ideology based on Engels’ work recognizes the need to equalize relationships and division of work within the family, and family reform was on the socialist regimes’ agendas: significant changes were introduced, at least formally, to provide women with greater freedom from traditional forms of patriarchal control such as exclusive male property ownership, polygamy, unilateral divorce, child marriage and exclusive access to areas of public life. But those regimes’ social policies lacked full commitment to the necessary transformations, nor were the regimes ever fully committed to the full emancipation of women and to gender/sex equality.

For instance, consider the ambiguous policies concerning reproduction. While women were needed to expand industry, population expansion was also vital. So, whereas in most Eastern and Central European socialist countries abortion laws were liberalized, the fears about the declining birth rate inspired pronatalist policies that compromised women’s reproduction rights. (Waylen, 2007: 142-3) For example, Romania’s Ceaucescu regime introduced severe restrictions on the availability of contraception and abortion. (Waylen, 2007:142-3) Also, during one part of the Stalinist regime the abortion ban was introduced not only in USSR but also in Hungary after increased concerned about declining birth rates voiced through so called demographic debates. (Kay, 2007: 45)

Despite provisions for childcare, maternity leave and healthcare that the socialist regimes knew they had to make in order to get more women into the workforce, these state family-policy interventions—as Waylen (2007:142-3) noted—did not address changes in men’s roles in either production or reproduction. For example, there were no provisions for fathers’ leaves for a newborn or sick child. Consequently, ideas about gender/sex roles did not change much, and ideas about women’s oppression by men remained untouched. (Waylen, 2007:143) This can be best seen in the refusal of the socialist regimes
to intervene in the issue of domestic violence. Furthermore, even though the regimes were secular, decrying religious belief, and marriages were now civil, the heterosexual monogamous nuclear family remained the basic unit of society. (Waylen, 2007:141) And the traditional and unequal division of labor in that family was encouraged; so the regimes’ efforts to get women into the workforce meant more work for them without any diminution of household responsibilities. (Waylen, 2007:141) To great extent, the traditional role of father as decision maker and male-child preference⁵ remained. Families still brought up children mainly in accordance with gender/sex stereotypes. The socialist regimes refused to recognize male domination in the family, seeing the relationship between sexes as complementary rather than hierarchical. (Molyneux, 1985:51)

Activism

This is one of the areas that varied significantly from country to country depending on the level of political and civil freedoms. However, looking to the first half of the 20th century, women throughout this region actively struggled for their rights. Waylen (2007:62), for example, pointed out that women’s organizations flourished in Poland and Czechoslovakia between World Wars. Women were also extremely active and visible within the socialist movements and contributed in large numbers to the socialist revolutions.

Nevertheless, once the socialist regimes were imposed and sex equality was formally granted—with the political elites proclaiming the women’s question solved—the women’s movement in fact suffered setbacks. Further organizing to address issues of sex equality was discouraged by the state when not outright forbidden. As Molyneux (1985:51) noted, for most of the time the socialist regimes were hostile towards feminists, feminist ideas and the women’s liberation movements, considering them “a diversion from the more ‘important’ tasks of class struggle and from the pressing need to develop the country’s economy.” (Molyneux, 1985:51)

As for women’s independent political organizations, as Molyneux (1981:27-8) pointed out, that issue brought into question not only the denial of feminist ideas but the very nature of political power in socialist states. Molyneux saw that the feminist concept of a women’s organization is “one that is

⁵ For example, boys were given priority in education, girls given extra household chores in order to help their mothers shoulder the double burden of work in and outside the home.
organizationally independent of other - usually male-dominated - political groups and which, whilst quite at liberty to undertake other wider political activities, and to engage in alliances, gives special prominence to the struggle for women’s emancipation.” (Molyneux, 1981:27) However, as with any other mass organizations in East and Central European socialist states (such as youth organizations, trade unions, etc.) women’s organizations were affiliated with the Party even if organized separately. (Molyneux, 1981:28) Within some countries, even some “official” women’s organizations were dissolved—despite their members’ resistance — because of the Party’s need to concentrate power, while women’s magazines were banned and their editors persecuted because the “authorities regarded the expression of independent feminist views as a subversive force.” (Molyneux, 1981:28)

Women’s organizations did not “exercise political autonomy or transgress the conventional guidelines of socialist policy on women, of course there [were] important variations, but most act[ed] as a form of pressure group, but one without much power.” (Molyneux, 1981: 28) The Communist Party controlled not only political and economic systems but also civil society (with maybe the exception of the Catholic Church in Poland). (Waylen, 2007:62) The women’s organizations that were permitted functioned to mobilize women in support of the Party rather than to represent women and their interests. (Waylen, 2007:63) Furthermore, the majority of those organizations did not have any explicitly feminist component—in fact, were quite hostile to the women’s movement and Western feminist ideas—and rarely encouraged radical thinking or action. (Molyneux, 1981:28) Nor did they try to deal with many subtle discriminatory practices unless those practices pre-dated the revolution or were seen as obstacles to development; but they did successfully mobilize women against the traditional, overt structures of oppression while still acting as agents for the furtherance of official policy. (Molyneux, 1981:28)

Most of the women’s organizations focused on social and educational issues aimed at improving women’s position (for example, through women’s welfare) with the object of making women more available for the labor force. Moreover, women actively participated in organizations such as trade unions, as members of the intelligentsia, and in some countries faith-based groups (i.e., in Poland, those under the aegis of the Catholic Church). (Waylen, 2007: 63) Not all of these organizations acted to achieve sex equality; indeed, some acted against it. And although women did not have meaningful leadership positions in
dissident movements, they did play important roles in peace movements and those promoting environmental issues and human rights. (Waylen, 2007: 64)

The majority of socialist regimes in the East and Central Europe restricted travel. Consequently, women had very few contacts with international feminism, this isolation was an additional obstacle to women's feminist organization. (Waylen, 2007:65) Some feminists did manage to organize and act, as in the women's peace movement in East Germany, established in 1982; the Polish Feminist Association, established in 1980; and the independent feminist group in Leningrad, established in 1979, that published *The Almanac: Women and Russia.* (Waylen, 2007:64)

To a certain extent the situation in the former Yugoslavia was an exception to these patterns. The mobility of the citizens was greater and the ideas could be exchanged between the academics from the West and the “East” was possible. Generally, the former SFRY was considered to be more open state towards the exchange of knowledges both from the Eastern and the Western Blocks. Also the change in attitudes towards the feminism by the ruling elites occurred in late 1970s when the feminism which by then was rejected as promoting bourgeoisie, mainly liberal and individualistic, ideas was started being tolerated (while still not encouraged it was not prosecuted). So the women who were at the universities had the opportunity both to read western feminist literature and meet the feminists from across the world. This provided them with the different ideas and knowledges which then they incorporated in their feminist works that both were focusing on the critic of socialist regime they were living in but also on the ways forward. That is why the feminism among the young academics in the academic centers of Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana developed already in 1970s. Already in 1978 they organized the famous feminist conference *Drug-ca žena* (Comrade woman) that was attended by the feminists from around the world. After several years of academic discussions the feminists also started doing activist work – primarily concerning the domestic violence as the private sphere was not addressed in the socialist regimes equality policies.

**Post-socialism and women’s rights**

One of the reasons for scanty participation of women in women's movements in the post-socialist period might be the paternalistic nature of emancipation policies imposed by state socialism. Women's rights—such as reproductive,
social and economic rights—were given not fought for, so they were taken for granted. (Waylen, 2007:62) After the fall of socialism, many rights were questioned and some (such as abortion, maternity leave and social care) were lost in some countries without much public debate, let alone struggle. This was not because women willingly gave them up but because they were gone before women could consolidate to rally in their defense.

At first, post-socialism, everything “Western” was uncritically received and neoliberal politics were implemented without much complaint. (Buyandelgeriyn, 2008) Watson explained this uncritical attitude:

Within the particular definitional context of transition, the West is first and foremost a ‘place’ where people are free. In a reversal of Marx’s view of communism as a state of freedom following capitalist alienation, the current rhetoric of change in eastern Europe is replete with the captivity-into-freedom trope. (Watson, 2000: 189).

These uncontested attitudes resulted, among other things, in parliaments becoming almost entirely male, reduction of social services, turning state property into private property of (mostly) men (Watson, 2000: 190), increased class and ethnic differentiation, rise in unemployment, financial uncertainty, and making the service sector largely the province of women. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:3)

The overall anti-feminist public perception remained (Watson, 2000:190-2) with very little spontaneous feminist organizing despite obvious gender inequality and even regression of women’s position. To be sure, certain types of feminisms were allowed in post-socialist countries; but, as before, they were imposed from the top. This time, women’s rights were introduced by neoliberal/neocolonial policies as a democratizing force from the West, an emblem of Western ‘civil society’ (Watson, 2000:190-1). This was feminism abused by the neoliberal elites. As Slapšak noted, “a package containing Western democratic and individualist values, together with consumerist lack of sense of reality, was exported into the context of varying levels of poverty, threatened social security, and a radically distinct type of education.” (Slapšak, 2002: 148) The interventions ignored previously existing women’s rights and their contexts, and most were intended to reestablish the classical colonial image of helpless women and barbarian men: focus was mostly on violence against women, while structural issues, like the obvious gender-based division of labor or all-male decision making, were ignored.
The most visible patterns of social transformation common to the post-socialist countries are marked rise in unemployment, loss of many benefits (especially social security) and impoverishment of large numbers. (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004:2) Moreover, some post-socialist countries—especially the post-war Balkans—have been affected by nationalism and ethno-nationalism, “accompanied by re-traditionalization of gender roles, both regarding the division of labor and sexuality,” (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004:2) However, while “degradation of feminine identity” resulting from “construction of a ‘man’s world’” and “simulations propagation of masculinity in the public sphere, with domestication and the marketing of women” (Watson, 1993:472) have informed many common trends in post-socialist societies, this study will, once again, focus on the issues of labor, education and family policies as they affect women, and on feminist activism.

**Education**

Post-socialist countries inherited from the socialist era a solid base of free education for all children, nearly universal school enrollment, and high literacy rates. However, the socialist “heritage” also included a rigidly bureaucratized and institutionally fragmented educational system, “with different hierarchies of educational provision and training divided between different branch ministries, resulting in severe inefficiencies.” (Silova, 2009:296) This significantly influenced the transformation of education systems in post-socialist societies.

The transformation processes have affected all areas of education, with changes in education financing, governance, curriculum, textbooks, examination and assessment systems, teacher education, and infrastructure. (Silova, 2009:296) Moreover, the transformations have been complex and marked by tensions. The need to reconcile the Western ideas with local realities resulted in conflicting values and interests in which “the educational systems have been struggling to balance their two main functions – the guarantee of free compulsory education for all children and the provision of quality education.” (Silova, 2009:310) Transformation has seen a fall in real public spending on education, lower teacher wages, insufficient funding for school repairs and maintenance, less social support through schools, and increasing levels of corruption.

Still some positive changes occurred, especially with respect to studying women’s positions in society. The replacement of socialist ideology opened
possibilities for feminist studies within the post-socialist educational systems, but the residual animosity toward feminism has meant that gender studies and the production of feminist works are substantially weaker in the post-socialist countries than in the West due to lack of state financial support and re-traditionalized gender roles. (Daskalova, 2011:198) Still, “although women’s and gender studies in the region are far from being success stories, the number of individuals, research projects, courses, and university programs dealing with women and gender relations has increased steadily since the fall of state socialism in 1989.” (Daskalova, 2011:193-4) Feminist education that has become more available, post-socialism, has enabled many women to actively engage in the struggle for improvement of women’s position in societies and their human rights. (Mlinarević, Sadiković and Čengić, 2011:238)

**Labor policies**

The labor market and labor relations, post-socialism, have been probably one of the most affected areas of the transformation. As noted, the shift to a market economy meant greatly increased unemployment and visible disparity in wealth, with the majority becoming rapidly impoverished. In a study conducted in Lodz, Poland, Frances Paine pointed out that both “Men and women employed in industry or in the service sector found themselves suddenly without work, while those still working were living with the threat of unemployment for the first time in their lives.” (Pine, 2007: 95) She also concluded women were disproportionately unemployed, at least in terms of formal, paid employment. (Pine, 2007:97)

The new economic order altered gendered nature of work, space and time (that is what jobs women are allowed/encouraged to perform, how much those jobs are paid, where do women perform the jobs, who is more flexible with time, etc.) (Pine, 2007:96); a great number of women lost their jobs in most post-socialist countries (Gal and Kligman, 2000: 57), and had to return to the home and to traditional duties and positions in the family. (Racioppi and O’Sullivan See, 2000:211) The very image of women changed: the worker-mother of the socialist era reverted to woman as wife, mother and homemaker. (Racioppi and O’Sullivan See, 2000:211)

Those women who did not lose their jobs have seen themselves largely frozen out of entire occupations. For example, when the financial sector became privatized, more central to the economy and lucrative, it became more male-
dominated. (Gal and Kligman, 2000: 58-61) Because men had fewer domestic obligations, their time was more flexible, making them more attractive employees; so they have taken over the increasingly idealized and higher-paying private sector jobs while women have been increasingly relegated to the lower-paying public sector. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:58-61) Some women have alternated between low-paying public and low-paying private sector service and caregiver work. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:58-61) The post-socialist societies have increasingly obvious feminization of poverty (although age also plays a significant role: men and women in their fifties who lost their jobs—and pensioners—are the most prone to poverty). In all, these changes have been extreme and have happened very fast, and the public-private dichotomy has been transformed so that the socialist definitions of “public” and “private” gender relations in the workplace no longer obtain, nor do they mirror those in today’s Western Europe or the United States. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:58-61)

To survive and support their families, women have had to take insecure jobs, those classified as part of the “gray economy.” And, while excluded from political power and decision-making positions, women have had to take responsibility for types of care and services previously provided by the socialist state, this mainly being provided on individual level (as unpaid work in family or poorly paid informal domestic work) and through civil societies’ organizations (Pine, 2007:97). In contradistinction, men gained more stable employment in greater numbers as full-time workers with sufficient salaries. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:58-61)

The labor laws mandating equality were introduced, but only to meet requirements for joining the EU; they remained only formal in nature. And while there has been some restructuring of the labor market and division of labor, and some approaches to equality have been made, patriarchal attitudes remain almost intact. True, patriarchy may be expressed differently, but gender disparity in labor still exists.

**Family policies**

The patterns, noted above, of reduced social services, women’s loss of secure employment, with some pushed back into the home, and many others working more hours in the “gray economy” to feed their families—all these influenced the gender division of work in households, with women having to take greater responsibilities at home (although some younger urban men started to share
some responsibilities). At the same time, phenomena such as the resurgence of religion and increased nationalism and ethno-nationalisms influenced public discourse about the family and the policies that restricted women’s reproductive rights—primarily abortion.

Post-socialist states’ expenditures for social services have actually increased. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:64) But their purpose has shifted from the socialist ideological politics of preventing poverty and income difference (or being able to deny their existence) to emergency measures to compensate for visible impoverishment and economic inequality, with most funds going to unemployment programs, poverty relief and pensions. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:64) These developments disproportionately impact women. For example, reduction in public health financing puts a greater burden on women, who are most likely to assume the role of unpaid caregivers. Women also lose years of work due to maternity leave, and with the post-socialist policies of earlier retirement in response to rising unemployment, women pensioners become the ones in greatest danger of falling into poverty. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:73)

Even though social security reforms in the post-socialist countries have had many implications for gender inequality, the gender issue has been given only marginal attention. (Steinhilber, 2005:17) The change in entitlement criteria that accompanied the shift from helping women workers cope with their dual roles as working mothers to the post-socialist need to support families whose economic hardship resulted from the transition meant a concomitant change in “the status of beneficiaries from holders of personal rights to petitioners of the state, required to prove their need.” (Steinhilber, 2005:17) Women’s needs have been addressed indirectly when women are seen as part of particular groups—e.g., the unemployed or low-income households—but gender equality could be achieved only by support for women as women, and as a matter of right. (Steinhilber, 2005:26)

Overall, social security and family benefits reforms have impacted the dynamics of power and gender with respect to female and male “employment and life choices and posed challenges to women’s economic independence, public presence and reproductive options.” (Steinhilber, 2005:26) Those reforms did not adequately comprehend women’s day-to-day lives, but tried to recreate a “traditional” gender structure in which “good motherhood” means full-time dedication and family is seen as the most natural social group. (Steinhilber, 2005:17-8)
Indeed, both men and women in the post-socialist states perceive the family that way: “In the face of massive social change, the family is popularly considered the one institution that provides continuity with the past.” (Gal and Kligman, 2000:68) That is why the state seldom intervenes in the “unchangeable” gender relationships in the private sphere—except for pronatalist reproduction policies and the criminalization of domestic violence. Interventions only concern “reduction of poverty.” Questions like labor division in the family and the impact of family benefits on gender relations were not addressed and never became issues for public debate or feminist/activist analysis. Nevertheless, profound changes have occurred in family composition and gender relations—as can be seen in rising rates of divorce and single parenting, and a lower birth rate. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:69)

Activism

The fall of socialism permitted the proliferation of civic organizations. Since 1989, both women and men in post-socialist countries “have been drawn to a diverse array of new associations independent of the state.” (Gal and Kligman, 2000:93) While many such organizations are not entirely new in these countries, their public legitimacy is. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:94) Many have become integral to the society as part of political life, for social services, and as new avenues of employment.

Women’s organizations played little role in the breakdown of socialism, though women did actively participate in the mass demonstrations against the regimes. (Waylen, 2007:66) One reason was the fact that women’s emancipation was often associated with state socialism. So in most post-socialist countries women’s organizations with feminist or gender-equality agendas had little influence in the first post-socialism elections—with the result that women’s representation in parliaments significantly decreased and their numbers grew in civic groups since that was their only way to bring gender issues into politics. For instance, women make up a distinct majority of those actively engaged in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a majority of which are headed by women. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:95) At the same time, participation in such groups became less attractive to men since “parliamentary politics became a forum for asserting power.” (Gal and Kligman, 2000:95) Furthermore, a clear gender division exists among NGOs, with women more likely to be involved
in those oriented towards public services, education and local self-help, less likely to be in those with political agendas. (Gal and Kligman, 2000:95)

Women’s NGOs have rapidly grown in numbers and have become places of paid employment for some of the feminists to promote social welfare and women’s equality, help women devise political strategies for obtaining benefits from their governments, and help women get elected to office. (Lang, 2000:290) Those NGOs have become dependant on—and their agendas set by—the governments (mainly with regard to welfare distribution), international donors, or the wealthiest women’s NGOs (which determine research agendas, areas for economical development of women, and criteria for receiving social welfare assistance). (Lang, 2000:290; Gal and Kligman, 2000:95-6) Moreover, those organizations have created new elites (employed in those organizations) that try to maintain contacts with the “civilized” West (Sampson, 2007:305-313) and are removed from their countrywomen’s day-to-day realities. While such organizing may empower women, improve their lives, and be effective in such areas as mobilization against violence against women, criminalization of domestic violence, recognition of wartime rape as a war crime, prevention of trafficking in women, etc.), it remains an open question whether NGO-ization and professionalization of the women’s movement damages feminist mobilization at grassroots, national or international levels. (Lang, 2000:290-301)

Conclusion

This short overview of common patterns of intervention by socialist and post-socialist East and Central European regimes to promote gender equality in education, labor, family, and activism makes clear the continuity of patriarchal norms in all those societies. One problem is that no regime directly and truthfully dealt with gender equality. Their interventions were made more to mobilize women for matters each regime considered essential for its survival. For example, socialist interventions were intended to get women into the labor force; post-socialist interventions were made to enable states function in the global market economy.

While the patriarchal order continued from socialism to post-socialism, there was no continuity in women’s emancipation. Whatever achievements in gender equality were realized under socialism, they were the first policies to be questioned in the post-socialist societies. Women were first to lose rights that
had been guaranteed. And though new rights were granted, the combination of both (e.g., social services and criminalization of domestic violence) might have created room for negotiations with the patriarchal regimes.

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Citizens' Europe: Habermas and European Public Sphere

There cannot be a European Federal State worthy of the name European democracy if in the scope of common political culture is not developed a pan-European public sphere; a civil society that would include interest groups organisations, international organisations, civil movements, etc, and of course an appropriate party system for the European arena.

Jürgen Habermas (1998: 160)

Abstract

Many scholars of EU have noted the absence of the demos and the so-called democratic deficit of European integration. A project to solve this issue and to bring the project of European unification closer to the citizens has been proposed by Habermas, in the framework of his communicative theory. The main merit of his project lies in the fact that it does not isolate the European integration process from the current developments in other parts of the world and it lies within Habermas' cosmopolitan vision of the world democratic order. This paper will present his project of reforming and deepening the integration from below, as well as some of the discussions and critiques it has generated. The essays by Habermas on the united Europe are an example of the indispensable role the public intellectuals in our time.

Key words: Habermas, Europe, public sphere, citizenship

Introduction

Jürgen Habermas has given major contributions to philosophy, sociology and political theory. He is one of the most prominent intellectuals of Germany and Europe, not only because of the influence of his work, but also because he often intervenes in public debates on important issues. In his country, he has been inspirer of Social-Democrats and for dozens of years tried to develop a democratic political culture based on the lessons learned from the disaster of World War II. From 1960ies of the twentieth century, his valuable interventions on social and political issues influenced the German political culture (Blühdorn, 1999: 185; Cronin & Pensky, 2006: vii; Finlayson, 2008: 10; Pensky, 2001: xi).
Habermas is also the proponent of the project of political unification of Europe, as the best way to preserve the victories of liberalisation and social-democracy under the conditions of globalisation and to promote establishment of a world cosmopolite order. This was the topic of a number of his essays during the 90es of the last century and during the last decade. Focusing on these essays, this paper will present his vision for a Europe of citizens who discuss in public sphere and who create the European citizenry. Firstly, it will address the philosophic and sociologic layer on which the Habermasian project for united Europe lies upon. Than this vision will be described and in the end it will be discussed how Habermas sees unified Europe as a station towards a cosmopolite order.

The lifeworld and globalisation

In order to analyze the Habermas project for a European political union, firstly we need to explain philosophical basis on which such a project lies. Habermas distinguishes two types of reasonable human action: (1) communicative action, that focuses on creating and accepting common values, and (2) instrumental action, which considers the most appropriate and less costly tools for achieving the set objectives, e.g., in economic field. The communicative action stems from the lifeworld, and includes the whole set of informal skills and knowledge that the individual uses in certain situations and which are partly given by the family, other social groups and cultures. In other words, the lifeworld provides a stock of meanings and a social horizon for daily meetings between people, and its function is to minimize divergences, disagreements and misunderstandings in communication. It is only a tool for symbolic and cultural reproduction of a society from one generation to another. Communicative action has an impact in changing the lifeworld, but such a change is made little by little and gradually (Finlayson, 2008: 76-83).

The instrumental action uses other things and people as material and organisational resource in order for an individual to achieve his strategic objectives. The product of instrumental action is the system, which in modern societies is further divided into subsystems of power and economy. The instrumental action paradoxically depends on the lifeworld, but at the same time tends to divide it; therefore in addition to solidarity in society we face extreme individualism. The increased extension and complication of societies is a consequence of industrialism, which makes social integration more difficult, therefore, subsystems of economy and state administration
take responsibility for communicative action. However, the more system interferes in the lifeworld, the greater is the risk for the latter not to perform its integrative function, because the system is driven by interests, which not always are in line with understanding and compliance. Therefore Habermas speaks about “colonization of lifeworld” by the system. Since the system in fact largely depends from the lifeworld, the colonization brings unsustainability and crises within the system (ibid: 84-87). Same as Max Weber before him, Habermas considers that solidarity in modern society is threatened by the intervention of bureaucracy, economic cast and political instrumentalisation. The main contribution of Habermas’ theory on communicative action is the protection of lifeworld under current modernity conditions. According to him, the continuation of illuminist project today has to do with the protection of lifeworld and civil liberties from the erosive effect of global system (Habermas, 2001a: 71-72). Every opening of lifeworld, which is a result of the system, needs to be closed afterwards in order to preserve its integrity and balance the system.

Only unimpeded civic liberties, even in alliance with science and technique, may achieve a balance of major forces, through which modern societies are integrated; they may achieve a new balance between the capital power and administrative power; on one side, and civic solidarity, on the other (Habermas, 2005a: 120).

Following the fall of Berlin Wall, globalisation represents for Habermas a major cleavage of solidarity that had been created by national states. He explains the globalisation as an increase of extent of relationship in economic exchanges and communication. Firstly, this is merely a technological transformation, just like the railway, steam engine and telegraph in the 19th century accelerated and regularized transportation of goods, people and information, in the 20th century satellite technology, air transport and digitalized communication extended the transport networks of goods, money, people and information. More specifically, in economic aspect, globalisation has made the trade of industrial goods between states more frequent, increased transnational corporate influence, increased the speed of capital circulation through electronic networks and, as result, provided more autonomy of financial processes, disconnecting them from real economy (Habermas, 2001a: 66). The high level of people’s mobility has changed the cultural structure of national states to the extent that “all European nations today find themselves in the path towards multicultural societies” (ibid: 73). In these new circumstances, the national state is not capable anymore to ensure the necessary social solidarity. According to Habermas, national state emerged from the crisis of legitimacy and integration suffered by old feudal societies during the modernisation processes. The
achievement of national states was exactly to integrate individuals atomized by political modernity and legitimacy with the idea of a nation (Habermas, 1998: 111). Current globalisation processes are weakening its role, because it is no more homogenous inside, nor it is sovereign in external relations. Communication of citizens in public sphere and democratic procedures of national state have no control over global dynamics.

National state once represented a convincing response to the historical challenge of finding a functional equivalent for early modern form of social integration, which was in the process of disintegration. Today we are facing a similar challenge. Globalisation of trade and communication, economic production and finances, spreading of technology and arms and, above all, ecological and military risks, pose problems that cannot be solved within the framework of national state or with traditional methods of agreement between sovereign states (ibid: 106).

In sum, according to Habermas, we are in a post-national phase in which the national state cannot exercise its classic functions: internal peace and protection of external borders, conditioning of national economy, maintaining the living standard through re-distribution policies, protection of individual rights and creating conditions for their materialization (Pensky, 2001: xiii). Social groups that are poor and excluded from consumption society are not being able to improve their conditions and in the longer term, this leads to the loss of social solidarity and destroys liberal political culture, based on whose universality the democracy is built (Habermas, 2001a: 50-51). In Habermas’ terminology, there is an opening of lifeworld that is happening, which needs a further “closing” in order for it to function.

Spreading of networks for exchange of goods, money, people and information requires a high level of mobility. On the other side, horizons of space and time of lifeworld, no matter how much they are extended, they always create a new entirety, which intuitively is present, but always withdrawn in a non-problematic background; a wholeness that is closed in the sense that it contains every possible interaction from the perspective of participants in lifeworld... with every impulse towards modernity, inter-subjectively shared lifeworlds are opened in order to get reorganized and then, they are closed again (ibid: 82-83).
According to Habermas, there are at least five major problems which now require post-national governance. They are: threats to international security, ecological risks, disproportionate distribution of energy resources in the world, failure to uphold fundamental human rights throughout the world and lack of a just economic order, which could meet the vital needs throughout the world, beyond what may be provided with ad hoc assistance in times of human catastrophes (Habermas, 2011: 117). There is a need for new political “closure” of this huge opening caused by the globalisation, therefore politics should be globalized. In fact, in Europe, North America and Asia are emerging new types of organizations of continental “regimes” at the supranational level, which could serve to reform the existing inefficient system of the United Nations (UN).

The Project of United Europe

Habermas believes that the ongoing project of European Union (EU) through redistribution policies and subsidies has managed to eliminate some harmful effects of regional competition between member states; therefore the EU offers a chance for political, supranational and democratic integration of societies in the continent. Political integration of the continent is required, because economic integration alone cannot mobilize support of masses: “alternative to the abdication of politics would be to follow the path for where the market leads us to, building a supranational political agency. A good example of this is Europe’s transition towards the European Union” (Habermas, 1998: 123). Decision to support and maintain an overall level of welfare depends from the concepts of distributive justice and, viewed in this aspect, the European project is “a common effort of national governments to retrieve in Brussels the capability to intervene [in the market], a capability they have already lost in their countries” (Habermas, 2001a: 14).

Political resolution of globalisation challenges through the EU should be done in such a way that it would not put at risk what has already been achieved by national states, democracy above all. In a national liberal state, citizens’ democratic participation generated solidarity based on the law, which legitimizes the very existence of state (Habermas, 1998: 112). This is an achievement of national states that should be preserved under the newly created conditions:

The challenge ahead of us is not the task to invent something new, but rather to preserve great democratic achievements of European national state beyond
its borders. These achievements include not only formal guarantees for the human rights, but also levels of social welfare, education and leisure time, which are preconditions of, not only private autonomy, but also of democratic citizenship (Habermas, 2001b: 6; cursive in original).

Erosive effects of globalisation can be addressed only if post-national constellation may develop new forms of democratic self-orientation, therefore, new opportunities should be tested for democratic policies beyond national state – the EU provides such opportunity (Habermas, 2001a: 88).

Habermas thinks that the project of European federation, as further transformation of current intergovernmental system of EU, is possible and feasible within the sociological tradition of European-western modernity. That is why there is a need to create a European public sphere, where European citizens will take the very same role that national citizens currently have. It is possible for the Pan-European solidarity to lay down roots, because while the national state once represented an abstract state and bureaucratic integration beyond the country and beyond dynastical identities, there is no reason why the same process could not extend to broader scale beyond the national state. The same artificial requirements that were used to create national conscience, may be used to create European post-national conscience, such as European civil society, pan-European public sphere and political culture that is shared by all European citizens (Habermas, 2001b: 16).

Here we have to explain that national identity, as meant by Habermas, is a civil rather than ethnic identity: “A nation of citizens must not be confused with a community of fate shaped by common descent, language and history” (ibid: 15). Collective solidarity of the civil nation is not primordial, but voluntary, because it emerges from the process of democratic communication in the public sphere. Democracy facilitates building of legitimacy and thus fills in the gaps created by social integration, generating a common political culture. Political culture of national state, at the centre of which lies the upholding of constitution, is gradually detached from the culture of majority, enabling all citizens, regardless of their national or ethnic origin, to identify themselves with that political culture, a process that Habermas calls a “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas, 2001a: 74). Constitutional patriotism replaces ethnic nationalism in the conditions of greater cultural and religious pluralism in European countries. It is not static, but rather a continuous process of reviewing values of a certain community in the light of universal norms.
Political culture of each existing European democratic state is established based on interpretation of universal principles of human rights by each historical tradition. Furthermore, the Pan-European public sphere shall emerge as result of mutual opening of national public spheres to one another, thus enabling democratic communication of European citizens and undertaking common responsibilities. Intervention of EU rules in regulating the life of member state citizens and mutual assistance between European peoples requires a European solidarity and this cannot be established without a public and democratic European sphere. The thesis that there cannot be a European people is true only if the term ‘people’ is understood as a parapolitical community, members of which link their mutual trust with the common origin and fate and sacrifice they have to make for the community. But in such illuminist and democratic politics, citizens see themselves as authors of the law, they comply with it and its obligations stem from the harmonization between the rights of each individual and equal rights for all (ibid: 98-101). In other words, the issue is not the European identity as such, but creation of conditions to establish the solidarity among European citizens:

In fact, the question if there exits such thing called European identity, today may be answered negatively. However, the question is put wrongly. It is about requirements that should be fulfilled in order for citizens to be able to extend their civic solidarity beyond the existing national borders with purpose of mutual inclusion (Habermas, 2005b: 83).

The unification process includes building up a common democratic will at the European level. It is because of this that Habermas considers that adoption of the constitution of federal Europe is a necessary requirement for deepening political integration of the EU. Constitution shall give legitimacy to common European political institutions and decision making on taxes, social policies, foreign policy, etc, which will in turn discourage member states from acting individually. He recommends that the European Parliament should function as a normal parliament, the Commission should become government, Council of Ministers should become the second Chamber of the Parliament and competencies of European Court of Justice should be extended. This would mean that a significant part of national states sovereignty shall be transferred to European federation. National states shall undertake regulatory policies that will not be in contradiction with “internal” affairs of other states (ibid: 100). European Federation shall avoid the declining towards nationalism and hegemonic efforts of particular states within Europe. Constitutional
patriotism shall respect diversity and integrity of different cultures. Creation of new solidarity community instead of particularistic national interest shall enable Europe to speak with one voice in global arena on economic, military, environmental, etc., issues. (Müller-Doohm, 2010: 448-449). Likewise, European institutions cannot exist without European public sphere:

There cannot be a European Federal State worthy of the name of European democracy if a pan-European public sphere is not developed within the scope of common political culture; a civil society that would include organisations of interest groups, international organisations, civil movements, etc, and certainly a suitable party system for the European arena. In brief, European public sphere enables public communication beyond the boundaries of national public spheres (Habermas, 1998: 160).

Institutional framework of European public sphere provides opportunities for communicative action of European citizens, which then provides for acceptance of same values and regeneration of Europeans’ inter-subjective lifeworld. Europeans therefore can agree with one another on political principles and procedures, even if they have different national or ethnic cultures. In this way, Habermas proposes a European polity that does not need “spiritual roots”, since citizens’ commitments are not stronger than universal standards of human rights, individual security and democratic participation (Turner, 2004: 308-309).

Habermas called for the adoption of Constitutional Treaty by the EU member states and considered the risk posed by the failure in referenda in France and Netherlands. He continues to insist that in principle, the process of closer political integration is positive and that this path should not be abandoned in exchange for provisional compromises that would satisfy everyone:

If for the sake of doubtful peace we avoid this delicate topic [Europe’s political future] and move forward with usual practice of compromise, then we will leave the dynamics of free markets make way and will do nothing, while the existing EU creative political force is dissolved at the account of an extended and diffusive European free trade area. It is the first time in the process of European unification that we are at risk to go backwards from the level of achieved integration (Habermas, 2006a: 151).

Habermasi is not satisfied that instead of European constitution governments made steps back and adopted the Lisbon Treaty. According to his interpretation
of this document, European decision making again remains a privilege of governments, which will decide behind closed doors about the future of Europe. The limitation of European Parliament competences makes citizens view this institution with scepticism and not as mechanism representing European citizens. Public sphere in Europe remains closed within national state borders and this influences the weak role of European Parliament (Habermas, 2011: 103).

Habermas normative project of unified Europe is in accordance with social democratic vision of modernity and criticism against capitalism (Habermas, 2001b: 12; Habermas, Michnik & Krzemiński, 1994: 24), shared by other theoreticians (e.g., Balibar, 2009; Bauman, 2004; Delanty 1995; 2003; Vattimo, 2006). Italian contemporary philosopher Gianno Vattimo considers that socialist program should be harmonized with European integration, because issues that concern the left, such as security, justice, quality of collective life, ecology, imperialist character of globalisation, etc., may be formulated within the requirement for a stronger European union inspired by values of equality and solidarity. The value of European project lies in the fact that for the first time in history we see greater democratic and voluntary political unification, different from national and imperial “unifications” of the past (Vattimo, 2006: 119-120). In this regard, Dahrendorf observes with a sense of irony that united Europe is the last political utopia of European left; it is a project of European Union that once belonged to Christian-Democrats and which in various periods was opposed by socialists in Germany, France, and Great Britain. Now the EU is not so popular anymore even in the founding member states, the Left has embraced the project of united Europe in the name of utopia for a better future (Dahrendorf, 2003: 110-111).

Habermas’ European normative project is influenced by the political situation in Germany after World War II. The way he formulated the foundations of postnational Europe and constitutional patriotism reminds you on the solution offered for German problems after the war. In other words, it seems that Habermas is projecting for Europe the relations between politics, economy, culture and law in Germany (Turner, 2004: 294). Democracy and tendency towards constitutional patriotism was developed in German Federal Republic, which by invading powers was denied the right to sovereignty and was imposed a Basic Law [Grundgesetz]. German defeat in 1945 linked the fate of Federal Republic with the fate of western countries and national interests were able to be promoted only within the framework of European integration; former
German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, used to say that “the more European our foreign policy is, the more national it is” (ibid: 296). Judging the past and German tradition, particularly the Nazi era in the light of universal principles, has also paved the way for German constitutional patriotism, thus making political culture abandon nationalism based on blood and affiliation (Habermas & Michnik, 1994: 23).

After the unification of two Germanies, Habermas was concerned about convulsive and violent reappearance of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. He disapproved the fact that the first political call of eastern Germans in 1989, “We are the people” [“Wir sind das Volk”], which symbolized citizens will against dictatorship, very quickly turned into the call “We are one people” [“Wir sind ein Volk”] (Habermas, Michnik & Krzemiński, 1994: 18). His concerns about normalisation of German national identity were transferred in formulation of constitutional patriotism at the European level, which requires a clear distinction between civic nationalism and nationalism based on blood affiliation. But, in many parts of Europe, particularly in new EU member states from the Eastern Europe, civic and ethnic nationalism cannot be easily separated from one another. If the European integration in the western part was linked with free transfer of functions by sovereign national states to the EU, in the former communist countries the European integration was seen as a way to affirm freedom and sovereignty of new states that had just emerged from the soviet hegemonic [system].

The world cosmopolite order

Habermasian project for European federalisation is articulated as part of creation of world cosmopolite order inspired by Kant, an order defined by Habermas as “internal global policy, but without a world government” (Habermas, 2006a: 6). There may be a contradiction between the Kantian open cosmopolitan project and the “closing” of United Europe, but this closing is necessary for a pragmatic implementation of Kantian ideal, for as long as there is no worldwide and democratic ethical compliance.

Every political union that wants to see itself as a democracy should at least distinguish its members from non-members... Even if such a union is based on universal principles of a democratic and constitutional state, it again creates a collective identity, in the sense that it interprets and realizes those principles in the light of its own history and in the context of its political way of life. This
ethical and political self-understanding of citizens for a certain political life is lacking in the all-inclusive union of world citizens (Habermas, 2001a: 107).

In order to realize Kantian ideal for a world in peace, Habermas proposes in addition to deepening the EU political integration to reform existing international institutions, such as, strengthening executive functions of the UN, in order to give the possibility to this organisation to act in protecting human rights. For the UN reform to be effective, national states in various areas are required to integrate into joint continental governments, using the EU example. The UN and these continental units would share the work between them and gradually would achieve citizen representation in the UN, similar to the European Parliament, which would mean institutionalisation of world citizenship (Habermas & Mendieta, 2004). During the NATO war against former Yugoslavia in 1999, Habermas supported the armed intervention for protection of human rights against state sovereignty, but he noticed a difference between European and American approaches:

Between Europeans and Americans ... there is an interesting difference in the way they understand human rights policy. United States considers global realization of human rights to be a national mission of a world power which follows this objective based on the power politics. Whereas the largest part of European Union understand the human rights policy as a project of complete legal regulation of international relations, a project which as of today changes the parameters of power politics (Habermas, 2001c: 33).

A single power cannot be entrusted with the protection of human rights, even if that is a democratic power, like the United States. Pursuant to democratic principles, the global implementers of human rights should feel they are the authors, therefore there is a need for a new global democratic order (ibid: 34). It is necessary for political consolidation of the EU to serve this purpose; otherwise creation of another world superpower would be of no value:

But if the sole purpose of federal project would be to include in the game another global player with the power similar to United States, it would remain particularistic and would simply equip this new economic dimension, which in migration policies is called “Fortress Europe” (Habermas, 2006b: 88).

It is obvious that Habermas is against the idea of dividing the world in large areas of sovereign influence of a big power, something that was recommended earlier by the German lawyer Carl Schmitt on the creation of Mitteleuropa
around Germany and which after 1989 is embraced by the European Right to oppose the liberal monopolarization of the world (Habermas, 2005b: 208-209; see below). It is precisely here that he sees a big division of the West: on one hand, the United States with its national power policy and on the other, the European project based on the implementation of international norms. Habermas considers that although the United States for the moment is sure in its way of power and disregards any international legal regulation, in a longer term it would be beneficial for it if world power would apply the practice of respecting international law:

An American government which thinks a different world in 2030 would not want to see China in the future act like Bush’s United States today. Furthermore, it is in its own interest to try to bind the future world powers by an international order, where there will be no need for a superpower (Habermas, 2011: 127).

In order for United States to take that step, it needs the United Europe walk along, meaning that the “division of the West” should be overcome. However, the joint American – European actions in regard to support of Arab Spring seems not to be going along the line outlined by Habermas. While the support provided by the West for national aspirations for freedom and democracy of peoples’ in North Africa and the Middle East is positive, seems that military actions undertaken by NATO and some particular countries are lead by the power logic and by interests of particular states to take hold of riches in the area (e.g., Libyan oil). Thus, they are caused more by the aggravation of competition resulting from global financial crisis, rather than by a coordinated plan of the West to include the Mediterranean region within a cosmopolite order of peace and justice.

Core Europe?

Support that was given to American invasion of Iraq in 2003 by Great Britain, Spain, Italy and some new members and states aspiring to become members of the EU, which by the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld were called “new Europe”, made Habermas undertake a one time intellectual action in some European states to mobilize the public for a political project that he and French philosopher Jacques Derrida called “Core Europe”. On May 31, 2003, Habermas and Derrida published a manifesto in two biggest newspapers in Germany and France, along with articles of some other prominent intellectuals that were published that same day in newspapers in Italy, Spain and Switzerland.
Habermas and Derrida called for a common foreign policy of main European countries that were against the war in Iraq, waged in contradiction with international laws. Their text was a contribution for building European public sphere and a “thin” European community. Habermas and Derrida tried to do this by articulating “common European values” vis-a-vis America as “the other one” and which embodies negative effects of globalisation.

Habermas and Derrida begin their manifesto by recalling big rallies that were held on 15 February 2003 in London, Rome, Madrid, Paris, Barcelona and Berlin against the war in Iraq. Since they were biggest rallies after the World War II, both authors say that they could remain in history as signs of European public sphere nascence (Habermas & Derrida, 2005: 4). EU core states, primarily France and Germany, which are more willing to provide the EU with qualities of a federal state, should follow people’s will expressed in those rallies and make decisive step towards establishing common security, defence and foreign policies: “Avant-garde Core Europe should not be closed within a "small Europe". It should be – as it often was – the driving force” (ibid: 6). Time has come to articulate the European identity which will emerge from historical and political traditions that have characterized modern European states. According to the two authors, these traditions are the following: laicism (secularism) and privatization of religion, primacy of democracy and market policy, sensibility of people for paradoxes of progress, scepticism about technology, social solidarity, criticism against totalitarianism and dedication to peace (ibid: 10-12). Habermas later repeated the idea that European common foreign policy is “less an initiative than a reaction born out of necessity” (Habermas, 2005b: 60), because the Iraqi war made it necessary for the EU to remove itself from US dependency and the EU foreign policy together with those of US, China, India and Japan can facilitate reformation of existing international economic institutions, as well as reform of the UN (Habermas, 2006a: 152-153).

Habermas and Derrida’s manifesto incited debate among intellectuals on relations between Europe and the US. In Habermas’s opinion, we notice a change from his previous research for rational and critical identities, to praising the European model, which is considered to be morally superior then non-European models. “The other one” of Europe, the US, is presented by Habermas as irrational, not bound by laws and behaving arbitrarily, while “Core Europe” presents the best possible part of the world where it tries to bring other new EU member states (Heins, 2005; Parkin, 2009: 398-399).
Habermas defends himself against this criticism, i.e., on emergence of “Core Europe” as citizenship standard, with the argument that this is merely a technical term, while the Treaty of Nice of 2001 provides for “strengthened cooperation” of those member states that want to move faster than other states in deepening political integration and that it is a fact that Germany, France, Benelux countries and Italy have been and continue to be in the forefront of European integration process. Secondly, there are some states within EU that want to preserve their national room for action and which are more interested for intergovernmental decision making, rather than extending the sphere of action of supranational institutions. “Core Europe” makes sense as an answer to this tendency (Habermas & Mendieta, 2004). Habermas states further that “in a core and periphery Europe, other countries that initially may prefer to stay aside, would maintain the possibility to join the centre at any given time” (Habermas, 2011: 130).

Those who criticize Habermas and Derrida have opposed the argument of division of the West, stressing that the US and Europe share the same traditions (Grimm, 2005: 100; Wehler, 2005). United States is not that religious and Europe is not that secular to distinguish them that much from one another. The emphasis on socialist values leaves out the European neoliberal schools, such as British political economy and Austrian school of Mises and Hayek (Kumar, 2008: 94-96). Furthermore, values of secularism, peace scepticism towards technology, etc., are already distributed globally and are not features only in Europe. Within Europe itself, too, there is a greater cultural diversity than between some European countries, on one hand, and the US, on the other. Therefore, “division of the West” will be temporary, since it is like a “family quarrel”, because the common things outweigh things that divide the two shores of the Atlantic. Actually, it may be said that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, but in fact, in the past, European states were more inclined to war than the US and the new Kantian order in the post World War II Europe flourished under the American protection, which resolved the “German issue” in 20th century, following the Hobbesian logic (Kagan, 2005: 94). Even after Berlin Wall fell down, American military presence in Europe is the key factor in preserving peace in Europe. Furthermore, under the US leadership, most powerful Western European countries are participating in defending the world order and do not see one another as competitors for hegemony in the continent (Mearsheimer, 2010). Habermas itself sees the western invasion of Germany in 1945 as liberation, and considers US to be an EU partner for
democratic reforming of existing international system. In defence of Habermas, we should say that his criticism against the US is empirical and not ontological; they indicate neo-liberalism and unilateralism that have been embraced by current political elite in America, but which could change in the future.

Despite all values of Habermasian project in creating a European political solidarity and avoiding ethno-nationalism, he was criticized as non-realistic, at least concerning the situation in Eastern Europe. The biggest risks of 20th century were considered to be two totalitarianisms: communism and Nazism. As result, ethno-cultural identity of national sovereignty enjoys a high prestige, even in countries that are already part of EU. A critic says that same as constitutional patriotism of German intellectuals proved to be non-realistic at the time of unification of two German states, there is a likelihood that their predictions that the adoption of EU constitution will also deepen the union of its members will not be proven, or that the European project itself may be put at risk (Auer, 2010). In fact, not only in Eastern Europe but also among EU founding members, political and intellectual forces continue to criticize the current EU project and have offered alternative models of European solidarity, which are based precisely on ethnic identities that Habermas tries to avoid.

Conclusions

The Unification of Europe is not only a bureaucratic project driven by the interests of common market and by the interests of members states. Many contemporary intellectuals have put their hopes on European Union, who favour it as a new chance that is being given to European citizens to build together not only a bureaucratic structure, but also a public sphere where they could exercise their rights as European citizens. This will be the basis for creation of new European identity. The most vocal among these intellectuals is the prominent German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas. His vision about United Europe requires that the top integration of elites should be accompanied with opening of national public spheres to one another and interaction of European citizens from below, just like liberal and democratic institutions of national state are fed by the public opinion and react against it, EU institutions, too, will be bureaucratic structures for as long as there will be no public opinion of European citizens. This remains a criticism that Habermas addresses to EU even after adoption of Treaty of Lisbon and which remains a challenge for a United Europe of 21st century. The Habermas project
for Citizens’ Europe is a reaction to current international situation where economic globalisation is not sufficiently supported with rational initiatives to control it. The existence of EU is not enough without a coordination of world powers and international institutions. This coordination, however, should at the same time open international organisations for citizens’ opinions. The driving force of Habermasian project lies in the fact that he does not see European integrations isolated from other developments around the world and he thinks that the model of western democracy and citizenship can be actualized also in other parts of the world. Regardless of criticism against it, the Habermas vision should be taken into consideration, both within Europe and EU, and at the world level, by those who are interested in a greater accountability of international institutions and states towards citizens that they represent. Habermas’ meditation for a United Europe serves as example how intellectual opinion in our time is involved in a rational and pragmatic and not simply utopian way, for the benefit of humanity. Habermas’ work is a reminder of irreplaceable role of public intellectuals in what is commonly referred to as "global era".

Bibliography


Internet activism as transformation of the political discourse

Abstract

This article analyses the internet use of the Kosova activists of Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) as a tool of reaching and influencing the audience as well as means of articulating an alternative voice within the public and political discourse of the country. By having used the new media technology ahead of most other political parties in the country, their discourse has succeeded to reach in particular young people- as most of non-financed Self-Determination activists seem to be. Without the internet Self-Determination would hardly have had the impact it has and could have deteriorated into closed militant structure. In particular the internet activism has caused for the lack of need of illegality and for disappearance of extreme radicalism as the net-communication is addressed not only to supporters but also to opponents who can freely follow the movement’s actions and opinions.

By using the theory of functional systemic grammar it is argued that the leader of this movement uses a specific text strategy similar to oral poetry formula in order to control authoritarian rhetoric and to appeal to the solidarity of the audience. Via internet, his written word has achieved the power of impersonal authority, as the explicit and accessible written code to those who follow a social group. He does not directly express his personal evaluation and explicit judgments in his texts aiming to create the impression that the perspective from which events are described is neutral and objective. The readers are thus invited to accept the world-view constructed through the text as factual, concrete and final.

Key words: Self-Determination; Kosova; interpersonal function; ideology; conceptual metaphor; dialogization.

Introduction: Distrust of the public discourse

In reaction to the political and cultural oppression by the Government in Belgrade during the 1990s, Albanians of Kosova established a parallel government, with a parallel education and health system. Up to that time, the traditional disconnection between Albanian people and governmental institutions in Kosova and the distrust of public discourse had been a normal state of conduct in the country. The parallel system functioned due to the
massive and euphoric participation of people in collective institutions, and became a process of giving meaning to a “parallel” reality, wherefrom Kosova’s Albanians established their identities.

After almost one decade, when the war ended, the Kosova Albanians started to abandon their ‘parallel identities’ and to take responsibility for shaping life in their country. However, despite its declaration of independence in February 2008, Kosova has limited sovereignty and neither UN mission nor EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX) have been able to prevent the everyday life partition of the northern part of the country inhabited by Serbs, in consequence provoking an up to date distrust of Kosova Albanians towards the public discourse.

“Self-Determination” started as a movement of Kosova young people with the leadership of Albin Kurti (a former student-leader imprisoned in Serbia during the parallel system) and with the main goal of self-determination of the Albanian people of Kosova. The origin of this movement goes back to the activities of Kosova Action Network (KAN) founded in 1997 by international activists and led by the American writer Alice Mead. KAN was in particular active with documentation of crimes during the war and with the campaign to release war hostages. “Self-Determination” besides having now over thousands of members all over the country is also part of the Kosova Assembly after winning in the elections of 2010.

The “Self-Determination” web-page includes the regular newsletter with information on activities of the movement, with articles of members and with related videos and photos. There is a separate link on the home page about the activities of this movement in the Kosova Assembly. In order to mobilize people for massive demonstrations “Self-Determination” in addition makes public statements and posts placards in the streets and on buildings.

Self-determination” uses social network to disseminate the information and to communicate with its’ members in order to strengthen the information interaction across the country. One example is for instance the effort to arrest Albin Kurti during a funeral, whereas the Kosova police had announced that their action took place in a street2. By publishing videos in the internet “Self-Determination” proved that the police, defying national tradition and ethics had intervened in the graveyard in the midst of a funeral. Therefore it became unfeasible to manipulate or misinform regarding activities of “Self-determination” because their activists regularly posted recorded material in their web-page.
This movement has organized demonstrations mainly in Prishtina, and on one occasion the demonstration ended with two murdered protestors shot by the international police and with more than eighty wounded, whereas there have been hundreds of arrested activists who served from one week to six months of prison. Albin Kurti himself has been indicted with eight months of arrest with the decision of the international court of EULEX. After the decision of EULEX in 15 February 2010 to restart the trial against the head of the movement Albin Kurti, the petition against political trial of Mr. Kurti which was disseminated electronically and was signed by 175 000 Albanians across national division (Albania, Kosova, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia). Instead of prosecuting Mr Kurti, said the petition, the international community should investigate the murders of the two protesters in 2007 by UN police. To this day, no criminal investigation has been launched.

**Methodology: the interpersonal function and ideology**

This paper presents a critical linguistic analysis of materials published in the web-page of Self-Determination, focusing on the texts of Albin Kurti, the leader of the movement, published during 2010. Although this movement has tried to build the image of an egalitarian organization, as Michael D. Kennedy says while analyzing the global solidarity's affinities of Self Determination, this movement is “hardly leaderless”. This particular time period was chosen due to publications containing the leader Kurti’s objections against the EULEX panel of judges in his trial, thus pointing out stylistic indicators of the personal discourse in the Kurti’s texts.

The linguistic tools used for examining connections between linguistic structures and social values are based on the functional model developed by M.A.K. Halliday (1973, 1978, 1994) and adopted by Roger Fowler (1979, 1991,2003), Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979), referred to as Systemic Functional Linguistics. This model focuses on the relevance of formal language features which are significant depending on their particular effect or value related to the specific functions, which implicate macro-functions. Halliday’s threefold classification of ideational, interpersonal and textual functions has been influenced by Bühler’s (1934) expressive, conative and referential functions, to which Jakobson (1960) added three other functions, the phatic, the metalingual, and poetic function. Fundamental to these models is the belief that the uses of language shape the linguistic system.
The corpus of texts by Albin Kurti will be seen from the aspect of interpersonal function, of which Halliday says that “subsumes both expressive and the conative”, which are not in fact distinct in the linguistic system”\(^5\). He describes the interpersonal function in language as both interactional and personal, as means whereby social groups are integrated and the individual is identified and reinforced. This function according to Halliday is realized through particular features of the grammatical system of the language, such as: lexical register, types of speech and modality, use of person, of modifiers and intensifiers, and in particular comments and evaluative expressions. Although he sees the independence of the three functions as relative, in the sense of the degree of mutual determination, however the interpersonal meanings are considered to be freer in the sense that the speaker is free to associate one’s attitudes and speech roles with various kinds of contents.

This particular association of attitude with content will be related to the notion of ‘ideology’ as van Dijk (1998) defines it, as sociocognitive phenomenon, integrating the personal, social, institutional and political dimensions. Within his theory both the social function and cognitive structure of ideology are recognized, as systems that underlie language use, just like grammar and discursive rule systems. The main cognitive function of ideologies is to organize specific group attitudes, such as for example the polarized representation of Self and Others, as the Good and the Bad ones. According to van Dijk the main categories featuring within the group self-representation are Membership, Activities, Goals, Values, Position, and Resources.

Due to the relevance of usage of the figurative language in the analyzed text, the theory of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989) will be taken, as part of the way members of a culture have of conceptualizing their experience and as one of our deepest modes of understanding.

**The proverbial code of the speaking authority**

Albin Kurti as the leader of the movement is usually the first one to announce public declarations and to present the movement, the first one to lead demonstrations, protests, and political manifestations, he is the one who was arrested by the Kosova police, UNMIK police and EULEX police, the one to face the panel of judges. He has created the self-image of an acting leader and not a mystical one who operates at the backstage.

The web-page most prevailing materials have the authorship of Albin Kurti. The main linguistic features of his style as regarding the interpersonal function are:
**Person and register:**

Amongst his publications only the two speeches prepared for the panel of judges are in first person. He makes use of impersonal constructions, passive voice and nominalization. The sentences are complex, with prevailing formal register and sometimes even specialized vocabulary. The only deviation from this register is the proverbial style, typically used for the opening and closing of the texts, which will be discussed in the analysis of comments and evaluative expressions.

In the speeches where he uses the first person, it is usually accompanied with the movement’s name (Myself and Self-Determination). Also, Kurti uses the inclusive plural, but never in the exclusive sense of the ‘institutional’ ‘we’ typically used from governmental representatives. He uses the consensual ‘we’ that appeals to the solidarity of the readers.

The impersonal style reinforces the effect of the generic statements which are taken as everlasting truths, whereas the inclusive ‘we’ helps narrowing the gap between impersonal discourse and life world discourse.

**Intensifiers and modifiers:**

Besides the abundant nominalization, there is a scarcity of adjectives in the texts, as well as adverbs, and typically topicalized subordinating conjunctions serve as intensifiers, as sometimes do adverbials. The few adjectives used are usually descriptive and non-evaluative, mainly perceptual, spatial, material, behavior or temporality related. Therefore the impression for the reader is created that the perspective from which events are described is neutral and objective, without personal evaluation, without emotive vocabulary and with argumentative basis.

**Comments and evaluative expressions:**

The ending in Kurti’s texts is always made prominent against the rest of the text from the aspect of evaluative mode, which only then becomes explicit. This kind of ending often makes use of the proverbial code and the common-sense wisdom which is usually associated with it. By using such endings, Kurti lets the emotional outburst to take place within the conclusion of the text, in order to switch from the authoritarian style and the didactic form of address. In spite of the dominating formal register, complex sentences and heavy nominalizations, he wants to make the whole text seem as a conversation presupposing consensus and solidarity with the addressee. Often at the final paragraph of the text the register changes and vernaculars and colloquialisms are used.
The generic statements are always in present tense and they are characterized by parallelism in all language levels, in the phonological, morphological, semantic and syntactic level. Contrast is extremely foregrounded in all language levels, at the sentence level contrasting dramatically short and long sentences, at the semantic level using antonyms and relational opposites.

The rare cases when evaluative adjectives are highlighted are rhetorical questions, and although this questions seem ‘insincere’ or ‘quasi-speech acts’, the impulse to invite for evaluation and to directly appeal to the reader to occupy a place at the end of the text attains rhetorical and persuasive effect.

The thematization at the ending paragraph is often a recurrent element in all the text, thus ensuring the cohesion and coherence of the text. The recurrent element of theme is a typical ‘formula’ occurring in verse line and helping the oral poet, just like the parallelism, contrast and the proverbial mode which make this kind of language more familiar for the Kosova Albanian reader.

Some of the main features of the dramatizing endings of Kurti’s texts are summarized in the table below.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parallelism</th>
<th>Contrast</th>
<th>Intensifiers / Modifiers</th>
<th>Rhetorical question</th>
<th>Proverbial style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anaphora and epiphora</td>
<td>Short / complex sentences</td>
<td>Topicalization of subordinating conjunctions</td>
<td>Foregrounded pronominal adjectives</td>
<td>Allegory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliteration/assonance</td>
<td>Positive statement / negation</td>
<td>Topicalization of adverbials</td>
<td>Irony</td>
<td>Antonyms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel phrase structures</td>
<td>General / specific</td>
<td>Thematization of dependent clauses</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>Puns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronological gradation</td>
<td>Quantity / quality</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>Generic statements</td>
<td>Paradox</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The ideological role of agency:**

Let us briefly see one of the essential categories of the ideational function, the relation that main participants in Kurti’s texts have with predicates, in order to find out what kind of picture emerges from these texts. This relation is represented in Table 2.
• The first person singular is related as agent mostly to verbs of mental processes involving judgment or reflection

• The inclusive first person plural is experiencer of mental and emotional states and a patient of the physical action of movement

• Kosova is rarely agent of actions, and in those rare cases these actions are negations, Kosova is mostly patient of physical actions of movement, experiencer of mental states mainly in passive constructions, and negated beneficiary

• Serbia is often agent of concrete physical actions, of mental processes involving planning and creation, and real beneficiary

• Kosova Albanians are mainly experiencers of mental states involving perception, agents of physical actions that affect themselves or that are metaphorical

• Serbs are mostly agents of concrete actions of movement

• Kosova politicians are dominantly agents of speech acts, and whenever they are related to concrete action, the verb they take as a subject is negative

• International governing bodies (Brussels, EU, EULEX) are mostly agents of concrete actions, of mental processes involving decision making and arrangement, and experiencers of mental-emotional states involving wishes and demands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>We</th>
<th>Kosova</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Kosova Albanians</th>
<th>Serb people</th>
<th>Kosova politicians</th>
<th>International governing bodies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Judgment and reflection</td>
<td>Physical actions</td>
<td>Concrete actions</td>
<td>Speech acts and negative actions</td>
<td>Concrete action and mental process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencer</td>
<td>Mental state and emotion</td>
<td>Mental states</td>
<td>Mental states</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wishes and demands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative effect</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient</td>
<td>Physical action</td>
<td>Physical action</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The world-view that is given to the readers as finite truth, as definite knowledge and as expert’s word (due to the characteristics of the interpersonal function) is a country governed by national politicians who can only engage themselves
in powerless verbal activity, governed also by internationals who are the real power of decisions based on their wishes and demands. This country functions only in imagination and has lost its possessions and physical abilities, endangered by another country which has strong potential of movement and domination in space. Inhabitants of these countries are similar to their countries, and things can only change if the rational impersonal voice or rather transmitter of the truth is followed by everyone for his judgment and wisdom.

**The mental model of negative information**

The Self-Determination web page includes news and activities of this movement, photos, and publications, consisting of their regular newsletter, leaflets, and documents considered relevant for the movement, and articles of the activists, amongst which leads Albin Kurti with 454 texts. There are also the so-called “deconstructions”, which are intended to “deconstruct” the mainstream politics, as the example which aims to explain the notion of “ethnic decentralization”, deconstructed as “apartheid and institutionalized racism” \(^6\). One of the main links in the home page titled “About Us” does not give specific information about the movement’s members, but gives the following description: “Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE! (Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION!) is a community of people that refuse to submit. We aim to achieve and realize the right to self-determination for the people of Kosova. Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE! is working to achieve radical social and political changes that will enable respect for human rights, civil rights and social justice for each and every citizen of Kosova without discrimination.”

In accordance with van Dijk’s notion of ideology as reflection of the social identity and self-schemata of a group, Self-Determination membership is defined with exclusion of a particular activity rather than with reinforcement of some specific trait: those who belong to this community are those who share what they do not want to do. The reason they are doing this is because they want everyone to have a chance for self-determination, and therefore the noun “Self-Determination” is both a proper name, identifying the definite and particular movement, but at the same time it functions as general abstract term denoting qualities, states and actions associated with individuals. In addition to this, besides serving to characterize the individuals/ members of the group, which is what usually abstract universals do, the noun “Self-Determination” also behaves as common noun or sortal universal, serving to group individuals in a certain class. This blending of characteristics of proper, abstract and common nouns within one term makes “Self-Determination” a powerful resource of semiotic innovation.
(Van Leeuwen 2005), both as a metaphor and metonymy. It acquires the quality of figurative direct thinking of the metaphor through the transfer of the field of reference, and at the same time it functions as an indexical sign through the direct relationship of the metonymy with its referent.

A similar interplay between metaphor and metonymy is noticeable in the definition that is given on “Self-Determination” web-page on the notion of “deconstruction”, which is one of the main headings of their publications (only in the Albanian version of their web-page): *The aim of deconstruction is twofold, explaining and making clear the political concept of the movement and at the same time deconstructing falsehoods served to the people of Kosova until they completely disappear.*

The choice of the term “deconstruction” evokes both a formal register of particular philosophical terminology, as well as the literal meaning of the word. Depending on the shared knowledge of the readers, this term could refer to the overall ethos of modern thought and the modern self as being aware about the constructed nature of knowledge, and on the other hand it could be perceived as commonplace thinking shared by everyone. The movement defines the Self by annulling definitions of the Other, and hence the metaphoric relation with the process of deconstruction as understanding becomes also the metonymic relation with the group of people that describe themselves as those who deconstruct.

The ideological categories from these examples mark basic information about who is considered as Self-Determination member: those who refuse to surrender, whose activity is to deconstruct falsehood served to the people of the country with the goal of self-explanation and disclosing of the other. This Movement is different from classical parties as its fundamental attitude and platform is opposing and critical, without showing approval. It functions on some basic general principles and its structure is close to the informal grouping of people who are gathered due to short-term interests but who have the need to legitimate their oppositional attitude as an internal cohesion and to demonstrate this in public, behind an uncontested leader and clear hierarchy. This movement has taken advantage of the lack of the basic standard of living, the need to decide for oneself, and has used an underlying mental model of the negative information by presenting Self-Determination not only as the communicator but mostly as the signifier of a simple truth – the truth of being short of self-determination.

By displaying the potential for semiotic change (Van Leeuwen 2005) the lexeme “Self-Determination” fuses the factual information or descriptive meaning with expressive or emotive meaning and the social or contextual
meaning, this way creating the cognitive structure which influences the social and political reasoning by shaping the way the audience understands the everyday world.

The leader of this movement Albin Kurti is very active with his articles and declarations, which besides in the Self-Determination web-page and facebook are published also in newspapers in Kosova and Albania. His written word has achieved the power of impersonal authority, in the sense that Van Leeuwen (2005) uses it, as the explicit and accessible written code to those who follow a social group. Although there are not always many participants in Self-Determination events, there is a silent respect for what is sometimes considered as the awareness of the nation, as the courageous and uncompromising word that no one else dares to say aloud. During detention of Kurti there was a full solidarity of Kosovar lawyers who refused to be part of the panel of judges even on the condition of losing their license.

The maxim of the leader Kurti could be perceived as "I refuse, therefore I am". Self-Determination reminds in some ways of the Polish anti-Soviet and anti-communist non-violent movement Solidarność, as even the visual domain of the logo has borrowed the letterforms and colors, evoking long-lasting values such as resistance in a totalitarian system and solidarity with the poor and oppressed.

The exclusivity of Self-Determination is partially considered their unconventional and sometimes spectacular activities such as painting institutional buildings, adding two letters to the UN logo (FUND) in order to compose the Albanian word for “The End”, producing installations with the photos of highest Kosova officials, and performances as the one at the 2012 New Year’s eve when the Christmas Tree was loaded with government failures instead of gifts, in spite of being itself part of this government. One can however suppose that the decision of Self-Determination to become political subject and to participate in 2010 election round could eventually put this movement into a similar position as the Greens Parliamentary party in Bundestag and the leader Albin Kurti following the destiny of Joschka Fischer who trailed the way from a street protestor and confronter of police towards the position of high official who respects the law and plays the parliamentary game by winning or losing like everyone else.

**Interaction towards de-radicalization**

As already pointed out, Self-Determination originates from an international initiative of international activists who were synonymous to the spirit of free expression and who wanted to make widely known the truth about Kosova, by giving background information and facts. By using internet for wider access of the
audience, Self Determination seems to have reached the original aim of widespread social and political struggle. Most of the contributors in the face-book and web-page of this movement are of young age, and this uncensored presentation of ideas and the possibility to exert control over content by the sender seems to be crucial for their participation. New technology has freed these young people from many constraints, such as fixed time schedules, management and measurement of communication, so the new medium is not just an applied technology for transmitting certain content. The new media in the case of this movement has in particular influenced the decrease of the eventual radical action because it enabled the filtering of energy and anger through interactivity and social presence without eroding the privacy at home, it enabled heterogeneity of composition, social relations between sender and receiver, in a very different fashion compared to special propaganda war between position and opposition, typical for undemocratic regimes.

One of the reasons that the new media is not just an addition but an impact in the mass communication is the often-mentioned intertextuality of the internet, which as Baylon and Mignot say "allows for texts echoing each-other. Therefore in essence Internet is dialogic." However, in the case of the political movement like Self-Determination which functions through internet activism by inviting the public to become active participants in the political process, one may argue that intertextuality is defied due to the need to assume common ground for the audience. Whereas the intertextuality opens up the difference of voices, the assumption on the other hand reduces difference and diminishes the dialogicality of the text (Fairclough 2003).

The rhetoric surrounding new media, sometimes ranging from one extreme to another and seeing today’s internet as either wholly liberating or oppressive technology, may focus on the fact that its future meaning is constituted by an ongoing struggle that contains contradictory forces. The new technology has more democratic and participatory potential, however this potential coexists with consumerism, alienation and domination (Kahn and Kellner 2006). However the clashing perceptions of this nature are not an exceptionality of internet studies, at least not in our age to which the historian Jacques Barzune (2000) assigns these labels: Age of Uncertainty, of Science, of Nihilism, of Massacres, of Masses, of Globalism, of Dictatorships, of Design, of Defeat, of Communication, of Common Man, of Cinema and Democracy, of Child, of Anxiety, of Anger; of Absurd Expectations.

Internet highlights the role of dialogization and interactivity, but this is possible only because of the already existing internal dialogism of the word, in the sense that Bakhtin and his circle have used this term from 1920 onwards: it is precisely this internal dialogism of the word, which does not assume any external
compositional forms of dialogue, that cannot be isolated as an independent act, separate from the word’s ability to form a concept of its object.⁸

**Conclusion**

Even though in his texts he foregrounds the impersonal style and the formal speech, Kurti succeeds to attract the solidarity of the receivers. By avoidance of personal evaluation and explicit judgments via adjectives or adverbials, the impression is created that the perspective from which events are described is neutral and objective. The readers are thus invited to perceive and accept the world-view constructed through the text as factual and concrete.

Kurti allows for the evaluative mode to take place within the ending of the text, by making use of the proverbial code and by the repetition and thematization of specific features belonging to linguistic levels. The foregrounded parallelism, contrast and generic statements in the concluding paragraphs (and sometimes in the opening ones) make Kurti's style similar to folk poetry and allow for familiarity with the addressee in spite of the authoritarian style of the rest of the text.

The world-view that is given to the readers as finite truth, as definite knowledge and as expert’s word is a country governed by national politicians who can only engage themselves in powerless verbal activity, governed in fact by internationals who are the real power of decisions based on their wishes and demands. The situation can only change if the rational impersonal voice of the Self-Determination who should be conceived as transmitter of the truth is followed by everyone for his judgment and wisdom.

By calling itself Self-Determination, this movement are creating both a proper name, identifying the movement, but at the same time this noun functions as general abstract term denoting qualities, states and actions associated with individuals who are members of this movement and who consequentially identify themselves with it. The movement has used an underlying mental model of the negative information by presenting Self-Determination not only as the communicator but in particular as the signifier of a simple truth - the lack of self-determination. Therefore the noun “Self-Determination” fuses the characteristics of proper, abstract and common nouns within one term and makes “Self-Determination” a powerful resource of semiotic innovation both as a metaphor and metonymy.

The influence of this political discourse depends on its capacity to reach and mobilize people towards particular ideology and this capacity has been achieved precisely by the new media technology.
The use of the internet is free, and this has immense impact on the potential of communication amongst young people, as most of non-financed Self-Determination activists seem to be. Without the internet Self-Determination would hardly have had the impact it has, and could have also deteriorated into closed militant structure. In particular the internet activism has caused for the lack of need of illegality and for disappearance of extreme radicalism as the net-communication is addressed not only to supporters but also to opponents who can freely follow the movement’s actions and opinions.

The efficient use of internet by Self-Determination has influenced the openness of the media towards this movement, as some of them have already published the newsletter of this movement.

In one hand, this movement does not have opponents on the web-space as people may more easily identify with the youngsters performing all forms of civil protests and always ready to sacrifice. On the other hand, as the internet is transparent and easily available, its usage by Self-Determination may be also a practical way to control its real capacities and to stay calm in spite of the calls of this movement for the expulsion of national and international politicians.

One may say that internet made it possible for Albin Kurti to avoid being authoritarian and instead allowed him to empower Self-Determination with the authority of the written code. His maxim could be perceived as “I refuse, therefore I am”.

Notes

(Endnotes)

1 “Kosova” is the Albanian name and “Kosovo” is the Serbian name, so unsurprisingly the government that announced independence in February 2008 calls itself the Republic of Kosova. The government of Serbia, which hasn’t recognized that government, calls it Kosovo. Although the use “Kosovo” or “Kosova” can depend on the opinion of the situation in the place concerned, many international speakers use “Kosovo” without implying that they believe that Kosovo is Serbian. The deliberate choice in this paper is the Albanian form of the lexeme.

2 Newsletter no.196, 30 April 2010 at the Self-Determination web archive

3 http://www.vetevendosje.org (last accessed on 5 December 2012)


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Philosophy as Self-Transformation:
From Socratic Wisdom to Foucauldian De-Naturalization

Abstract

If we can assume that individual human beings as well as societies not only change or undergo transformation, but can do so as the result of a process of self-transformation, then we might pose the following question: Can philosophy contribute to such self-transformation and, if so, how? It is argued here that the answer is a firm “yes,” in different ways that are both direct and indirect. It is worthwhile to try to spell out what these various ways might be. One answer to the question of philosophy’s possible role in human transformation is Socratic. But there are other non-Socratic answers as well. In this paper, several of these roles are identified and explained: Socrates’ idea that philosophy provides substantive answers that guide our attitudes and actions, Bertrand Russell’s contention that philosophy does not so much provide definitive answers as possibilities that widen our sense of ourselves and the world, the “Critical Thinking” notion that philosophy sharpens our cognitive skills and habits, and the Marxist idea that philosophy can and should change the world itself by helping us understand our current material reality and its contradictions. Finally, a more specific idea is presented, namely, that philosophy shows us that we take to be natural and inevitable is, in fact, contingent and malleable. On this view, philosophy de-naturalizes what masquerades as natural. This insight is traced in various thinkers such as the Stoic Epictetus, Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Foucault. It is argued that the e-naturalization insight has real transformative potential.

Key words: philosophy, self-transformation, social transformation, critical thinking, de-naturalization

The announced topic for our philosophy conference is “Human and Social Transformation.” If we can assume that individual human beings as well as societies not only change or undergo transformation, but can do so as the

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1 This paper was written for a conference in Prishtina in November 2012 celebrating 40 years of the Department of Philosophy and Department of Sociology conference at the University of Prishtina. It was a pleasure and honor to participate in the conference and stimulating to discuss these ideas and others with colleagues and students there.
result of a process of self-transformation, then we might pose the following question: Can philosophy contribute to such self-transformation and, if so, how? I believe that the answer is a firm “yes,” in different ways that are both direct and indirect. It is worthwhile to try to spell out what these various ways might be. One answer to the question of philosophy’s possible role in human transformation is Socratic. But there are other thoroughly non-Socratic answers as well. In this paper, I identify and explain a few of these, borrowed from philosophers as different as Marx and Bertrand Russell. Finally, I go into more detail on yet one more answer to this question, namely, that philosophy can help us transform ourselves by demonstrating and making palpable that what we take to be natural and necessary is, in reality, only contingent. I trace this idea from Stoicism through Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre and Foucault. I suggest that it has great transformative potential.

Before proceeding I have two preliminary comments: First, there is another position concerning philosophy and human transformation, whether or not anyone really holds it. The position is this: The two have nothing to do with one another. Philosophy is a matter of theoretical and conceptual analysis. The most it can do is analyze transformation, that is, analyze the concept, its conditions, its types and so on. I will not argue directly against this position except insofar as I identify and discuss philosophical paths of self-transformation that support the opposite view. Second, I enumerate several types of philosophical self-transformation. I do not at all take these to be mutually exclusive. They may work separately next to one another. In some cases they may work together at the same time or even reinforce one another.

**Socrates and Philosophical Self-Transformation**

Socrates held the conviction-- and his life exemplified that conviction-- that the search for truth and wisdom, the philosophical life, was life lived at its best. By truth, he did not mean a finite (or infinite) set of factual propositions about the way the world is. The kind of truth Socrates had in mind was the underlying meaning of the concepts we employ – concepts such as truth, knowledge, beauty, justice, learning, piety, etc. To the extent, that one falls short of attaining truths, it is essential to recognize and bear that shortcoming in mind. Wisdom, then, is the condition of possessing truths--and the awareness to the extent that one does not--and having one’s emotions and actions guided accordingly so as to do the right things. The philosophical life aims a self-improvement, improvement not of the body, but of the soul. (Since Socrates
believed in the survival of the soul after death, philosophy as the improvement of the soul, means preparation for one’s death as well.) Consider the passage in the Apology (29d-30b) in which Socrates defends philosophy as the most essential of activities: “Men of Athens ... I shall not cease to practice philosophy” because it is devoted to “wisdom, or truth, or the best possible state of your soul.”

Clearly, insofar as the philosophical life is supposed to shape our emotions and actions, it proposes a kind of self-transformation. What is crucial here, especially in light of certain paths to self-transformation outlined below, is that for Socrates we are transformed insofar as we come to have an understanding or a grasp of the essence of the key concepts upon which our lives are based. While the activity itself of searching for truths is gratifying, it is substantive answers to substantive questions that are crucial for self-improvement.

**Russell on Philosophical Self-Transformation**

In stark contrast to Socrates, Bertrand Russell asserts that because philosophy cannot give us certain and definitive answers, whatever its impact on our lives may be, it must lie elsewhere. In his book *The Problems of Philosophy* (originally 1912), which otherwise introduces the general reader to topics internal to the discipline, Russell includes a short chapter on “The Value of Philosophy.” Russell suggests there that philosophy is not done for the sake of its straightforward utility, rather its value can only be indirect through “its effects upon the lives of those who study it” (153). He goes on to say that while “philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge,” (154) we cannot expect from it. “any definite set of answers to (fundamental) questions” (156). But if no firm answers are provided, what effect on us can it possibly have? Russell has this to say (due its eloquence and insightfulness, I quote him at length):

“The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense ... To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious ... Philosophy though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the

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2 See Plato, “Apology.” For the Socratic idea that practicing philosophy for the sake of the soul is a kind of spiritual exercise, and one interestingly exemplified by Socrates, see Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, esp. Chapter 5 “The Figure of Socrates.”

3 See Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*. Page numbers are given in the body of the text.
tyranny of custom. Philosophy is to be studied not for the sake of any definite answers to the questions—but rather for the sake of the questions themselves, because these questions enlarge our conceptions of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation, but above all because through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates , the mind also is rendered great and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.” (Russell, 156f., 161)

Except for the last surprisingly spiritual allusion to uniting with the universe – something that would count as a rather different notion of philosophical self-transformation, had Russell developed it further--the kernel of his idea is that philosophy enlarges and enriches us by getting us to discover and consider unforeseen possibilities. What is crucial for my purposes is the contrast with Socrates. For Russell, while philosophy does not allow us to come into possession of a set of definitive fundamental truths, it does give us something that is perhaps no less noble: a more open, fuller vision and imagination.

What accounts for the difference between Socrates and Russell? Perhaps, it is not merely a difference in temperament, but a couple thousand years of cultural drift that explains the gap. Modern philosophy regards itself more modestly due perhaps to a rise in skepticism and especially to the breakdown in the prospects for finding unquestionable foundations. There may be another difference as well. Our modern way of thinking may be more pluralistic in allowing for the fact that there may be multiple goods and even multiple sets of truths. Whether due to a scaling down of philosophy’s ambitions or a recognition of a pluralistic universe, the presuppositions are very different from Socrates and have led to a different conception of philosophical transformation. One last observation: What Russell says about philosophy’s value resembles what others have said about the value of art: it widens the imagination. That philosophy and art should be such close neighbors might disturb scientifically minded philosophers, but certainly not Russell’s friends in the Bloomsbury circle.

**Self-Transformation via Improved Critical Thinking**

A different answer from either of the above is the idea that studying and practicing philosophy can transform us by improving a certain set of reasoning skills that can be applied not just to philosophical matters, but any matter that
require effective thinking. This is the impetus behind the critical thinking and critical reasoning courses offered and sometimes required at a large number of universities. These are most often taught by trained philosophers using material that are partly drawn from the philosophical canon. University philosophy departments sometimes recommend studying and majoring in philosophy because their students perform well on postgraduate entrance exams for professional and academic study in other fields. The idea is that philosophy students achieve high results on these exams because doing philosophy makes one a better thinker.

Two questions arise here: What is it about philosophy that is supposed to enable it to achieve the goal of so effectively honing thinking skills? Second, which skills exactly are supposed to be sharpened by philosophy? Philosophy is not the only field that deals with conceptual analysis and the evaluation of arguments but one might argue that it is the only field whose nature is defined by those and in which the collection of empirical data is secondary. This focus on information “processing” rather than information gathering makes philosophy unique in this regard. The result is supposed to be the improvement of the following skills: identifying and clarifying questions; defining terms; judging sources and evidence; recognizing arguments (their assumptions, inferences and conclusions); evaluating arguments; constructing arguments; formulating objections; determining and applying criteria of relevance; determining what has been improperly omitted. It is an open question as to what kind of training can best improve these skills and whether philosophical study can significantly contribute to critical thinking. But many people hold that it can and does so and that in the course of doing so our lives and our societies are (or already have been), in some measure, transformed.4

While Socrates and Russell locate philosophy’s transformative value in the substantive answers it provides or in the substantive possibilities it envisions,

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4 In 1980 the Chancellor of the nineteen campuses of California State University issued an executive order requiring tens of thousands of students to enroll in critical thinking courses with the explanation that: “Instruction in critical thinking is to be designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which should lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought.” Quoted in Donald Lazere, “Cultural Literacy and Critical Literacy,” in (ed.) Richard A. Talaska, Critical Reasoning in Contemporary Culture (SUNY Press: Albany, 1992), pp. 54-55.
the “critical thinking” view is that philosophy provides us with the tools for better dealing with matters that are not necessarily philosophical at all. In other words, the idea is that philosophy’s value for human transformation is only instrumental.

**Marx on Philosophy’s Role in Transforming the World**

It would be difficult to find a more explicit statement affirming philosophy’s role in social transformation than Karl Marx’s eleventh of his Theses on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it.” Clearly, the world that can and should be changed by philosophers carrying out philosophy includes us. Hence, the business of philosophy is nothing other than human, social self-transformation.

Where to begin with Marx’s conception? Perhaps, it is best to begin with a certain paradox at the heart of his theory and then try to move beyond it. If we want to change the world, why not immediately get out there and change it? Why should we bother to study philosophy? Presumably, because philosophical investigation, wedded with other kinds of investigation such as political economy, history, etc. will help us to understand better what needs to be done. In other words, our conscious understanding of the world needs training. Yet, Marx famously described his philosophy as based on the idea that our consciousness does not so much determine the ways of the world as much as the other way round:

“...legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life... It is not the consciousness of men that determine their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness ... consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life”\(^5\)

It seems here that Marx holds that changing our consciousness would not change the world since the latter determines the former. Yet, in the same passage, Marx speaks of “men becom[ing] conscious of this conflict and fight[ing] it out.” There are various ways to try to eliminate or get past the paradox. One might give up on the effectiveness of power or on the explanatory primacy of material relations. But either one of these strategies would come

\(^5\) “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” (1859). The Marx Reader, 4-5.
with a very high price. For our purposes, we might say the following: Marx holds that the prevalent and dominant ideas that hold sway at any period of history are determined by the material reality (the economic organization of society), but that it is still possible for individuals to break with these otherwise-dominant ideas so as to form new, oppositional ideas and that when they do so, they can act on these ideas and eventually change themselves and the world around them.

To see how this is possible, let us proceed in two steps. First, we should see what Marx’s philosophy and philosophizing contains. That is, what ideas does his philosophy put forth? The second step consists in showing how these ideas contribute to the process of social, human and self transformation, whether directly or indirectly, at which target audience they are aimed and what end they serve.

On Marx’s philosophical ideas: Over the course of his career, from roughly 1841-1883, Marx’s writings try to do a number of different things. One task was to give a general account of historical change, its direction and structure as well as its “motor,” i.e. what it is that drives historical change. This consists in his working out of a theory of historical materialism which gives primacy to technological and economic conditions that produce certain internal conflicts that get fought out by social classes. A second task was to give an account of the reigning ideology in the then-current state of bourgeois capitalism that involved analyzing and exposing the flaws in the influential philosophy and theory of that era. A third task was to give an account of the then-current state of the lives of real human beings, in particular of wage-laborers. This account centered on a theory of exploitation, alienation and its effects. A fourth task was to explain the internal dynamics and cycles of capitalist economy. Finally, a fifth task consisted in envisioning a future that would move beyond capitalism – a problem that Marx treated more tentatively and much less fully than the others.

Now, how do all these ideas get translated into self-transformation? The answer is clear: not by means of some metamorphosis that occurs in the internal organs of human beings, but by means of taking coordinated collective action aimed at the institutions and material conditions in society so as to change them, thereby changing ourselves. The steps that implement this transformation can be reconstructed as follows. On the basis of the accounts given above, we see that current conditions are contradictory, inefficient, unjust and of deleterious and that they can be replaced by something better. We then undertake actions
that will accelerate, what must occur in any case, namely, the transition to a
different and more egalitarian political economy with clear arguments about
why this transition is to be welcomed and helped along. This will mean that
intellectuals, armed with *The German Ideology* and *Das Kapital*, undertake
to change minds and that workers and activists, armed with *The Communist
Manifesto*, undertake to change institutions and property relations. The
intellectual work is in the service of the activist engagement, of course, not the
other way round. Finally, once the old has been destroyed, the new is brought
in with a self-conscious understanding of its own emancipatory potential and
a much widened panoply for possibilities of human self-realization.

In contrast to the conceptions of philosophical transformation discussed
above – Socratic, Russellian and critical thinking – the Marxist idea puts the
accent on the necessity of changing not merely how we think and what we
desire, but the material or economic relations which so strongly shape our
thoughts and desires. Yet one might notice certain commonalities between the
Marxist vision and the others. (In fact, gradually one begins to notice points
of intersection among all the various conceptions.) Like Socrates, Marx thinks
there are certain substantive answers to be revealed by philosophical analysis.
And like Russell, Marx sees the consequences of transformation in terms of
expanded possibilities.

**Philosophical Transformation by means of
De-Naturalizing and De-Necessitation what is in Reality
Contingent and Malleable**

I would like to suggest one last conception of philosophical transformation.
It is not widely recognized under the name I have given it or under any other
commonly circulated name, although the idea behind it is hardly novel. The
idea cuts across different thinkers in different thinkers and eras. And it is an
idea that is more specific than the conceptions above despite the fact that it
has wide applicability. Captured in a nutshell, the idea is this: Philosophy can
show us that what we take to be natural or necessary and inevitable, is, in fact,
contingent or non-necessary as well as eliminable or malleable. I find this idea
at the heart of Foucault’s philosophy, though it is present, in different forms
in other thinkers as well such as Stoicism, Marx, Nietzsche, and Sartre. The
thing to notice, first of all, is that to show that what we take to be necessary
is actually contingent is far different from showing that what we take to be
ture is actually false. Philosophy can and does expose falsehoods but this is
i) something that many other kinds of inquiry do all the time and ii) while giving up false beliefs can certainly have an impact on our actions and the lives we lead, it has a different kind or modality or impact than the realization that things must not be the way we take them to be. It is this latter notion that I want to highlight here. Let me then trace this idea through five thinkers, broadening the scope of application as we go along.

**Stoicism**

In his Handbook (The Encheiridion 1st-2nd century A.D), Epictetus tells us that freedom and happiness depend on recognizing a distinction between what is and is not “up to us.” What is up to us are our “opinions … desires, aversions” as well as our feelings of attachments to things, people, and states of affairs. What is not up to us are “our bodies … our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices” as well as the life and welfare of our friends and loved ones. Epictetus urges us to minimize or even eliminate our desires for and dependence on things in the latter category – our bodies, possessions, family and friends. This is advice that taken in its extreme form will seem unacceptable to most of us. But what interests me here is something else, namely, what Epictetus says about the category of things that are up to us. In other words, there are two halves to Epictetus’s counsel. First, we should not think that what is not up to us is up to us and we should not let it affect us. The second half of the equation is: we should not think that what is up to is not up to us. It’s this part that is relevant to my point here.

To say that we should not think that what is up to us is not up to us is to say that we should not misconstrue as necessary, natural and inevitable what is really changeable or malleable, i.e. what in fact could be otherwise. Not only that, but it is crucial to our avoiding suffering and achieving some happiness in life that we “work on’ this point with constant attention. We must employ what he calls our faculty of choice (prohairesis) guided by a ruling principle (hegemonikon). Now what Epictetus has in mind when it comes to realizing that what is inevitable is not so is basically one thing and one thing alone: it is our reactions to things, our desires (attachments or dependencies) and our aversions. For example, he writes: “Remember that what is insulting is not the person who abuses you or hits you, but the judgment about them that they are insulting. It is your own belief.” Epictetus says similar things about other

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6 Epictetus, p. 11.
aspects of life such as the loss of a treasured object or even a treasured person. Whether and to what extent Epictetus provides feasible and sound advice is a further question. The point here is that one half of his formula for happiness consists in overcoming the false belief in something’s necessity where that something is for him restricted to our natural and spontaneous, pre-reflective reaction to things. These reactions can be altered on a piecemeal basis and our character can become altered so as to be generally predisposed to react differently to what happens around us.

Marx

In Part 4, I argued that Marx’s understanding of the transformative role of philosophy centered on changing the world materially or, more explicitly, dismantling capitalism. But part of this process consists in making transparent the prevalent ideology and mode of experience of the times we live in. This is to say we must see more clearly how we think, act and feel and come to see it as historically conditioned by the circumstances in which we live and not as something natural and inescapable. So Marx too is a de-naturalizer. More strongly, he is one of the leading lights of this idea.

Marx is most focused and most explicit about the non-naturalness of beliefs, including beliefs about economic and social conditions and about human nature. Among the most important texts, is the chapter on commodity fetishism in Kapital which argues that humans being objectify the production and value of commodities, giving them a power over us as things having a nonhuman, foreign status. But there are many more beliefs that falsely naturalize such as the belief that human nature is competitive and acquisitive that mistakenly take features of human behavior under capitalism to be written in stone and valid for human beings under all social conditions. The same sort of false objectification occurs with regard to our institutions and practices. Thus we might make the mistake of thinking that family and religious identification will and must always be roughly similar to the way they are now, failing to see their malleability and optionality under other social arrangements. What is distinctive about Marx’s view is not so much the scope of these naturalization mistakes – their reach, for Marx, is long and wide—but the fact that these mistakes occur for a particular reason: because they serve the interests of the ruling class, or put less polemically, these forms of consciousness are required for the effective functioning of institutions and for social reproduction until
these institutions are overturned. Marxist philosophy, though, can serve to dissolve the naturalization mistakes allowing us to throw off these shackles.  

**Nietzsche**

Nietzsche’s philosophy is directed not primarily at the beliefs we hold as much as at the concepts or conceptual frameworks with which we operate. Since it is not beliefs that are at issue, his goal is not to expose falsehoods or mistakes, but to uncover the values that are embedded in these concepts and frameworks. And since it is values that need to be uncovered, he is not interested in providing arguments that would refute our commitments, but rather in carrying out a philosophical activity that he calls genealogy. Nietzschean genealogy aims to trace the genesis of our thinking by finding the various sources and paths that have led us to the present. The idea is that our concepts are not only not necessary but also not fixed. They are historical artifacts, changing and changeable (though not always easily so). If we probe their history, we find that they are motivated by impulses and instincts that are hidden from us such as fear, resentment, hatred, the desire to control, etc. They are not only hidden but they are contrary to what we usually assume and accept about the way we operate. The concepts and frameworks that guide our behavior in modern European culture involve a denial of ourselves and a denial of this-world (as opposed to some other-world that we might fabricate and long for). They express twisted, reactive forces in us, rather than healthy ones. We need not abandon ourselves to this way of life. There is nothing necessary or natural about it. We can overturn these conceptual frameworks and develop new values or valuational schemes which can lead to a different way of life, to an active, healthy life in which we affirm the only reality we’ll ever know, the world around us and the world within us.

For Nietzsche, then, philosophy is a means by which we can transform ourselves and societies in which we live by coming to see that our habits are only habits not necessities. They can be replaced once we come to see them as optional and as debilitating. Genealogical self-examination is the first large step after which follows the creation of new values guided by a philosophy that is self-consciously affirmative.

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7 For more on this idea as it appears in Frankfurt School critical theorist philosophers, see Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 14f, 71ff.
Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre, the quintessential Existentialist, held to the idea that human beings do not inherit a pre-existing nature, job description and set of values. We are free to make of ourselves what we will. This is not a privilege or right that human beings happen to have, but a kind of ontological specification of what or who we are. The emphasis on freedom is an insistence that things are, as much as we might overlook or disguise the fact, “up to us.” This is another way of articulating our refrain: what is thought be necessary and natural is not at all so, but could be otherwise.

Sartre does not think that we are free in the sense that some heavenly creatures might be. We are factical creatures tied to a physical and social reality. Sartre’s account goes like this: Human beings have a double character of freedom and givenness, or in his terminology, transcendence-facticity. Our transcendence (synonymous here with freedom) consists in the human capacity to negate or to question the way things are (ourselves included), to envision the way things are not might be and to act on that knowledge. It is the capacity to discern possibilities that accounts for our freedom. As to facticity: Human beings are not transcendent through and through. They have bodies and certain “factual” attributes that are fixed and not within their capacity to control fully. One finds in Sartre at least three salient types of factual attributes. One such type of attribute of human beings is their past. I am always, in part, what I and my situation have been. I can no longer change what has led up to the present, regardless of whether my past activities were chosen by me or not. A second factical feature is a person’s body. Third, there is the way that others view us or what Sartre calls our being-for-others. The way others regard us is not altogether separate from us, but constitutes, in part, who we are insofar as we are our situation. So, human beings are composed of two aspects: the freedom to surpass what is and the factical constraints on their freedom deriving from the past, their bodies and their image in the eyes of others.

Now, Sartre thinks that we have a tendency to conflate the factical and the transcendent. Sometimes we take what is factical to be transcendent such as when we deny that our body or our past are relevant to who we are. But more often the conflation runs in the other direction. We take what is, in fact, up to us and turn it into something that is beyond our control, regarding it is as

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9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 99-100. This account borrows from my essay “Sartre on the Authenticity Required If My Choices are to be Truly Mine” in Filozofia (Bratislava) 9 ((2011), 879-889.
necessary and inevitable. Either way we end up in, what Sartre calls, bad faith. Like Marx, Sartre thinks that this is no accident. But for Sartre its prevalence is not so much explained by its necessity for the functioning of an economic system, but by the fact that freedom present itself to us as a formidable challenge or even burden that we are tempted to want to avoid. Sartre’s philosophy in *Being and Nothingness* and other texts and lectures of the 1940s is dedicated first and foremost to the idea that we are much more free than we realize and that very many circumstances in our lives are not necessary but up to us. This is the kind of philosophical insight which demands that piece-by-piece application such that we re-assess this or that aspect of our thinking and behavior.

**Foucault**

Of recent philosophers, Michel Foucault is probably the one who most insistently performs and encourages us to perform the activity of de-naturalizing seeming inevitabilities. Whether it is madness, physical health, the category of the human, practices of punishment, the idea of sexuality, Foucault shows that our ideas have in fact undergone tectonic shifts over the centuries. Our conceptions are not clearly superior to earlier ones but based on different epistemic foundations. If we can sniff out their many sources (not their single origin!) and their many circuitous paths (Foucault is the first to admit how much Nietzsche has shaped him), we can see them as accidents that might not have happened as they did, and we can then dislodge their grip on us. Thus Foucault sees the most natural seeming concepts such as “sexuality” or “normal vs. pathological” as inventions or, as we more often say, social constructions. Behind this constructedness lies, according to Foucault (especially his texts in the 1970s), not simply different ideas about what counts as knowledge, or different drives and instincts, but different power constellations that get played out differently under different historical conditions. Still, the important point is that this is not merely an academic exercise, but has practical implications for today, for our politics and more generally for our choices. We can de-naturalize and choose differently. As Foucault writes in his essay “What is Enlightenment”:

“a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental ...it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological...in the sense that .... it will seek
to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say and do as so many historical events... And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”¹⁰

Conclusion

The conceptions of philosophical self and social transformation sketched above are hardly exhaustive. ¹¹ One might even be tempted to say that there are as many conceptions of philosophical transformation as there are philosophies or philosophers. But I do not think that this is right. The truth is that many prominent academic philosophers today prefer not to engage in metaphilosophy (i.e. reflections on the conditions, nature and consequences of doing philosophy) and hold that philosophy is a specialized activity that need not directly serve any wider social goals. This view may be right in one respect. It may be that focusing on and constantly expecting philosophy to make direct payoffs to human welfare will be self-defeating. But this should not blind us to the possibility that there are many ways in which philosophical reflection and critique can and do contribute to individual and social transformation at various levels of human functioning.

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¹⁰ Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” 46.

¹¹ For example, Wittgenstein’s philosophical therapy was left out.


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Towards an Exclusive Architecture

(Le Corbusier and the Ambivalent Affirmation of Modernism)

Abstract

Le Corbusier’s entire discourse, as fragmented and as inconsequent as it might seem at first glance, might be erected on some basic concepts it was constructed from. Some of concepts which reflect on the shaping of his architectural expression seem to furnish, with a somewhat coherent form, not only his thought but also the general modernist discourse in architecture. The search for simple shapes, clear and open surfaces, endless light, primary function, machinist efficiency and social liberation are but expressions of a deeper conceptualization of a ‘discourse regime’ used to articulate the visions of modern architects and particularly those of Le Corbusier.

Yet, Le Corbusier’s discursive coherence does not align with some of his works. This is an important twist which should make architects reflect on the rigid implications of the restricting discursive formulae to which even Le Corbusier himself was not so loyal.

Key words: architecture, discourse, abstraction, light, machine, revolution, liberation

Introduction

Writing about modernism in architecture, identifying the principles and the premises which have shaped up the architectural expression we term modern, inevitably leads to a process of a rather uneasy interpreting of the architectural expression in the works of modern architects as well as the thoughts preceding that expression. This is firstly due to architectural expressive riches which are difficult to stack under some interpretation stereotype, and secondly, it is due to the lack of theoretical articulation of those architects’ ideas. Perhaps all that can be read on the ideas of great architects is comprised in no more than some dozens of books, in which their visions where generated and shaped up in order to be later expressed in their works. Architecture critics and scholars are aware of this tension which always accompanies direct architectural thought.
and expression. There is however an agreement on the existence of something 
such as ‘modern architecture’ i.e. on the existence of certain premises which 
‘unify’ architectural practice into the expression we term modern architecture.

When looking at the theoretical and discursive features in which the vision 
of modern architects was expressed, it becomes clear that their thinking 
is inhabited by a spirit identical to that of missionaries, a sort of a self-
proclaimed heroism of architects to be part of the great processes of speeded 
change of modernism in the last two centuries. This is to be found in all of the 
manifests of modern architecture, as well as individual writings of modern 
architects, which are uncompromising on the necessity for the big change and 
the embrace of new principles in order to express and enliven the novelty. The 
 novelty is for them the cumulative projection of the new world, the new era 
and new conscience, these being conditioned by the impact of grand epochal 
developments in industry and technology. This is commonly termed Zeitgeist’s 
ideology (Spirit of time) which inevitably reflects on architectural practice.1 
The architect who has made the greatest effort to view his own vision within 
this crucial line of developments was, without any doubt, Le Corbusier. He 
was among the most influential architects in the 20th century, who endeavored 
to articulate the grand vision of modernism in architecture with his 
architectural, theoretical and programming works. This is why the affirmation 
of modernism in architecture is permanently linked to his name and works.

His works amount to a wide opus of writings and books: 50 written works, 57 
architectural oeuvres, and a vast number of blueprints and unaccomplished 
works, which his researchers study today. Le Corbusier was a fanatic visionary, 
a passionate creator, extremely devoted to his work. He was at the same time 
the most prominent name in modern architecture, a controversial character 
whose creative power often emerges outside the frame of his thinking 
structured on concise premises. By this, the thinking falls pray of generalizing 
and ready-made assumptions. Not without a strong reason is he an architect 
whose architectural work sometimes collides with the principles affirmed in

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1 Naturally, as mentioned above, the spirit of time does not preassume uniformity of styles but 
rather of practices. Thus the famous critic Charles Jencks distinguishes between 6 architectural 
traditions in modern architecture: 1. Idealistic tradition, 2. Self-aware tradition, 3. Logical tradition, 
4. Intuitive tradition, 5. Activist tradition and 6. Non-self-aware tradition. All of these traditions 
are an expression of a certain relation between architecture and politics. The majority of what is 
identified with modern architecture and its visions is related to the idealistic tradition, which in a 
way comprises the theoretical grounding for other traditions. The attempt of Hitchcock-Johnson to 
also call the modern architecture the international style should be seen in this very light. (Source: 
his writings (the uncompromising affirmation of purism and the clear primary geometrical shapes in the majority of his works were removed by Ronchamp Chapel!). Charles Jencks will see his personality as some sort of Dr Jekyll & Mr. Hide, both at the personal level in which he personifies a villager called Charles-Eduard Jennarete, and a citizen called Le Corbusier. The same holds true for the architectural level where he affirms the geometrical and biomorphic shapes at the same time. Le Corbusier was, simultaneously, the most influential man and the most hated of all architects. He has affirmed modernist practices all over the world and due to his influence many cities of the world are what they are today – projections of his ideas. This is precisely why he is most hated, as the worst of projections and implemented architectural and urban solutions conforming to modernist vision are attributed to him, making his name a target for critics of modernism. Though criticism towards Le Corbusier might seem abundant, grave and somewhat exaggerated, it nevertheless is supported by his stance or positioning, as he had assumed to carry the burden of modernist vision of architecture on his shoulders. This is what he does in his renowned Vers une Architecture (1923). This is the most pretentious work ever written in architecture after that of Vitruvius (De Architectura Libri decem). It summarizes the aspiring vision of the new era, the vision which has shaped up our current dwelling and many modern cities. Of course, many architectural solutions which Le Corbusier promotes are not his inventions and it would be wrong to say he was the first one to suggest them. He was among the first ones to originally incorporate all of those solutions into a clear expression, with independent identity – or, as Scully puts it, he has given them ‘the dramatic aura’.

In order to define the modern architecture, to draw the premises which give this architecture its identity, and find its discursive coherence, we have to always refer to Le Corbusier’s Vers une Architecture. This is, so to say, a paradigmatic work on the entire modernist discourse in architecture which resulted in architectural practice still enduring the consequences of this books premises – be it through continuing their implementation, or confronting with such practices in an attempt to find more advanced solutions.

His work is characteristic as it strives to be a manifesto of modern architecture. Not a manifesto of a certain style, a certain school, but of a totally new and different approach to the ones predominant before it. This work is written in a shape of a manifesto characterized by a particular aggressive type of expression, as a call for a necessary mobilization needed to intervene in
important social processes. Le Corbusier admits his book was written in ‘an aggressive style’, to then claim: “And how can you speak about architecture with an elegant disregard, about the architecture which is a representative of the soul of an era, in a time when this soul is still covered by unbearable archaism of a dying era”\(^2\). This tone in his attitude reveals the heroic character of his thought and discourses in architecture, as he is firm and firmly wants to cut off from tradition and traditional expression in architecture. The affirmation of Le Corbusier’s new architecture is seen simultaneously as a final liberation from unnecessary burden of style, décor and other outdated suffocating details.

Le Corbusier’s entire discourse, as fragmented and inconsequent as it might seem at first glance, might be erected on some basic concepts it was constructed from. It seems as if some concepts which give a somewhat coherent form to his thought are also reflected in the way his architectural expression, and also the modernist discourse of architecture in general, were shaped. The search for simple shapes, clear and open surfaces, endless light, primary function, machinist efficiency and social liberation are but expressions of a deeper conceptualization of a ‘discourse regime’ used to articulate the visions of modern architects and particularly those of Le Corbusier. With Le Corbusier it seems possible to establish some axis between architecture and other concepts, in order for everything to acquire a coherent meaning: *architecture and abstraction; architecture and light; architecture and machine; architecture and revolution*. Of course, those basic notions cannot be considered as separate or isolated architectural findings, as they are merely derivations of a larger

\(^2\) Le Corbusier, *Drejt një arkitekture*, PHOENIX/Tirana, 2000, p. II
formation of modernity. Yet, their contextualization in architectural projection has lead towards a new unique expression, the consequences of which we are observing to this very day.

**Architecture and abstraction**

In spite of the sometimes conflicting expressions in accomplishing Le Corbusier’s concrete projects, the need to unify the architectural practice on clear discursive premises seems to be ever present. The shaping of architectural expression is a consequence of a system of thought and not an incidental expression of immediate needs. Le Corbusier expresses this stance by linking architecture to an era and a spirit, viewing it as pure crystallization of the visions within a conscience of that period. He writes that “an era creates its architecture as a clear image of a system of thought”.3 This might well be the most concise formulation expressing the tendency of modern architecture. Expressed here is the basic aim of modern architecture to be a part of a system of thought, namely of a self-regulative system of thought which begets its own norm. Notwithstanding other content, apart from that of mind as a regulative principle, Le Corbusier dismantles a paradigm of traditional architectural projection in order to affirm new rational and clean forms. This tendency of affirming the principles of the clear mind was intentionally brought about in one of his works known as Villa Savoye. Peter Blake writes about this: “The precise geometrical silhouette of Villa Savoye allows for no confusion between architecture and nature. It was aimed to be a man-made building, a production of a great characteristic peculiar to human – the clear mind”.4 When Scully claims that new architecture expresses a sort of ‘relieving pleasure’, he seems to refer to this demiurgic impulse in Le Corbusier’s architecture, as the mind free from external pressure will start to put order and abstract forms as a separate reality.

The new horizons opening up with this impulse impose the total reviewing of a tradition and traditional shapes. On this, Le Corbusier writes: “We go through a difficulty and the new horizons do not find the grand avenue of the tradition, apart from the total review of means we utilize and through placing new construction basis erected on reason”.5 He sees architecture

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3 Le Corbusier; ibid, p. 69.
5 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekturë, p. 47.
and the possibility to express its vision clearly as being inseparable from the system of thought and reasoning as a scheme deriving from that system. In the illuminist tradition this is part of the geometric Cartesian system which will be expressed in the majority of Le Corbusier’s works (his enthusiasm will go so far that he will even write the *Poem of the Right Angle*). Le Corbusier’s overwhelming with geometry and possible logical geometrical solutions is blatant, when he claims that “large problems of modern construction will be resolved through geometry”. Geometry for Le Corbusier does not only play the technical function of finding the best solutions in architectural constructions; he views geometry from a wider angle of universal agreement. He views geometry as a universal language which touches everyone’s feelings – something not thought of before in classical architectural accomplishments. However strained, his search based on abstraction, remains today an inevitable heritage in architectural projection. The well-known irony with abstraction was not suitably exploited in architecture – apart from an odd return of natural shapes or biomorphism which we encounter in Art Nouveau and with Gaudi (whose work remains unclassified from the stylistic and modernist categorization viewpoint). The famous triptych by Roy Lichtenstein *Cows going abstract* might serve here as an efficient illustration of the notion of abstraction. Lichtenstein also plays an irony on the abstract expression and plasticism of modernists in art, which can be viewed as reaching towards cuts and solutions overlooking the unimportant to bring out a permanent structure of buildings we perceive, however disfigured they might be in concrete appearance. In this triptych, in the abstraction from a natural form, we find the tendency of not-so-unimportant solutions in architecture. Perhaps a lot of that abstraction in architecture continues to remain an important and useful premise for acceptable solutions; a rather inevitable heritage for the future of architecture as well. What remains a disputable issue in the relation
of abstraction to architecture is the reduction of architectural solutions into exclusively abstract geometrical shapes, which accounts to quite a big loss in modernist architecture. Other orientations, particularly those which incorporate the phenomenological treatment of space and architecture, show that such a reduction will turn the entire existential root of space abstract. The loss of natural bond between architecture and the site has opened up the path for such architectural arbitrary modeling in modernism, which resulted in a one-way reduced development of modern architecture. The roots of this one-way development, full of inherited problems, may also be found in one of Le Corbusier’s stances: the geometry and abstraction which produce clear shapes are viewed by him as possibilities to find sustainable and definitive architectural expressions which everyone would identify with. Such a stance is evident in all of Le Corbusier’s writings, although later works do not show such rigid preference towards architectural shapes.

"The peculiar and astonishing fact about architectural abstraction is that, through working with the stone matter, it brings life to it". The power of abstraction, which Le Corbusier refers to, is in perfect and permanent Platonic shapes, in the undisturbed architectural order of mind. It is not by accident that all of the geometric shapes he prefers and aspires to, implemented in architectural projections are those we might call exclusive projections of mind. The basic shapes Le Corbusier considers for his expression, not only in architecture, but art in general, are ‘sphere, cube, cone, cylinder’, none of which are found in nature. His view is, above all, based on also finding the ideal proportions in classical architecture, where he finds the ideal cuttings of corners and compositional surfaces.

His early paintings contain compositional variations which will reflect fully in his architectural projects. This seems to be an important moment in the shaping of Le Corbusier modernist vision: abstraction and search for universal primary forms always remains the most relevant issue in his production, if not as a consequence of realizing exclusively primary forms in his creations, then at least in the primarity of form. It is at this very point that we seem to find a natural evolution of his works which intrigue his researchers to this day on the changes in the periods of creativity (that of the 1920s, and that after WW2 of the 1950s). Peter Blake, one of the scholars who studied his work, writes about Le Corbusier in a work entitled Mastery of form. Although his

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6 Le Corbusier; ibid, p. 35.
thoughts expressed for an efficient resolution of a well-expressed problem, from the engineering viewpoint are directly associated with functioning and functionalization, which will turn into a dogma of modern architecture, perhaps the form is what will always remain of primary importance for Le Corbusier in his works. This thesis might be backed further by the fact that his architectural works were always preceded by researches in painting – in the forms he was finding and studying initially in the pictorial expression.

In his writings with Ozenfant, which coincide with the period of joint research, initially in art and then also in architecture, they strive to find a universal language, unchangeable and applicable everywhere and for everyone. This will lead them to identify the purist system within which they will divide between primary and secondary sensations. This elementary division will be the guiding premise for Le Corbusier’s work for some time (at least he will never abandon his discourse). In their writings, they claim to have distinguished between two sensations of senses:

“(i) Primary sensations for all human beings are determined with the simple game of primary forms and colors. If the sphere, in the shape of a table-pool ball is shown to anyone – a Frenchman, a black man, a Lapone – (this ball being one of the most perfect human materializations of the ball) the ball will trigger the identical inherent sensation about the spherical form; this is the constant primary sensation.

(ii) There are also secondary sensations, differing from one individual to the other, as they are dependent on their inherited or cultural capital. Thus, should I hold a primary cubic form, it will stir the same primary sensation for the cube within each individual, but if I were to put on that cube some geometric black spots, the civilized man will immediately trigger the notion of the dice and a set of related associations. The Papuan would only see an ornament. There exist, therefore, alongside our primary sensations, the secondary sensations, diverse and numerically indefinite”.

This is a pretentious division over which to establish the architectural projection; it is an attempt to find a constant expression on the constant incitement which the abstract form may cause on humans. The numerically indefinite variations of the secondary sensation, though not expelled from Le Corbusier’s architectural practice, are derived from accidental associations on which architectural

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practice should not be based. This finding of Le Corbusier and Ozenfant was seen as an expansion of the argument initiated on the applicability of geometrical rigor in art and architecture. After all, this persistence on finding the universal principles of application in architectural creativity will be an inseparable part of Le Corbusier’s search. Together with Ozenfant they had only strengthened his initiative of basing projections on abstraction.

**Architecture and light**

Before he was introduced to Ozenfant, Le Corbusier had made his most relevant work in architecture: that of the Domino house (1915). This was part of his independent and original findings which would later be articulated and expanded in his pictorial research and joint writings with Ozenfant. The Dom-ino house is a simple structural system of house raised on six pillars holding the structure, thus creating an open internal space and an outer façade to be willingly modeled (as the external walls have no weight carrying function). The naming of Dom-ino house encompasses two Latin words: *domicile* and *innovation*, while also serving the metaphor of the domino game – implying that the house may be structured in the same way that domino pieces are assembled in the game.\(^8\) The important thing in this house is the primary elementary form achieved as a consequence of abstraction and that the principle of light penetration through the surface free from façade was affirmed. This element is of utmost importance for Le Corbusier.

In this period Le Corbusier implements this principle fully in his projections. Thus, in *House for Ozenfant* (Paris, 1922), he manages to utilize the entire liberating power of pure geometric shapes in order to crown his new architectural vision. The power with which light penetrates in this work expresses Le Corbusier’s creative ability to model the space and give it shapes never before known. Scully expresses this with a strong emphasis as part of

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\(^8\) Shih për këtë Keneth Frampton, Le Corbusier, Thames and Hudson Inc/New York, 2001, fq. 21.
his exploration of architectural vision, claiming: “The interior of the Ozenfant House literally explodes into space; all of the old details of the great European tradition, which qualified the corners and modified the changes in the plan, were thrown away by the brightness of light”.

The search for light, or rather, the opening to it, is an inseparable part of Le Corbusier’s vision. The abstraction is a discovery of simplicity, of pure form which achieves its full meaning with light. The primary simple form is not only important for its emergence into the light where it is clearly and wholly revealed, but also for its opening to light. After all, the character of every space is determined by light – it is through light and its penetration that the environment associated with other features of psychological and social nature is created. The initial stages of this deliberation on primordiality of light are to be found in antiquity, reflecting our way of religious and metaphysical conceptualization of the world. This will later culminate with the metaphorical use of light to describe great transformations, secession from the past and shaping of new enlightened modern visions. Calinescu notices this very well when claiming that medieval period with its nocturnal dark character is overcome with the light of the renaissance. The metaphor of light is gradually transformed into a final goal in illuminism and modernity, to gain its fundamental ontological character in modernist architecture. The metaphor of light is part of important differentiation of different historical and cultural eras, while the peculiarity of its treatment is directly reflected in architecture – in its utilization, which rather than metaphorical is realistic. It is not by accident that the new era following the renaissance treats the light differently, striving to rebring a more emphasized and natural presence of classical light of antiquity, lost in the dimness of medieval cathedrals, in which light only penetrated from above to signify the supernatural light over the terrestrial darkness. In modernity, especially with Le Corbusier, there is a notable awareness of opening towards light – after all, his projects are a constant attempt to free the space as much as possible in order to make room for light, to ensure its penetration and natural flow. Le Corbusier’s findings are in full accord with this principle of light treatment and lead towards light. What Reichlin had claimed in his study on windows and the Perret-Le Corbusier controversy is meaningful for the issue of light and its treatment by Le Corbusier. Reichlin in this study treats a debate made in Paris Journal in 1923 which was initiated after Perret’s interview and his evaluation made by Le Corbusier on the issue of window

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treatment. Riechlin views this as an important outlining of two cultural models in the widest anthropological meaning of the word, in the treatment of the vertical and horizontal window. Horizontal extensions of windows in Le Corbusier’s façades are seen by Perret as an attempt to achieve a certain volume and form which ‘creates an impression from outside’ but ‘leaves half of the space in darkness from inside’. In his reply, Le Corbusier talks about how those arguments of Perret insult him, as they are not only incorrect, but also false. Le Corbusier says in his reply: “And here comes the latest insult of Mr. Perret against me: my windows do not allow for sufficient light to enter. This accusation really enrages me for as much as its falsity is evident. What was he trying to say? I endeavor to create well lit interiors ... this is my primary aim and this is precisely why the exterior appearance of my façades might seem a bit bizarre in the eyes of creatures of habit. Mr. Perret holds the belief that I create the bizarre intentionally. Correct – intentionally. This is not for the sake of the bizarre in itself, but in order to permit the maximum light and air inside my houses...”

Le Corbusier’s sharp awareness of light reinforces the entire presented argument on inspearingablity of architecture from light. In the window treatment, not only the borders between interior and exterior which have traditionally defined the space are challenged; the space itself is redefined through the flow of light. The light gains a meaningful value for the overall definition of architecture.

A result of this belief is the famous statement by Le Corbusier on architecture: ‘Architecture is the clever, accurate and wonderful game of volumes placed in light’. As we have derived the world of Platonic ideas from the notion of good – which identifies with the sun – enabling everything else to appear in this world, we also find Le Corbusier’s belief that architecture emerges from light, from the way its volumes appear in light. Architecture and light thus comprise an important binome in his discourse. Le Corbusier claims that ‘our eyes are made to see shapes in light; light and shadow reveal shapes; cubes, cones, spheres, cylinders or pyramids are very important simple forms which are made to look good from light; the image is clear and graspable, without ambiguity. (...) The entire world agreed with this claim, the child, the uncivilized man and the metaphysical one.”

According to Le Corbusier, from direct sensual perception of childhood to the intermediated metaphysical one, the simple shape is the one which looks best in light.

11 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekturse, fq. 16
It is in this line of search which Le Corbusier never abandons that his later findings, such as the five principles of architectural creation, the modular and the three urban joys, obtain their meaning.

The effects of obtained forms which stir primary sensations are evident; they reduce the architectural creation to its pure form, devoid of any ornament and décor, undo the traditional practices in order to open up the avenues for new rational and universal architecture, which is pure and minimal.

The spirit of the new era is what rids of the need for the decorative architecture. “During the turmoil of this period of crisis, the event to precede the new era, open to new clear ideas and earnest wills, the decorative art, was like a piece of straw providing a false hope of safety in a midst of a storm. An illusory blast. Let us consider the adventure of the decorative art as a good example to rid of the past and truthfully seek the physiognomy of architecture”.

The modern architecture physiognomy was already sketched, assuming its shape. This physiognomy consists of no more than ‘the taste of free air and endless light’.

‘Free air’ stands for the breathing freed from chains of the past, removal of the burden of the unimportant from the pure abstract forms.

“Endless light' however does not express only a rhetorical thrill. The presence of light in Le Corbusier’s discourse is now clear; it is not accidental. It expressed the results of the illuminist belief incorporated in shaping the modern era as part of the great illumination awaiting us to implement the principles of the enlightened mind. ‘Endless light’ expresses the limitless potentials of the mind to enlighten the darkest corners of the space we dwell in.

As in the deconstruction of anything, the mind has endeavored to light up the dark corners of the libidinal instinctive forces in psychoanalysis. In architecture we see the same endeavor, to light up everything, so that the space gains a unified, inseparable and uninterrupted flow. This might be one of the greatest findings of modern architecture – flow of space, its continuity. ‘The borders have turned fluid: the space is envisioned as a flow’ claimed Moholy-Nagy. The expression ‘endless light’ is more meaningful than it initially appears; architecture is not only placed under light, it is open to light, its shapes in no way limit the light. This is because the projection of pure universal forms does not presume rigid and violent cuttings of space. Le Corbusier’s findings in architecture are related to a great synthesis of analytical fractures of space.

12 Le Corbusier, po aty, fq. 69
study which we encounter in many courses of modern art. Thus, the cubist deconstruction of internal structures which may appear simultaneously is presented there, as well as the movement and the enforced simultaneous dynamics of the Italian futurists. “all of this in architecture meant the possibility to explore a new different space – a space not enclosed in cubes, not contained statically within walls, foundation, roof, but a space simultaneously experienced from within and outside, seen from the observer in passing more than fixed in one point within the total composition”.13

Architecture and machine

Although modernists’ aspirations, especially those of Le Corbusier, have resulted in evident reduction, namely that of grounding the architectural expression on some pure geometric forms, those aspirations have advanced the architectural practice through an analytical treatment of space in different finding of its modeling and utilization. They have brought the new and different experiencing of space, necessary for the period of time and the frantic acceleration of development in the last century. Thus the affirmation of new aesthetics is fully linked to the challenges of time, ‘the important thing for those people was to develop a new aesthetic language, a language which might be useful to face the current problems’.14 It is through the constant and universal geometric shapes that they hoped to have channeled the development of architecture towards its proper path. In the accurate and clear articulation, both useful and practical, which crowns and resolves great engineering problems, the model to resolve architectural problems was found. Le Corbusier did not reach these decisions by some mysterious creative illumination – pure geometric shapes, or purism, was reached through close cooperation with Ozenfant, while the link of architecture with the industry and the machinery was reached through his work with Peter Behrens. In this path he spent time at Peter Behrens’ studio, where Gropius and Van Der Rohe were also alongside Le Corbusier for a while. This is an important turn in Le Corbusier’s formation, as there he faces the creative attempts to link design, architecture and industry for the first time. This was an important practical feature of architecture and another open path for further shaping of his vision in line with the needs of the era. This experience will impact Gropius and Van der Rohe so powerfully, that they will conclude this entire

13 Peter Blake, Master Builders, fq. 23.
14 Peter Blake, po aty, fq.16
search with their Bauhaus school, which radically changed the idea of design and architecture, shaping the style of modern life, designing our daily life. Although Corbusier will not be fully involved in the radical fictionalization we find in the German school, his experience in Behrens’ German school will be an important milestone in his carrier. Peter Blake and Charles Jencks, just like Keneth Frampton and other scholars, recognize this as a turning point in Le Corbusier’s search. Though Le Corbusier will not blindly follow the need for machinist efficiency and extreme functionality in his projections, this premise will always be present in his discourse. This is that duality which will always accompany his work. This is noted by Jencks when he writes “while attacking functionalism for lack of poetics he rejected Art Nouveau and formalism for lack of rigor’.15 What we have emphasized above on the importance of shape and poetics for Le Corbusier does not reject the other reference on efficiency and functionality of the machinist vision which is admired and inevitable in his Vers Une Architecture. Only through this influence of the German school can the presence of machinist art in Le Corbusier’s work be explained. This experience will reflect in his perception of new technological tendencies as an erected efficient model of architectural solutions.

In many engine vehicles (such as ferries, vehicles, airplanes) the solutions were more advanced, both aesthetically and practically – in the practical design and reduction of basic functions reflecting their beauty. This will naturally reflect on another and different aesthetical vision – the one we know as machinist art or machine aesthetics. Le Corbusier thought architecture remains intact only because of the ‘observing eyes’ which is why he made sure to emphasize through a photo montage great engineering achievements such as ferries and cathedrals. Le Corbusier writes: “Architects live with the simplicity of smallness of things they learn in schools, the ignorance of new construction rules and their concepts which go no further than kissing pigeons. But the ferry constructors, courageous and knowledgeable, construct buildings, next to which the cathedrals could look rather small: and then they let them float on the sea.”16 The engineering work has already started to change the entire world; it has started to give a different physiognomy to everything that surrounds us. The possibilities offered by technical and technological achievements redefine the architectural practice which is still enslaved within traditional schemes of construction. This for Le Corbusier ‘is tragic’ as in the spreading blindness the

15 Charles Jencks, Le Corbusier and the Tragic View of Architecture, fq.29
16 Le Cobrusier, Drejt një arkitekturë, fq.71
architects are not able to see the great social transformation that ‘everything has changed as a consequence of the machine’. Furthermore, everything has also changed with the overturn of this relation when the machine has become a goal. This is imposed as a model to express an era in the architectural works because ‘the core of architecture cannot emerge differently than from a certain state of things and time’. A consequence of this is the full change which Le Corbusier insists on. This change is radical and somehow should conform to the needs of time. “Whole cities must be constructed and reconstructed to ensure some basic comfort, the lack of which over time might jeopardize the social equilibrium. The society is moving; it cracks from the disorder of a 50-year-long progress which has changed the face of earth of more than 6-previous centuries”.17 Le Corbusier here clearly expresses an important feature of his discourse, that of architectural projection and social equilibrium which will provide an element, unknown to architecture of previous periods, to turn into a general emblem of revolution.

The machine enables uncountable possibilities to model anything. It clearly expresses the demiurgic spirit to be adopted in architectural projection. It is what enlivens everything through efficiency and organization. Le Corbusier writes: 'The creations form the machine techniques are organisms tending towards purity obeying the same rules of development as those natural objects which we admire'.18 In this discourse we encounter an infiltrating premise of the illuminist belief among thinkers of the Cartesian tradition. The Cartesian vision is not organic but rather mechanical – inherited among all of ‘the children of illuminism’ to whom Le Corbusier himself subscribes.

The notion of Deus ex machina of the Greek theater comes in handy here, strengthened by the fact that the machine here becomes god. The modeling of the machine expresses absolute superiority of artistic and architectural creation; it is an endless opportunity of animating the universal and avoiding the personal of the subjective in machine creation. Charles Jencks notes this well emphasizing the strengthened belief in the machine as an uncontaminated cosmic force; devoid of all special feature and as a pure finding of universalism. “Such sentiments might only be expressed by the person who can animate or personify the machine civilization into something of an ideal living being, being an atheist; Le Corbusier saw the machine as a pure cosmic

17 Le Corbusier, ibid., p.79.
18 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekture, p. 80.
force, uncontaminated by personal intervention”. The machine model is thus imposed spontaneously as a possibility to solve, in architecture too, the problems of time. The reflection of this way of thinking in architecture is more than evident. The kitchens of today have their current shape and order not by chance; they resemble the pilot’s cabin in an aircraft where the functions are within our reach – where we have such ergonomic solution of maximum performance within the minimum of primary functions. The same is projected in the apartment as a whole – it too must be efficient and functional in accord with the machine model. Le Corbusier writes about this: ‘A house is a machine to live in. bathrooms, the sun, hot water, cold water, temperature according to wish, preservation of food, hygiene, aesthetics of reports’. The new treatment of apartments according to the machine model is part of the great change – even Le Corbusier claims that ‘primary task of architecture is to reevaluate the values’ by which he touches directly on the issue of dwelling and ‘reassessing the elements of dwelling’.

This enthusiasm, characteristic of modernism is expressed among many thinkers, artists and architects of the period. Charles Jencks expresses this stance clearly when summarizing the many different thoughts to express the creators’ excitement with the machine and the spirit of the time modeled according to the machine. Thus Paul Valery has called the book ‘a machine to read’, Ozenfant e had named the painting ‘a machine that excites us’, Le Corbusier e has named the house ‘a machine for living’, Russian director Eisenstein had claimed that ‘theater is a machine to perform in’, whereas Marcel Duchamp, as Jencks claims, had taken this idealist metaphor to its logical extreme with his claim ‘the idea is a machine for making art’.

When Le Corbusier claimed that the abstraction gives a soul to the stone matter, this is to be viewed within this logical line of treating the machine as a creature of spirituality. Le Corbusier is identical with this stance to Theo van Doesburg, who had written: “Every machine is spirituality of an organism... the machine is, par excellence, a phenomenon of spiritual discipline ... The new artistic sensibility of 20th century has not only felt the beauty of the machine, it has also become aware on its endless expressive possibilities in art”. This

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20 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekture, p. 73.
22 Theo Van Doesburg, cituar sipas Charles Jencks, Moderni pokreti u arkitekturi, fq. 43.
is where the persistence to abstractionism and universality is based, both of which are qualities of the machine. The liberating features of the machine which Jencks notices with Van Doesburg are aimed towards social liberation which the machine enables.

**Architecture and revolution**

The exalting aims of architects to be part of the force which enables grand social change, the great liberation and mobilization, did not yield the expected results. More than having, as Bloch claims, made ‘the houses of today look like their half way in the making’, and having implemented the necessary mobilization of people for the needs of the time, they did not manage to accomplish the mission they have set themselves to change the society. The aims of modern architects, as well as those of Le Corbusier for great social change, did not reflect in their work as a precondition for the elaboration and the thinking behind the projects. These aims remain common for all of the modern architects, whose works have shaped up the architectural identity of the last two centuries. We might claim that Le Corbusier is an architect who would always express the great inclination for change in architecture clearly, such as to have a direct effect and impact in social change. Although this might seem a bit controversial reading his *Vers Une Architecture*, where he seeks for the change in architecture due to the great social changes of the 20th century, his work ends with him offering the alternative of choice between architecture and revolution in his chapter Architecture or Revolution.

His entire work is filled with great words, with the military intonation of what was happening in the society. Le Corbusier openly expresses the fact that a ‘new era is just starting’ and that architecture is the ‘mirror of time’. “A grand era is beginning. There is a new spirit. The dynamic industry, like a river flowing in its bed, brings us new and necessary tools for this period filled with new inspiration”.23 The inspiration does not seem to be just a wishful-thinking, since the new tools are the ones opening up the possibilities for the works emerging from new inspiration to become accomplished. For Le Corbusier it is easily possible for the social equilibrium to derive from architecture. He thinks that an industrial era man’s life experience should harmonize with a clear organization of the dwelling space. The dwelling space which must be compatible with the needs of time reflects the harmony and the necessary

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23 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekturë, fq. 187.
rhythm of existence in the new living context. He claims that ‘there is a great mismatch between the omnipresent modern mentality and a suffocating pile of centurial litter’.24 The modern mentality is what directly imposes the need for the ‘new code’ in architecture. This code is univalent and excludes any inclusion of unnecessary variables in pure architectural projection. This is because ‘architecture is facing a modified code. The constructive achievements are such as the old styles which have suppressed us cannot govern them any more; (...) there is a new explosion of form and rhythm, backed by constructive development, and a renewal in industrial orders and programs, of the residence or urban, which in the end present to our logic the true basic laws of architecture...’25 Le Corbusier sees this as ‘a revolution in the architectural concept’. Revolutionizing the architecture is inevitable a revolution of the society, a penetration into its most sensible core – the organization of a family’s daily life. The misery of living under the circumstances of social imbalance as a consequence of disorganization or unclear definition of dwelling space, a dwelling not suited with the flow of the mass energy, the circulation of capital and visible technological advancement, creates the destabilizing social dissatisfaction. The imbalanced social context and the possible consequences of unwanted developments have imposed the need to think out applicable

24 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekturre, fq. 243.
25 Le Corbusier, Drejt një arkitekturre, fq. 240.
solutions in order to soothe or balance the processes. For Le Corbusier this was architecture with its new program.

The alternative between architecture and revolution express the alternative between the accomplishment of a programmatic request of historical importance and a permanent disastrous threat for the society. Le Corbusier claims ‘historical mechanism which is tremendously shaken will swing between a program of historical importance and a disaster’.26

Here Le Corbusier sees the great mission of architecture, entering the general discursive scheme of the need to reshape the dwelling space in order to directly reflect on the grand social change. The entire social equilibrium depends on the issue of dwelling. The dependency of social equilibrium from the resolution of the dwelling issue means to view architecture as a relevant force to resolve great social issues, and thus note any other possible violent social change which the political revolution bring about. Though the causes of social imbalance are reduced to dwelling, Le Corbusier nevertheless identifies an important aspect of spatial organization necessary to affirm the new society, outside the overthrowing political schemes.

Although Charles Jencks considers that it is the political moment which transcends and unifies modernist practices in general, Le Corbusier presents this issue beyond the political sphere, as in his alternative between architectures and revolution the violent political intervention is avoided for the great changes the society is facing. His firm conviction in the possibility of change through reorganization of space sets the modernist enthusiasm in architecture apart, and Le Corbusier is no exception in this case. His articulation of the alternative between architecture and revolution expresses only a prophetic orientation for final solutions of great social problems towards which modern architecture may lead. This sort of utopian belief is found among all modernist architects, being present in the implemented architectural projects of Le Corbusier, through the integration of utopian ideas, such as Phalanstere of Fourier in Unite d’Habitation. This work, perhaps best illustrates the attempt to find ideal social solutions through architecture by avoiding revolutions. As in all revolutionary schemes of modernism this too remains a monument with a sort of ‘balance between positive aims and negative consequences’ as Jencks would rightly put it.

What does the alternative between architecture and revolution express? Is it to do with some essential orientation of architecture? Can architecture avoid revolution? Can architecture with its special redimensioning accomplish the redimensioning of the society? Is architecture revolutionary and if so, how much?

Within the timeframe when this alternative was articulated by Le Corbusier, it clearly expresses something prophetic in the enthusiasm of modernists to change everything. This enthusiasm is a consequence of technological achievements and unexplored possibilities of the concrete, steel and glass as new elements of modeling which traditional architecture did not have at its disposal.

The current contextualization of the idea on revolution and architecture accounts for the great distancing this alternative has today. Should we not want to make the death of this premise so precise, as does Jencks with Pruitt-Igoe in Saint Louis, considering this building was a sort of final accomplishment of thinking the possibility on revolutionizing the society through architecture – this being a building inspired by the most sublime thoughts of CIAM on the equilibrating social effect of architectural projection – then we have to consider the functioning of architecture in much more complex relations with politics and power. Such a relation is found elaborated in Foucault’s study. The deconstruction of very sophisticated structures of power and might make him reach the conclusion that they are outside any architect influence which makes them not be ‘masters of space’.

In thinking the architecture and revolution on can be assisted by the Neil Leach initiative, which recontextualizes this relation in the semantic and associative aspect of ‘historical memory and collective imagination’. The associative moment in architecture according to Leach remains very important to express a key difference between that which is political content and architectural form. This relation is only associative and semantic or even allegorical and reflects no inseparable bond between architecture and politics. On the contrary, the semantic and associative aspects account for some fragility of the presupposed bond between the two. Leach claims ‘while the building through association might seem very political, one must understand that politics is not an attribute of architectural form as such. The political content does not inhabit the architectural form; furthermore, it is embedded in it through a process which is precisely allegorical’.

is in this case only conceptual, as it is always embedded with some particular ideological perception. This is because the associative and semantic side exists 'only within timeframes.' The time and context limitation of the associative side of perceiving an architectural form presupposes some bond, though not an essential one, between politics and architecture, namely the architectural form. The change in the perception of a building, the associative changes of significance, express only the possible ‘reclaiming’ from the ‘other ideological imperatives’. Leachi supports this thesis on the many symbolic constructions of different ideological regimes which are today perceived differently or in which the primary significances have been ‘erased’ (such as the Berlin Olympic Stadium built in 1936 under the Nazis). The simple architectural form independent from ‘social context’, or even the cultural and ideological one, will hardly have some fixed ideological defined significance.

But, was Le Corbusier’s request for social change totally political? What did Le Corbusier mean by ‘revolution’? It seems that the labeling his contemporaries give him on the affection to bolshevism, fascism and the qualifications that he is a micro-bourgeois, only tell us of some uncertainty and twisted understanding Le Corbusier had on the notion of revolution. The notion of revolution is in this case inseparable from his machinist vision and engineering efficiency. The machinist vision projects some modeling of harmonized and efficient social functioning. Only this aspect gives coherence to his discourse in which the revolution reflects the way of functional and coordinated organizing of space with current actions of vibrant industrialization. Naturally there have been contents of utopian visions injected in this model, as we have seen in the case in Unite. But the accomplishment of this vision was mostly based on the machinist model – as the machine is an uncontaminated force and as such equilibrated by itself. McLeod enters quite well into this aspect of the impact efficiency and industrial rationalization of production has (especially those of Taylorism and Fordism) in Le Corbusier’s vision. He claims that “during the 1920’s Le Corbusier, as many of his German contemporaries, considered Taylorism and the serial production as a fundamental component of social renewal. While aesthetic suggestions of mechanical repetition and standardization have echoed in many of his formal principles, the promise of industrial efficiency and added productivity have enabled him to perceive architecture as a social means”.

Reviewing the bond between architecture and politics is a great assistance to finding the meaning which the alternative expressed by Le Corbusier has for architecture or revolution, or even for the impact which architecture might have in possible social change. The inability of finding political content in architectural form only strengthens Le Corbusier’s argument that ‘nobody can make a politician out of him’ since he saw himself only as an architect and nothing else. In this line should Le Corbusier’s understanding of revolution be viewed – as a change conditioned by the modeling of the society in accord with the machinist model.

The modernist vision formed on such premises of a great promise of change has made many things in architecture be redefined and architecture to be redefined in line with new requirements. It has shaped and given form to an advanced way of defining space and form. Its heritage remains engaging and inevitable in architectural projection. The embracing of modernist architecture or its premises means necessary development towards adequate non-dogmatic application, not as was done in the majority of cases, when the insistence on exclusively functional and rational solutions has deprived the language and the content of modernist architecture. The deprivation of architectural language, reduction into abstract shapes, simplified functional solutions, extreme rationalization, barren universality; all of these are a continuation of dogmatic development of architecture, non-flexible application of modernist solid
premises. These consequences have caused that which is known as the crisis of modernism in architecture. Naturally, Le Corbusier deserves a great credit for this. However, the unwanted direction the development of modernism in architecture took, in as much as this was a continuation of implementing Le Corbusier’s principles, remains a responsibility for those who in a non-reflexive way have embraced his principles. His personal inconsequence might have been a sufficient guide for richer and more creative solutions. Apart from the rigorous affirmation of theoretic premises of modernism, Le Corbusier can be seen as a reference for a search more complex than the limiting and simplifying formulations of an abstract and reduced functionalism and rationalism. This is because Le Corbusier’s personal inconsistency in his architectural accomplishments is in favor of search free from closed and absolute discursive construction.

**Architecture and liberation**

It is true that Le Corbusier has always affirmed a coherent discourse for the functioning and the role of architecture. He has fanatically affirmed the revolutionary aspect of modern architecture. It is also true that the social change has always followed his architectural and urban vision. The early period of his creativity is perhaps fully indulged in the idea of an irreplaceable
influence of architecture in society – especially of the architecture redefined in line with universal and rational principles. But how does one explain what happens in his following period of work accompanied by a lot of controversy, a period in which we do not have the necessary revolutionary consistency in his projections? It seems that this controversy in Le Corbusier of the neuralgic point from which to find or seek the answers for many unsaid things in his oeuvre, and the modernist project in general. His Ronchamp Chapel remains an inexplicable challenge for the modernist project in architecture. Many claims were made about what this building represents and how it is contextualized within a fixed universal modernist system which Le Corbusier himself preached and with which modernism identified in general. This was the reason why this work stirred a lot of reaction among architects of modernist provenience, due to the inability of putting it inside some template constructed on clear rationalist premises. On the construction of Ronchamp Chapel, Peter Blake claims that Le Corbusier is the architect "of cube and cylinder who returned to architecture the magical world of plastic forms...which were obviously lacking in the work of all modernists, apart from perhaps Frank Lloyd Wrightt’. 29

The many elements of irrationality, affirmation of imaginative and plastic form, contrary to the rational ones of the mind in Ronchamp Chapel, have made his disciples perceive this as some sort of treason to the great project, to which Le Corbusier had not only belonged, but had passionately affirmed during his entire life. In Ronchamp Chapel the irrational incentive of solutions in form had culminated, as it did in some other works, such as the Mandrot and Jaoul houses, were we see a return of pre-industrial and traditional elements which do not comply with reduced rational forms or constructive serial developments. Scully says of the above works that ‘academicians of my generation still remember the students of the 1940s who had condemned Le Corbusier for what they considered a general treason of the machine era and machine aesthetics, despite everything he previously preached and believed. Their mistake, naturally encouraged from his debates, consists in the fact that they considered him as a conceptual artist and as a prescriptive prophet first and foremost’. 30 This search out of Le Corbusier’s affirmed conceptual schemes, Scully justifies by considering him an ‘instinctive artist’.

29 Peter Blake, Master Builders, fq. 136
30 Vincent Scully, Modern Architecture and Other Essays, p. 134
One of the critics to have fanatically and persistently affirmed the modern project, Giulio Carlo Argan had reacted in a latter, after the projection of Ronchamp Chapel, to Ernest Rogers’ evaluation, expressing his ‘deep disagreement’ with what Le Corbusier had done. This reaction of Argan is indicative for a simple reason; it is a reaction following all of the universal principles of modernism which at the same time reveals still unarticulated initiatives on the possible future development or reviewing of modern architecture. He starts by initially insisting to find an answer on what id the meaning of this design ‘in the totality of the internal links of an artist’s work. Are we dealing with a crisis of conscience, a u-turn or sudden enlightenment’?

Argan identifies a very symptomatic point on Le Corbusier, be it for his discourse, or his oeuvre in general. The imaginative game in Ronchamp Chapel with the shape emerging outside rigorous rational and abstract precisions, Le Corbusier goes totally against the persistence to finding primary shapes which revolutionize the architecture as a whole. On the other hand, the social change is not linked at all to the mystical feelings of religiousness which Le Corbusier expresses in this work. This is why Argan claims that Le Corbusier was an architect involved in social issues and as such never in his past gave us a reason to doubt that behind a ‘rational rigor’ in him there was ‘always a spark of some mystical fire’. Argan treats Le Corbusier’s work based on full coherence of modernist premises – and one among the main ones was the social aspect. Because according to him “the modern architecture has determined its expressing manner based on a certain way of understanding the society (...) Resulting from this social postulate, it has formulated the premises and sketched its processes in the rationalist and functionalist sense. Le Corbusier knows this well, and in order to ‘overcome’ rationalism (...) found no better solution from the one of debating with rationalism and accomplish the apology of the irrational and finally, totally arbitrarily, identify it with religion”. Even in the application of functionalism principles in Ronchamp Chapel, Argan sees a mystification of purpose, as any functional solution of the uneven grounding, without ‘axial obstacles’ which leads you towards the Church altar is for him ‘disgusting’, as for him Le Corbusier from the ‘machine a habiter’ is not inventing the ‘machine a prier’. Argan identifies in the Ronchamp Chapel a very religious moment and mystifying moment which contradicts with the enlightened principles of rationalism. It is important though that Argan in Ronchamp Chapel identifies something

31 Gulio Carlo Argan, Arkitektura i kultura, Logos/Split, 1989 p. 176-177
32 Gulio Carlo Argan, ibid., p. 178
which will later remain a clear motto and consciously aimed for the reviewing of modernist discourse. While analyzing the Ronchamp shape he notices some of baroque style in it. This element of baroque is taken not as a loan from traditional forms of 17th century but as a ‘style of sustainable equality which endures under culture’. All of the turned and broken lined, its bimorph rhythm, everything in there, according to Argan, is baroque. But he thinks that there is something included there which does not belong to baroque, something entirely in the spirit of modernism, namely the white walls and the small windows which are ‘ordered with a refined elegance’. He sees these elements as loans from neoplasticism and Mondrian. Argan sees this mix as a huge unconscious drawback of Le Corbusier. He even thinks that here we are not only dealing with ‘eclecticism’. Argan claims that ‘in this unification of forms opposed in their historical origin and semantic value I feel the tendency towards the mix of styles and the profane, which I know are unconscious, but still insulting, both when linked to the theme of religiousness, and also the full secularism of neoplasticism and Mondrian. Peeled to their formal core, two different symbologies confront here’. The opposing of stylistic elements within one construction make Argan see it as an undoing of the abstract order of pure forms which modernism aspires. In Ronchamp Chapel the first hybrid of mixture is affirmed, which for the modernist purism is inacceptable. This is because, as Argan put it, included there are “on one hand, the signs of what was the most naïve and least dangerous of European rationalist utopia, the final act of illuminist belief in the mind, and on the other, the surpassing of the rational credo, the elevation of inspiration and arbitrariness, parentheses”.

Argan finally finds the direction of natural development or logical evolution of architecture towards the style mixing and enrichment of architectural language which will later develop into postmodernist discourse. He identifies the first indexes, the first creative sparks of Le Corbusier in order to find other and different paths of expression outside the limitations presented to himself in his own discourse. This is some sort of a creative liberation moment from the doctrinary belonging to a program which exhausts the self into unnecessary impoverishment into abstract form. As paradoxical as it this work may seem, or appear that it is opposed to the discursive structure of Le Corbusier, what remains to be viewed is the framework of creative search of forms outside the architectural of the mind. Perhaps these are the first sparks

33 Gulio Carlo Argan, ibid., p. 179

34 Gulio Carlo Argan, ibid., p. 179
of the creative temptation which should avoid simplifying violent limitations, perhaps it is the necessary direction of modern architecture development outside the reductive models in the future. This can perhaps be only an internal awakening of an artist like Le Corbusier on the need to open the possibilities for other prospects of architectural solutions. Maybe, in the later period of Le Corbusier’s work such a hypothesis sparks, not put in the theoretic context of his work, but made concrete in accomplishing more complex – plastic forms where the premise of elementary abstract forms of orthogonal geometry is overlooked. Perhaps, this was an unconscious message for all of the blind appliers of ready-made formulae leading to alienation of entire cities. This multitude of perhaps is not accidentally behind the thought in Le Corbusier’s work. Had this perhaps lead the accomplishments of modern architects who blindly implemented Le Corbusier’s principles, it would most probably reflect in flexible solutions of architectural forms. This unfaithfulness of Le Corbusier was not a fully articulated achievement on what the tendency in architecture should be. On the contrary, he never presented or thought these solutions in the way he had affirmed the abstract, rational, and functional and machinist solutions in his theory. In theory he remains always coherent on what the path towards architecture should be. In his theory or discourse they preserve a somewhat axiomatic character, necessary and indisputable. The axiomatic character of new architecture principles in Le Corbusier’s discourse is what gave shape to the modernist expression and identity. The modernist architecture in Le Cobusier’s discourse finds clearer and summarizing formulation on its autonomy. Of course the consequent developments of modernist architecture based on these formulations have not resulted to what the expectations were. All of the solutions formed on the principles of abstraction, rationalism, functionalism, and universalism have not found the necessary application, apart from the unformulated search and wandering which could have been a somewhat different solution in line with complex requests. Furthermore, they were imposed with their violent and neglecting character to many contexts they were applied on. Modernist architecture with its exclusive character (of uncompromised shaping of the architectural contexts) was gradually corrected, and is now in the undetermined path of inclusive complex solutions. This is a necessary path to liberate from the burden of sealed discourse and to open up prospects of freedom of imaginative architectural search. This should be the natural development of architecture. Strangely this development in architecture does not mean lack of loyalty to Le Corbusier, but rather a loyalty to the disloyalty of Le Corbusier himself.
**Bibliography**


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**Fehmi Agani**

*(The founder of sociological studies in Albanian language)*

The work of Academician Fehmi Agani (1932 – 1999) is renowned in Albanian lands for its scientific discourse and practical action as well as for its balance in the context of scientific works and the humanist and patriotic activity. As a critical and creative intellectual and particular expert, Agani is known for his education in the traditions of the humanism of social thought with the aim of human liberation. He is known for his interest and deep knowledge about a wide range of human sciences such as general sociology and political sociology, social and political theory, the theory and practice of social movements, and methodology.

Fehmi Agani is also known for founding sociological studies as an academic discipline for the first time in Albanian in the former Yugoslavia at the Philosophical Faculty in Pristina;

Agani is known for founding the Instituti Filozofi-Sociologji (Philosophical and Sociological Institute) at the University of Prishtina and also for the founding of the journal *Studia Humanistica and Thema* – where he was the chief editor; and for overseeing doctoral studies in sociology, among other things.

Fehmi Agani is generally known for his founding role in the development of educational, research, scientific and academic institutions including the University of Prishtina and the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences, which played a decisive role in the development of emancipation and equality, in the development of individual and collective human rights, and in expanding the areas of human freedoms and national freedom. 'There can be no democratisation,' said Agani, ‘without the human component, without respect for individuals, and their work and dignity.' This freedom and these rights were, according to him, interconnected but they retained their individual features and could not be merged into one another.

After finishing his studies at the University of Belgrade, in the late 1950s, as one of the most distinguished students and also one of the rare Albanian
intellectuals of that time who gave an identity to their generation, Agani returned to Kosovo. With extraordinary intellectual courage he became committed to finding means of institutional development of the rights of Albanian citizens, from increasing the educational network of faculties and senior schools, and founding the first public Albanian language university in the former Yugoslavia to the founding of the Albanological Institute to continue later with the demand for Kosovo’s constitutional status to be upgraded to the level of a Republic, within the federation of the time.

From the 1970s not only was Agani a trenchant analyst but also an active participant, from working with the organizers of the student demonstrations of ‘68, to public and substantial support of their demands, and also distinguished in his commitment to founding the University of Prishtina; He was committed to national academic collaboration, to literary Albanian and to affirming the decisions of the Congress on spelling as progress for national linguistic identity through which the process begun with the Congress of Manastir would be developed further.

Fehmi Agani was one of the founders of the University of Prishtina, the highest public institution for education, and the only one in all the Albanian lands of the SFRY where teaching was organised in Albanian. The loudest call for the foundation of the University of Prishtina came from Fehmi Agani himself along with some of his colleagues such as Gazmend Zajmi, Ali Hadri, Mark Krasniqi and Dervish Rozhaja. From that period onwards, Professor Agani was one of the most acclaimed people, and one with the most influence, in the University of Prishtina. He led with ideas, initiatives and their practical realisation, with many selected collaborators, but he had no equal as a supreme authority of reason with his open but scientific character. Despite the political differentiation from the official communist establishment, as a form of obscurantist punishment like excommunication – with economic and social repercussions; despite assassination attempts, frequent arrests, being called in for questioning, and constant threats, Agani took part in the most dangerous enterprises for the development of national consciousness and the liberation of his country, and naturally he became the moral authority with the most influence and most accepted by students, intellectuals, and Albanian citizens in general in the Albanian lands of the former Yugoslavia.

From the discussions I had with Agani, I remember his explanation that the opening of the first faculties in Serbian in Pristina was part of the programme
to colonise Kosovo. This was done with the aim of having a systematic flow of Serbian students and professors into Kosovo. Some Chairs, such as the Russian Chair, were even planned to be established in the centre for these studies at the level of the SFRY.

As someone knowledgeable about Serbian national systematic discriminatory policies and practices, which seemed to prove once again the saying by Voltaire that there are both individuals, but also peoples, among whom evil prevails, Agani was notable for his commitment to unmasking evil, institutions built on lies, the politics of force and faits accomplis, systematic oppression and that of pre-meditated state terror, even as far as the ethnic cleansing exercised against the Albanians.

The ethnic cleansing of non-Slav communities: primarily of Albanians but also of Germans, Hungarians and Italians, was seen as the final solution to the issue of national minorities in the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

The author of the notorious memorandums for ethnic cleansing of Albanians and non-Slav communities in Yugoslavia: The Expulsion of the Albanians Memorandum, 1937; and The Minority problem in the New Yugoslavia, Memorandum, 1944., was Vasa Čubrilović, Serbian academician, member of SANU (the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts), nominated for the KACKJ (Këshilli Antifashist i Çlirimit Kombëtar te Jugosllavise or Anti-fascist Council for National Liberation of Jugoslavia), the highest prize awarded for extraordinary merit. The memorandums of Cubrilovic proposes concrete ways to solve the ‘Albanian issue’ with ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo ‘since it is impossible to repress Albanians just with gradual colonisation’ (V Čubrilović, 1937).

Fehmi Agani managed to persuade the chair of the KACKJ prizegiving committee, who was Slovenian, not to award a prize to the author of the ‘expulsion of the Albanians’ racist project. It worked. Fehmi Agani prevented Vasa Čubrilović, racist Serbian politician and academician, with influence in Yugoslavia, from receiving the KACKJ prize. What intellectual courage, theoretical knowledge and practical skills were needed to prevent Vasa Čubrilović from receiving the prize for which he was nominated at a
time when the LKJ (Lidhja Komuniste e Jugosllavisë or Yugoslav Communist League) which made official policy was dominated and led by Serbs.

Fehmi Agani, Gazmend Zajmi and friends were intellectuals engaged in the organisation of student revolt in the demonstrations of ’68 for the opening of the University in Albanian in Pristina, for equal rights for ethnically Albanian citizens and against discrimination, in lobbying for the articulation and the protection of fair and legitimate requests from citizens.

The demonstrations of ’68 and the opening of the University of Pristina marked the two crowning events where Fehmi Agani was among the main protagonists.

Universities holding the fate of the society where they were created and where they work, like the University of Prishtina, are rare. Agani stressed that this could be said because the University of Prishtina expresses through its very being the aims and develops the aspirations and peculiarities of being and of development but also the difficulties and contradictions of this development. Professors with universal emancipation and developed national awareness, who are sensitive and responsible like Agani, lead the processes and the increased development of institutions. According to Agani, general Albanian emancipation would inevitably bring a solution for the difficulties of the time for Albanian citizens in Kosovo and beyond.

Loud and public agitation for the Republic of Kosovo began with Professor Fehmi Agani’s discussions from 1967 as part of political activism in Gjakova. Testimony to his work are the members of Group R, the group for Kosovo as a Republic which Professor Agani led and which included also Gazmend Zajmi, Ali Hadri, Dervish Rozhaja and Rezak Shala.

Later he was noted for his ceaseless commitment to protecting the Kosovan Constitution of 1974. In 1984, as a consequence of the ‘process of political differentiation’ an obscurantist group, as Agani himself called it, expelled him, together with Gazmend Zajmi, from teaching and from the leadership of studies for the Doctorate of Sociology. From 1989 to 1990, Agani was committed to the organisation of a political movement of a Kosovan character, specifically to the organisation of the peaceful active movement for the independence of the Republic of Kosovo.
He was the author or co-author of the majority of appeals, protests and documents against Serbian institutional oppression in Kosovo.

Agani publically repeated the observation that the xenophobia that was evident in Serbia and Yugoslavia against Albanians was a new Serbian fascism, while he called Milošević’s rule, ‘Sultanism’.

Working together, and with a commitment to unifying the political movement amongst themselves, and to the unification of the military movement amongst themselves, as well as to unifying the political movement with the military during the last war in Kosovo, in 1998-9, Agani showed himself until the end to be a first among equals. This integrating role of Agani’s had a tangible impact and was also reflected in the successful work of the Kosovo Delegation at the Rambouillet Conference. According to the most well-known contemporary US diplomat and negotiator, and active participant in the Conference, Ambassador Chris Hill, Agani distinguished himself during that time for the sharpness of his reasoning and his fine sense of dialogue, for his culture of co-operation and his moral authority which united people, for his unswerving commitment to the best possible solution to the Kosovo question in the context of the war and Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In this way he contributed to the most realistic solution to the Albanian issue in the Balkans and relationships in the Balkans in general.

The scientific and professional work of Fehmi Agani was also fruitful, particularly during the ’eighties and ’nineties when he was published in various periodicals and academic collections in Kosovo and abroad, in special works. In these works, Agani dealt with the issue of the development of social and political opinion from Ancient Greece where to be free meant to deal with politics with the aim of promoting and achieving the idea of general good, peace, happiness and human wellbeing. These are themes whose systematic treatment would be begun by the founding classes of society and politics in Plato’s ‘state’ and Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, from antiquity to the first thinkers of the New Age, from Machiavelli to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. The treatment of fear as a principle of despotism, in line with Montesquieu, and the sovereignty of the people in line with J.J. Rousseau, from the ultilitarians to the classics of sociology and politics such as A.Comte, K.Marx, E.Durkheim and M.Weber; to the representatives of elitist theory such as Vilfredo Pareto; Gaetano Mosca; and Robert Michels of the modern theories of Wright Mills.
and Karl Mannheim, and theories of fascism and neoconservatism. Some of these works were published in a special volume ‘On the trends of sociological thought’ (Prishtine, 1990), which even today is the most important work in Albanian on social thought;

He published important works on the Albanian political parties; he was the author and co-author of sociology textbooks; a collaborator in various scientific research projects; valuable sociological translations such as *The basis of general sociology* by Ante Fiamengo, a work which influenced the affirmation of sociology in Eastern Europe too, following the Stalinist dictatorship; Themes from the sociology of daily social and political life in Kosovo, which represent a wealth of ideas and competent treatments of the issues which even today have not lost their relevance.

Continuing his fruitful creativity, in exceptional circumstances, Agani will deal the relationship between areas such as democracy, country, and self-determination, categories that are also in the title of his next book: ‘Democracy, Nation, and Self-determination’, (Prishtinë, 1994), in which he also problematises the relationship between individual and collective rights, the relationships between minorities and majorities and between equality and democracy. “The path to the creation of our nation has been hard”, said Agani, “barriers and blows, many attempts at eliminating our nationality. The creation of a nation has to be achieved in the context of long foreign rule, in conditions of permanent threat. Extraordinary spiritual strength is required, and extraordinary work, courage and a readiness to be sacrificed, a long view and the commitment to achieving the creation of a nation, to bringing together and protecting, strengthening and nurturing the things we have in common such as language and culture, such as shared interests and a sense of belonging.” Agani constantly stressed that the solution that envisaged Kosovo remaining in Yugoslavia dispossessed and alienated Kosovars from Kosovo. A Kosovo of Kosovars right up to self-determination, meaning its democratisation, were the two main premises for a sustainable solution to the Kosovo question. ‘It is not difficult to prove,’ Agani said, ‘that the calls for Kosovo’s independence are in essence European.’

Agani devoted substantial study to the issue of self-determination. In support of social developmental tendencies Agani stated publically his identification of Kosovan independence as the only solution to the issue. And he viewed
independent Kosovo as the most realistic solution to the Albanian issue in the Balkans, and to relationships in the Balkans in general. Self-determination, as the general right of all peoples ‘is fundamentally democratic, the essential expression of democracy... it is connected and interwoven with individual human rights... as collective rights, the right of communities it can be neither reduced to nor absorbed into individual human rights’

Agani went on to stress explicitly ‘for it to be realised, the right of self-determination presupposes the safe freedom of expression of the will of the people in question. Thus referenda, voting or other processes in which the entire population take part, are preconditions for its realisation.’ This treatment of the principle of self-determination as a right and an obligation occurred in a time of conditions, relationships, and interconnected international positions on the issue of Kosovo which could not be solved without respect for the fundamental right for self-determination and independence. ‘The solution for Kosovo cannot be other than in accordance with international principles, clearly stated, and with the will, also clearly stated, of the people of Kosovo,’ stressed Agani. In his own work, Agani raised at an academic level the issue of the right to self-determination for Albanians in Kosovo.

At the same time that this legitimate right, articulated through the peaceful movement of Albanian citizens in Kosovo, was not acknowledged in Kosovo, within Bosnia and Herzegovina the Republika Srpska was recognised – a result of Serb state genocide against Bosnian Muslim civilians which represented the largest genocide since the Second World War. In challenging the Serb policy of fait accompli, Agani elaborated:

‘If the existence of two Albanian states is a problem for the world, this problem is not impossible to solve because a way can be found for us not to remain as two states but to become one’ (1997, 160-1).

The concept of freedom and tolerance became in the end one of the two fundamental concepts of Professor Agani’s sociological and political thinking.

In the last part of his life Professor Agani was increasingly involved with the issue of civil society. In his work, ‘On civil society’ Agani came to the conclusion that the failure of Serbia was evidence of a failure not in the efforts to ‘preserve’ Yugoslavia but actually a failure in the creation of civil society.
In Kosovo Europe was protected, wrote Agani, citizens’ rights were protected, the values of universal rights were protected: Freedom, Peace, Equality.

Agani, the professor of freedom, not only loved freedom, he also knew what freedom was and wanted others to know; Those who know what we should do with freedom, how to rise to the heights of the idea of freedom, to know ‘what will happen to us now without the Barbarians?’

Agani’s treatment of the contribution and the role of the French encyclopedists who preceded the Revolution of freedom and equality between people in Europe is a reminder of the similar influence of the Albanian encyclopedists in the Ottoman Empire. Hasan Tasini, the first Rector of the first Turkish university and Sami Frashëri, the greatest encyclopedist of Turkey preceded the liberation and independence of Albania.

With their contribution in theory and practice, a whole generation of Kosovan encyclopedists such as Fehmi Agani, Gazmend Zajmi, Mark Krasniqi, Ali Hadri, Hasan Mekuli, and Dervish Rozhaja, preceded the systematic development of Kosovo’s equality and the affirmation of the right to self-determination as far as liberation, as far as independence. Like many other worthy colleagues and collaborators, not many of these distinguished intellectuals with their creative role had the chance to enjoy the independence of Kosovo.

An era of sociology, political philosophy and politics began and ended with Fehmi Agani here – an era of its foundation and development on a humanist base. It’s the era when social and political thought in Kosovo and about the question of Kosovo was a great dialogue with Agani as an original contributor, as polemic or as a required point of reference.

Fehmi Agani created a dignified figure of the Kosovan professor which engendered a feeling of pride in the authority and respect which he enjoyed among human scientists at home and abroad.

Fehmi Agani is one of the most distinguished experts in sociology and Albanian politics of the second half of the twentieth century. With his analytical writings and his sociological and political studies, for nearly half a century Academician Agani was a synonym for academic originality, for sharp, independent and critical thinking on the all-encompassing social developments among us and around us. A unique voice, responsible and
committed to justice, and to the interests and aspirations of our country raised to an academic level – when it was rare for someone to dare to listen; a committed, creative and courageous intellectual who publicly unmasked the Serb state institutionalisation of crimes against humanity, as a means and an end, in the form of Serb collective crime in Kosovo too, and in the form of the institutionalisation of lying, of segregation, of systematic discrimination, of invasion and of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

His independent professional identity, his characteristic invention in setting out issues and creative solutions, the lightness of his writing and the clarity of his independent thought on independence itself were the characteristics which permeate the rich academic and political works of Agani.

Agani’s contribution through his academic work for the unconditional recognition of the right to self-determination and the independence of Kosovo, as well as through his practical activism, make him constantly a major figure in Albanian life of the second half of the twentieth century.

By the time Fehmi Agani was executed in 1999, by firing squad regular Serbian police, he had established himself as one of the central figures in Albanian life, through his ideas, his writings, his activity for freedom and his influence on social processes and his influence on other social thinkers.
On the slopes of the Rumija Mountain

Author: Mitja Guštin

The book entitled On the Slopes of the Rumija Mountain (Littera picta, Ljubljana, 2012) by the Slovenian author Mitja Guštin is a general monograph on the life in and around Rumija mountain in Montenegro. By presenting the pastoral transhumance in the shore of Shkodra Lake, the author has managed to present quite interesting data on the past and the present life in the wide area between Shkodra Lake and the city of Bar.

The book, published simultaneously in Montenegrin, Albanian and English, brings in its 106 pages many findings of ethnographic, archeological, architectural and historical character, as well as memories of people interviewed and those of the author himself. The comparative study of transhumance and vernacular architecture in wider Balkan areas is also of great significance, adding to the value of this useful book.

The book observes pastoral transhumance during the summer period moving from mountain to the field, next to Shkodra Lake, and not as would usually occur during the hot season, i.e. from the field to the mountain. The author explains: The migration of farmers from mountains dried in burning sun to the lake shore under Virpazar, rich in water and grass, was aimed at saving the animals from the harsh conditions of feeding and thirst, characteristic of Muriqi i Sipërm and other mountainous villages during summer, as well as at enabling people to make a living from farming.

Though the book was dedicated mostly to Nesla and Selim Muratoviq and their pastoral transhumance, it comprises the entire past and the present of the Albanians living in the slopes of Rumija mountain which separates the Shkodra Lake and Virpazar from the Adriatic Sea spreading all the way to the city of Bar. Other old families of these areas are also presented in the book, namely...
the Alibashiq, Llukoliq and Maleviq families, as well as a part of their material culture inherited from their ancestors. A rich tradition, not only pastoral but rural as well, is presented as part of the material culture of villages Ostros, Godinjë, Kërnica, Katanikiq, Gjuravc, Muriq i Poshtëm and Muriq i Sipërm. One of the chests of Lukoviq family is a good example of this (photo 72).

The vernacular architecture is presented in full in this publication with all of the environmental adaptations and the living necessities of the people dwelling in high mountains. Stone houses with arched doors made by stone-carvers (53, 66, 69, 90, and 95), animal storages (66, 67) and other supporting facilities for livestock and food as well as cattle farms are presented. One also encounters sacral buildings, churches and mosques, as well as old and new buildings (photos 31, 32, 33, 52, 53) which speak of transformations in different times and of foreign influences and conquests, as well as of the taste of tradition and the desire to return to the hearths and graves of the forefathers. The author describes in detail the Church of Gjurovc village, built in line with the sacral Roman architectural tradition.

The book highlights the great changes and life dynamics among villagers which have made the traditional ways of farming and agriculture slowly fade into history. In the case of Nesla and Selim's family, the tradition has transformed into a healthy production and a tourist attraction.
The author also notes that the rural architecture, particularly the houses of Muratoviq, Alibashiq and Llukuliq families, relate to the Albanian Muslim inhabitants. The presence of churches with old graves is only a testimony of previous Christian identity of the villagers in the area of Rumija mountain.

The book contains 101 high quality illustrations, including blueprints of the vernacular architecture. The subtitle of the book *Reflections on the life by Shkodra Lake and vernacular architecture* is related to chapters and subchapters entitled *Life by the lake, Arrival to Vir Pazar – Is this the end or Paradise?, In the village -


Such a mixture of documentary material and text, offered in a clear scientific language and literary inspiration which the environment and the interviewees enable, make the book quite useful and attractive for both researchers and other readers.